Tue Jan 20, 2009 5:33 pm
Pete
I remember reading somewhere online that Robin Olds got behind the same idea-hang a drop tank and a 500lb bomb under P-51's and go after the strategic targets in Europe with much greater accuracy, much smaller logistics, and 9/10 less crew risk. The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town.
I'm pretty sure that was mainly the 20th Fighter Group. They had the Droop Snoot bombardier ships and wanted to protect them, so, they made it look like all of the P-38s had that line across the nose so it would be harder for an enemy aircraft to tell that one of the planes was unarmed. I still remember one of the 20th FG guys talking about what a difference it might've made if the AF had invested in a large number of P-38 squadrons with bombs lined up behind the Droop Snoots. Once they dropped their bombs they were able to fight their own way home. Cheaper in manpower and possibly just as effective.
Ryan
I remember reading somewhere online that Robin Olds got behind the same idea-hang a drop tank and a 500lb bomb under P-51's and go after the strategic targets in Europe with much greater accuracy, much smaller logistics, and 9/10 less crew risk. The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town.
Tue Jan 20, 2009 6:35 pm
michaelharadon wrote:I remember reading somewhere online that Robin Olds got behind the same idea-hang a drop tank and a 500lb bomb under P-51's and go after the strategic targets in Europe with much greater accuracy, much smaller logistics, and 9/10 less crew risk. The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town.
The problem is a bit more than glory. Great accuracy might be achieved (debatable - no sights at med/high alt, and low level attacks to strategic targets are a difficult call).
The real issue is when the fighters are bounced on the way in, they drop the bomb and the tank, and the mission's aborted. Carrying on with the bomb/tank would be suicide, and tangling with the Luftwaffe is only a secondary objective.
Cheers,
Tue Jan 20, 2009 7:18 pm
JDK wrote:michaelharadon wrote:I remember reading somewhere online that Robin Olds got behind the same idea-hang a drop tank and a 500lb bomb under P-51's and go after the strategic targets in Europe with much greater accuracy, much smaller logistics, and 9/10 less crew risk. The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town.
The problem is a bit more than glory. Great accuracy might be achieved (debatable - no sights at med/high alt, and low level attacks to strategic targets are a difficult call).
The real issue is when the fighters are bounced on the way in, they drop the bomb and the tank, and the mission's aborted. Carrying on with the bomb/tank would be suicide, and tangling with the Luftwaffe is only a secondary objective.
Cheers,
True enough, but in fairness, this would've forced the Germans into a tough situation. The 20th FG apparently flew a number of bombing missions like this and it wasn't so easy for the Germans to tell which groups to attack. Now there was no difference between the fighters and the bombers. You could put up similar formations of bombers and fighters and have them fly at similar courses and speeds. Would likely have been a bit more difficult for the Germans to attack. You wouldn't know if you were attacking a group of bombers or fighters.
Ryan
Tue Jan 20, 2009 11:55 pm
JDK wrote:michaelharadon wrote:The problem is a bit more than glory. Great accuracy might be achieved (debatable - no sights at med/high alt, and low level attacks to strategic targets are a difficult call).
The real issue is when the fighters are bounced on the way in, they drop the bomb and the tank, and the mission's aborted. Carrying on with the bomb/tank would be suicide, and tangling with the Luftwaffe is only a secondary objective.
Be that as it may, "strike fighters" have been tasked against strategic targets in US doctrine for a long time -- at least since Vietnam, and probably during Korea, too.
That same jettison issue exists today, and it doesn't keep fighters from being able to stiffarm their way into the target to deliver their ordnance.
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:10 am
JDK wrote:michaelharadon wrote:I remember reading somewhere online that Robin Olds got behind the same idea-hang a drop tank and a 500lb bomb under P-51's and go after the strategic targets in Europe with much greater accuracy, much smaller logistics, and 9/10 less crew risk. The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town.
The problem is a bit more than glory. Great accuracy might be achieved (debatable - no sights at med/high alt, and low level attacks to strategic targets are a difficult call).
