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Mark Allen M wrote: Caption reads: "31st Fighter Group Spitfires at Tebessa, North Africa after being evacuated from Thelepte, North Africa. 18 February, 1943."   The evacuation of the base at Thelepte actually concluded around noon on the 17th--a prelude to the debacle at Kasserine Pass. WIXers may be interested in the following event details (as posted at the Hyperwar site): At Thelepte the day of the 15th began with a strafing attack by six Me-109's which necessitated the recall of the first mission. Twelve Spitfires and two P-39's returned in time to destroy three of the raiders; but one Spit was downed, and an A-20 was strafed and destroyed on the ground. Early in the afternoon, in a move to reinforce XII ASC, two squadrons of the 52d Group arrived from XII Bomber Command (the other went to Youks). All day the Spits and P-39's strafed and patrolled in the region of Sidi bou Zid. Reconnaissance on the 14th having shown Kairouan airdrome well stocked with aircraft, Kuter at AASC called for bombers; and Spaatz detailed the mediums for AASC's needs on the 15th. Thirteen B-26's hit Kairouan first, the frags catching two aircraft taking off. Nine B-25's followed in a half-hour, finding three aircraft afire after the previous attack. Despite heavy flak which crippled a B-25 enough that the enemy pursuit finished it off, they laid their frags along the runways and in the dispersal areas, bombers and escort compiling claims of seven enemy fighters. The B-25's belonged to the 12th Group, which had earned a commendable reputation with the Ninth Air Force. Two squadrons-the 8 1st and 8zd-had flown from Gambut to Biskra on 3 February and subsequently moved on to Berteaux.
The 16th saw Combat Command A, harassed by dive bombing, in a bitter delaying action east and southeast of Sbeitla. By now it was apparent that the whole area east of the Western Dorsal was untenable. II Corps' losses--reported as 98 medium tanks, 5 7 half-tracks, 12 x 115-mm, and 17 x 105-mm. guns--rendered counterstrokes impossible. XII ASC did what it could in the deteriorating situation, its fighters furnishing cover and its light bombers attacking trucks, tanks, and gun positions. However, on the night of the 15th, Gafsa had been occupied by a small enemy column and the orders had gone out to organize Kasserine Pass for defense.
Consequently, XII ASC had to evacuate its forward bases; and during the week of 13-21 February it abandoned a total of five, simultaneously maintaining a respectable level of air activity, This achievement reflected credit not only on the individual Air Corps units but on the advance planning of XII ASC and of Allied Air Support Command, the possibility of retreat having figured in headquarters calculations ever since the German stroke at Faid Pass. On 10 February, Evacuation Plan A for Sbeitla and Thelepte had been disseminated to the interested commands.
The plan, which in the event was not followed to the letter, operated somewhat as follows: as preliminaries, Sbeitla, which lay most proximate to the front at Faid Pass, was not to receive supplies in excess of a four-day level for one fighter group (no tactical units had yet arrived there); and the Thelepte fields--the engineers had constructed a second--were to have their stockage reduced to a four-day level for all resident units. Back at Canrobert a ten-day stockage was to be built up for the 47th's light bombers. Once the evacuation was ordered, the combat units would leave for Youks, Tebessa, and Le Kouif, stockage at the Thelepte fields would be reduced to a four-day level for one fighter group, and 3d Service Area Command would be responsible for removing the remaining supplies out of Sbeitla and Thelepte. XII ASC would assist to the maximum, determine priorities for movement of supplies and personnel, and destroy such equipment and stores as were likely to fall into enemy hands.
Signal for the execution of Plan A was withdrawal from Gafsa, and when the ground forces pulled out on the 14th, the plan was put into effect as of 2200 hours--but for Sbeitla only. The time for the evacuation of Thelepte was left to Williams' discretion, In preparation for the reception of the 68th Observation Group, Sbeitla had been occupied by the 46th Service Squadron (as the situation developed, Kuter had never felt the base safe enough for the 68th). The service squadron was very nearly captured that night, but it not only got safely away but brought out with it seventy-five truckloads of supplies, a three-day level of munitions, and over 100,000 gallons of gas and oil.
The valuable Thelepte fields were abandoned on the 17th as the Allied line was swung back on the Western Dorsal and the Germans and Italians drove in from Gafsa and Sbeitla. Fredendall had told Williams around nightfall of the 16th that his II Corps was dug in on high ground and expected to hold the line Sbeitla-Feriana. Nevertheless, at 2400 hours Williams was summoned again to corps to learn that the enemy had put in a night attack at Sbeitla and that the situation was serious. Holding forces at Kasserine and Feriana would endeavor to give XII ASC until ten the next morning to clear out of Thelepte. Williams, who had taken the precaution to spot transportation around Tebessa, gave the evacuation order shortly after midnight.
Thelepte had been partially cleared on the 16th when its two A-20 squadrons had been ordered out. The ground crews beginning preparations while the planes were away on business, by 2400 the squadrons were united with the rest of the group at Youks. This left to evacuate: Thelepte's two fighter groups (the 31st and the 81st), the Lafayette Escadrille, a squadron of the 350th (P-39's), and two squadrons of the 52d, altogether 124 operational aircraft. Missions were set up for the morning of the 17th, the aircraft to return to rearward stations. In the event, XII ASC was given plenty of time. The last mission went off at 1030 hours and a security detachment inspected the fields between 1100 and 1200. II Corps saw to it that the enemy did not arrive until the afternoon.
As planned, the 31st Group went to Tebessa, the P-39's to Le Kouif, the 52d to Youks. About 3,000 troops and most of the organizational equipment were got out of Thelepte. What could not be moved was destroyed: 60,000 gallons of aviation gas were poured out; rations blown up; eighteen aircraft, of which five were non-reparable, burned. Nothing was left for the enemy. Communications and supplies having been spotted previously at the new bases, operations continued uninterruptedly during the day.https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/II/AAF-II-5.html
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