The real issue is when the fighters are bounced on the way in, they drop the bomb and the tank, and the mission's aborted. Carrying on with the bomb/tank would be suicide, and tangling with the Luftwaffe is only a secondary objective.
Cheers,
I neglected to include that fighter cover would have been provided by fighters unencumbered by bombs. Olds' point was that much greater accuracy could be achieved with much less loss of men and machines.
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:30 am
Randy Haskin wrote:JDK wrote:michaelharadon wrote:The problem is a bit more than glory. Great accuracy might be achieved (debatable - no sights at med/high alt, and low level attacks to strategic targets are a difficult call).
The real issue is when the fighters are bounced on the way in, they drop the bomb and the tank, and the mission's aborted. Carrying on with the bomb/tank would be suicide, and tangling with the Luftwaffe is only a secondary objective.
Be that as it may, "strike fighters" have been tasked against strategic targets in US doctrine for a long time -- at least since Vietnam, and probably during Korea, too.
That same jettison issue exists today, and it doesn't keep fighters from being able to stiffarm their way into the target to deliver their ordnance.
Looks like how you define 'strategic bombing' is an issue here, not to mention the change in unit weight of ordinace by aircraft agains the rather different oposition since. Randy's better positioned than I to ourtline the differences in aerial opposition 'fighter' sighting, AA(A) and sheer weight toted today compared to a W.W.II fighter.
I'm sorry, I don't see any correlation between 21st century fighter bombers and the 1930s and W.W.II strategic bomber doctrine and attempted implementation.
Right back to Douhet there's been debate about 'lots of little bombers' vs 'a few big bombers'. While there were and are issues with the bombing campaign in Europe, clearly Olds knew all the answers.
However, like swapping the four engine RAF heavies for Mosquitoes, the proposal completely overlooks the logistical basic - using the available resources as effectively as possible.
Mainly though, I do rather find the suggestion that: "The bomber generals wouldn't hear of their slice of the glory pie cut thinner and he was run out of town." is rather insulting to even Le May. Whatever the 'glory' issue (and Olds wasn't adverse to the spotlight) it's got nothing to do with the reason/s why.
Regards,
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:44 am
James,
The stuff being attributed to Olds here is almost exactly what I heard from some of the 20th FG guys. They did run several feasibility missions including a run over sub pens with moderate to decent results - and one would think they might've gotten better. The P-38s would form up in formation around the Droop Snoots which had Nordens in the nose. They didn't do too badly from what I remember and losses (in lives especially) were fairly light.
For more information check Warren Bodie's P-38 book pgs. 202-203. It seems it was never taken too seriously, although some test missions were undertaken. It may be that there were not enough aircraft available at the time to make it worthwhile anyway, but it is intriguing to think that perhaps it could have been much less costly in lives at least for the shorter-range missions.
Ryan
The stuff being attributed to Olds here is almost exactly what I heard from some of the 20th FG guys. They did run several feasibility missions including a run over sub pens with moderate to decent results - and one would think they might've gotten better. The P-38s would form up in formation around the Droop Snoots which had Nordens in the nose. They didn't do too badly from what I remember and losses (in lives especially) were fairly light.
For more information check Warren Bodie's P-38 book pgs. 202-203. It seems it was never taken too seriously, although some test missions were undertaken. It may be that there were not enough aircraft available at the time to make it worthwhile anyway, but it is intriguing to think that perhaps it could have been much less costly in lives at least for the shorter-range missions.
Ryan
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:51 am
RyanShort1 wrote:The stuff being attributed to Olds here is almost exactly what I heard from some of the 20th FG guys. They did run several feasibility missions including a run over sub pens with moderate to decent results - and one would think they might've gotten better. The P-38s would form up in formation around the Droop Snoots which had Nordens in the nose. They didn't do too badly from what I remember and losses (in lives especially) were fairly light.
For more information check Warren Bodie's P-38 book pgs. 202-203. It seems it was never taken too seriously, although some test missions were undertaken. It may be that there were not enough aircraft available at the time to make it worthwhile anyway, but it is intriguing to think that perhaps it could have been much less costly in lives at least for the shorter-range missions.
Thanks Ryan - might be some slightly crossed wires here. P-38s bombing on a droop snoot bomb-sight equipped lead make some advanced tactical / lower-end strategic bombing sense.
However a P-51 with one bomb and one tank escorted by other P-51s doesn't. IMHO. To match a single B-24, you'd need eight P-51 'bombers', plus fighter escort, wouldn't you? Meanwhile what are you going to do with the heavies? You can't escort them as well.
Cheers,
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:21 pm
Randy Haskin wrote:Be that as it may, "strike fighters" have been tasked against strategic targets in US doctrine for a long time -- at least since Vietnam, and probably during Korea, too.
That same jettison issue exists today, and it doesn't keep fighters from being able to stiffarm their way into the target to deliver their ordnance.
Didn't an F-18 tangle with one or more Iraqi MiGs in '91 and down one while maintaining his bomb load?
Wed Jan 21, 2009 12:34 pm
The F/A-18 and F-15E can both fight with most bomb loads up to around 6G's without problems. If you're able to go BVR, then taking on an opponent isn't a big deal since there's usually not a lot of hard maneuvering going on. I'm not sure on the F-16 as to what it's maneuvering restrictions are while carrying bombs.
Most "modern" aircraft (including Vietnam era aircraft like the F-4 Phantom) that had a dual-role capability were able to "fight-in, fight-out" on at least some level even with bombs hanging off the racks, but they weren't able to fly at their full potential. In most cases, you could even go supersonic (and release supersonic) with bombs, but again, this wasn't (and isn't) universal.
The Navy touts the F/A-18's "true multi-role" capability, but it's not the first to have the ability to effectively fight it's way in and out of a target by itself. The Phantom pioneered the capability carrying a pair of Sidewinders and 4 Sparrows even with 6 500-lbs bombs slung under each wing, and the F-15E continued this "all range" capability once the AMRAAM became more common by carrying 2 Sidewinders and 2 AMRAAMs on the wing rails and a normal bomb load and prior to that could carry 4 Sidewinders and 4 Sparrows at the cost of the CFT stations for bombs. The F/A-18 can carry its bomb load, a pair of Sidewinders, and a pair of Sparrows or AMRAAMs, but it can't go as far as a Strike Eagle while doing it (inherent issue of the F/A-18 is relatively short legs due to design weight restrictions for it to operate off a carrier).
Most "modern" aircraft (including Vietnam era aircraft like the F-4 Phantom) that had a dual-role capability were able to "fight-in, fight-out" on at least some level even with bombs hanging off the racks, but they weren't able to fly at their full potential. In most cases, you could even go supersonic (and release supersonic) with bombs, but again, this wasn't (and isn't) universal.
The Navy touts the F/A-18's "true multi-role" capability, but it's not the first to have the ability to effectively fight it's way in and out of a target by itself. The Phantom pioneered the capability carrying a pair of Sidewinders and 4 Sparrows even with 6 500-lbs bombs slung under each wing, and the F-15E continued this "all range" capability once the AMRAAM became more common by carrying 2 Sidewinders and 2 AMRAAMs on the wing rails and a normal bomb load and prior to that could carry 4 Sidewinders and 4 Sparrows at the cost of the CFT stations for bombs. The F/A-18 can carry its bomb load, a pair of Sidewinders, and a pair of Sparrows or AMRAAMs, but it can't go as far as a Strike Eagle while doing it (inherent issue of the F/A-18 is relatively short legs due to design weight restrictions for it to operate off a carrier).
Wed Jan 21, 2009 3:58 pm
JDK wrote:I'm sorry, I don't see any correlation between 21st century fighter bombers and the 1930s and W.W.II strategic bomber doctrine and attempted implementation.
There's a direct correlation between the two in this case;
You stated that one of the counter-arguments to fighters performing the strategic bombing mission during WWII was that encounters with Luftwaffe fighters would potentially force the fighters to dump their bombs someplace other than the target in order to defend themselves from the adversary fighters.
We know, of course, that only 15-20 years later that US fighters were, in fact, being used in the strategic bombing role and continue to do so to the present day.
This problem that faced the concept in WWII has remained an issue throughout the life of the strike fighter concept. Even so, it hasn't caused the concept to be ditched. In fact, the value of the precision and less risk to personnel has generally outweighed the risks and downsides to fighters use in that role.
JDK wrote:Looks like how you define 'strategic bombing' is an issue here
Nope. The target itself determines the classification, not the type of asset used to attack it. Things that were "strategic" targets in 1940 -- leadership, infrastructure, industry -- are still defined essentially the same way today.
What is different now is that physical placement on the battlefield no longer has any relation to how those definitions are applied. In other words, depending on whom you are attacking, the fielded forces may actually be more of a "strategic" target than the leadership (this is the basis of Warden's centers of gravity theory).
Wed Jan 21, 2009 10:22 pm
Never argue with a fXXXghXr - sorry, bXmxxr, sorry Figh... What are you?
Seems to be a terminology problem here. Bombing concepts go back to antiquity. They only became decisive in 1945. Ideas are great, results count.
Single seat fighters without bombsights toting a single bomb (plus droptank on the other hardpoint) may be a form of a concept that's live in the modern air force - but it didn't and couldn't work well in W.W.II. They replaced dive bombers and overtook the tactical niche, but were going to be the bottom end of strategic at best, using for instance P-38s and lead bomber.
I'd be interested in the evidence that a P-51D would be able to retain its bomb if attacked, unlike the options open to the modern F-15 driver, as outlined above. Then there's the assumption that there would be more fighters to protect them goes against Doolittle's successful 'free ranging' Luftwaffe destruction - you can't have both.
Meanwhile, what are you going to do with the bomber force without either bunch of fighters? Send them home? Warfare required the best use of available resources.
I can't see how a F-15 with sighting and smart bombs without current aerial opposition of equivalent threat level to the Luftwaffe in 1944 'proves' the idea of 1944 would 'work'. It's completely different capability, surely? (Not to mention an F-15 carries a greater load than a W.W.II heavy with a greater accuracy and yield - so as it outclasses the heavy equivalent, it outclasses the W.W.II fighter redoubled.)
Sure - but the weight of bombs possible with P-51s and P-47s was not going to achieve strategic results. Tactical was the best you were going to get. Pounding the Ruhr or Berlin with single-seaters with a single bomb each? Nope. There weren't enough, and they wouldn't achieve the concentration at target, never mind the other flaws
There you lose me. However it's clear that this ~um~ 'asymmetric warfare' thing is worlds away from offering the strategic bombing objectives of industry and infrastructure that was the objective of Point Blank. Ergo - different...
Regards,
Seems to be a terminology problem here. Bombing concepts go back to antiquity. They only became decisive in 1945. Ideas are great, results count.
Single seat fighters without bombsights toting a single bomb (plus droptank on the other hardpoint) may be a form of a concept that's live in the modern air force - but it didn't and couldn't work well in W.W.II. They replaced dive bombers and overtook the tactical niche, but were going to be the bottom end of strategic at best, using for instance P-38s and lead bomber.
I'd be interested in the evidence that a P-51D would be able to retain its bomb if attacked, unlike the options open to the modern F-15 driver, as outlined above. Then there's the assumption that there would be more fighters to protect them goes against Doolittle's successful 'free ranging' Luftwaffe destruction - you can't have both.
Meanwhile, what are you going to do with the bomber force without either bunch of fighters? Send them home? Warfare required the best use of available resources.
I can't see how a F-15 with sighting and smart bombs without current aerial opposition of equivalent threat level to the Luftwaffe in 1944 'proves' the idea of 1944 would 'work'. It's completely different capability, surely? (Not to mention an F-15 carries a greater load than a W.W.II heavy with a greater accuracy and yield - so as it outclasses the heavy equivalent, it outclasses the W.W.II fighter redoubled.)
Randy Haskin wrote:JDK wrote:Looks like how you define 'strategic bombing' is an issue here
Nope. The target itself determines the classification, not the type of asset used to attack it. Things that were "strategic" targets in 1940 -- leadership, infrastructure, industry -- are still defined essentially the same way today.
Sure - but the weight of bombs possible with P-51s and P-47s was not going to achieve strategic results. Tactical was the best you were going to get. Pounding the Ruhr or Berlin with single-seaters with a single bomb each? Nope. There weren't enough, and they wouldn't achieve the concentration at target, never mind the other flaws
What is different now is that physical placement on the battlefield no longer has any relation to how those definitions are applied. In other words, depending on whom you are attacking, the fielded forces may actually be more of a "strategic" target than the leadership (this is the basis of Warden's centers of gravity theory).
There you lose me. However it's clear that this ~um~ 'asymmetric warfare' thing is worlds away from offering the strategic bombing objectives of industry and infrastructure that was the objective of Point Blank. Ergo - different...
Regards,
Wed Jan 21, 2009 10:53 pm
James,
I think the important concept you're leaving out is that these "single seat bombers" wouldn't be unescorted nor required to fight for their own lives. This is the fundamental difference that you are leaving out. The B-17's defended themselves only because they could, but their self defense never really was proved to be really effective.
The loss numbers versus kills should have been much higher had they been effective, but it was the introduction of comprehensive fighter escort that curtailed the losses to enemy air action.
The same would be said about single-seat fighters operating against strategic targets - they would be escorted by dedicated fighters whom would fly similar profiles to the bombers making it difficult for the enemy to determine who they needed to attack, giving a slight advantage to the allies. In addition, the ability of an asset to bring a tactical PRECISION to a strategic TARGET would have allowed (theoretically) the much more efficient elimination of the target for a much lower expenditure of warload, equipment, and lives.
In the end, it doesn't matter how many planes you put up if they don't hit the target. This was the major failure of "strategic bombers" during WWII. They rarely hit more than a general area and many times failed to hit anything close to the actual target. In WWII, "Strategic Bombers" had a "Circle of Probability" on the order of 2 miles, while "Tactical Fighters" has a CoP of several hundred feet. Again, it takes less warload to take out a target as long as you put a larger percentage of that warload on the target. This is what led to the demise of the classic "Carpet Bombing" and lead to the shift in concept from Douchet to Warden where a "Tactical Fighter" can have a much larger Strategic impact because it can make a much larger impact by using precision as a physical and psychological weapon to disable and demoralize the enemy.
I think the important concept you're leaving out is that these "single seat bombers" wouldn't be unescorted nor required to fight for their own lives. This is the fundamental difference that you are leaving out. The B-17's defended themselves only because they could, but their self defense never really was proved to be really effective.
The loss numbers versus kills should have been much higher had they been effective, but it was the introduction of comprehensive fighter escort that curtailed the losses to enemy air action.
The same would be said about single-seat fighters operating against strategic targets - they would be escorted by dedicated fighters whom would fly similar profiles to the bombers making it difficult for the enemy to determine who they needed to attack, giving a slight advantage to the allies. In addition, the ability of an asset to bring a tactical PRECISION to a strategic TARGET would have allowed (theoretically) the much more efficient elimination of the target for a much lower expenditure of warload, equipment, and lives.
In the end, it doesn't matter how many planes you put up if they don't hit the target. This was the major failure of "strategic bombers" during WWII. They rarely hit more than a general area and many times failed to hit anything close to the actual target. In WWII, "Strategic Bombers" had a "Circle of Probability" on the order of 2 miles, while "Tactical Fighters" has a CoP of several hundred feet. Again, it takes less warload to take out a target as long as you put a larger percentage of that warload on the target. This is what led to the demise of the classic "Carpet Bombing" and lead to the shift in concept from Douchet to Warden where a "Tactical Fighter" can have a much larger Strategic impact because it can make a much larger impact by using precision as a physical and psychological weapon to disable and demoralize the enemy.
Wed Jan 21, 2009 11:18 pm
CAPFlyer wrote:I think the important concept you're leaving out is that these "single seat bombers" wouldn't be unescorted nor required to fight for their own lives.
Nope.
First - You've got X four engine heavies, Y single engine fighter to deploy. You use 1/2 your fighters as bombers, and you either use the other 1/2 to escort them, or the bombers, or a quarter each way. (Remember it takes 6-8 fighter-bombers to = one bomber, and losses loose a pilot and engine and aircraft, so the loss rate is potentially more attractive until it's examined.) That's not efficient use of available resource.
Meanwhile you've the bombers sitting at base, and more bombers (and fighters) and crews coming with no plans to use them. That's really not efficient use of available resource.
As I said earlier, it's not about 'glory' which is cheap, and insulting, IMHO, but other practical reasons.
If you have light fighter opposition, then bombers are better off anyway, flack being the differentiator giving slight advantage to fighter-bombers over bombers.
If you have heavy fighter opposition, you'll have some get through to the fighter bombers, at which point they either sit and take it, with NO defensive fire, or the jettison and abort the mission. They might try and keep the bombs and fight, but that's a semi-bort, due to losses, decreased combat efficiency (unlike the modern F-15 etc.) and, they're fighter pilots with forward firing guns only - they aren't going to just sit there in formation, under attack.
Lastly, as I said, it's generally held that Dolittle's change to aggressive free ranging was a decisive factor in the campaign. That couldn't happen (unless you further subdivide your fighter force to even more tasks) if they were tied to close defence of fighter-bombers.
It's all what iffery, and I may well be wrong - however we just can't get around a) if it had been a really good idea the USAAF was pretty good at implementing good ideas b) what did you do with the rest of the 8th AF in the meantime? and c) what do you do with those bomber factors and bomber crew trainees? Bomber generals glory-hunting won't wash.
Or maybe someone can outline Olds' plan in detail, and show it's solid? I don't buy what we've postulated so far. Either way we don't know what would have happened if it was tried, it wasn't, there's no comparison which is a good fit (so far) so it's all um...
Just my view, of course.
Wed Jan 21, 2009 11:25 pm
Sorry, your other good point -
Sure, but fighter-bombers at medium or high level will be less accurate than bombers with bomb-aimer and sight.
However, I presume that those tactical fighters were not bombing the Ruhr or Berlin at any height - the comparisons against different targets (strategic vs tactical) and attack profiles (high/medium against low).
I'm unaware of any attacks at low level by massed single seater bombers over large city size targets in Germany.
And low level attacks on Berlin and the Ruhr are very different to attacks on tactical targets such as airfields and tank concentrations. Losses over the target would be unacceptable.
Cheers,
CAPFlyer wrote:In the end, it doesn't matter how many planes you put up if they don't hit the target.
Sure, but fighter-bombers at medium or high level will be less accurate than bombers with bomb-aimer and sight.
In WWII, "Strategic Bombers" had a "Circle of Probability" on the order of 2 miles, while "Tactical Fighters" has a CoP of several hundred feet. Again, it takes less warload to take out a target as long as you put a larger percentage of that warload on the target.
However, I presume that those tactical fighters were not bombing the Ruhr or Berlin at any height - the comparisons against different targets (strategic vs tactical) and attack profiles (high/medium against low).
I'm unaware of any attacks at low level by massed single seater bombers over large city size targets in Germany.
And low level attacks on Berlin and the Ruhr are very different to attacks on tactical targets such as airfields and tank concentrations. Losses over the target would be unacceptable.
Cheers,