Xray wrote:
Yes, by all means, address each and every one of my false assertions point by point.
I can understand the reasons for you being upset so I won't follow in your condescending approach, sure I and everyone else would be interested in what you have to say.
Okay, let’s start with your first assertion, that 1/4 of the production run were “lost” in accidents. This is a prime example of the misconstrued statistics that permeate most discussions of the type. “Lost” leads one to believe that 25% of the aircraft were catastrophically destroyed. This could not be further from the truth. To begin with, the Cutlass, as a result of its long gestation period and delay reaching the fleet, found itself thrust into roles it was never originally designed for…. General purpose fighter, missile interceptor, nuclear delivery capable attack. As a result, in spite of it being the first to assume the last two of these tasks in the navy, it was by definition a “placeholder” aircraft to function in these roles until mission dedicated aircraft exited development and reached the fleet. In the case of missile interceptor it was a placeholder for the F3H-2M. Likewise, nuclear delivery saw it assume the placeholder role for the A4D. Even in the general purpose fighter role, it was the replacement for the failed XF10 Jaguar that never materialized.
This resulted in a fiscal situation that saw the F7U-3 series to be considered a one-tour aircraft, meaning that no plans were made for the aircraft to transit an overhaul facility in preparation for a second bite at the apple service-wise. Because of this, airframes that sustained very minor damage incurred in normal operations, or airframes that sustained moderate ( but fixable) damage in accidents such as runway excursions were not repaired. The spare parts contracts that normally follow the initial production contracts were not proffered as the prevailing wisdom held that the airframes would soon be replaced by purpose built fighters, interceptors, and dedicated attack aircraft coming down the pipeline.
This lack of spares, and BuAer’s reluctance to fund repairs to airframes sustaining minor damage resulted in these airframes being “struck off charge” or less eloquently “sent for scrapping.”
Due to BuAer’s antiquated, yet rigid system for classification of asset status, these airframes that were fully repairable, and fully viable candidates for rework, were simply classified as unrepairable due to accident or incident. It is much akin to taking your new Tesla to the store and getting a shopping cart “ding” in the door….. instead of getting the dent pulled out, you scrap the car and wait for next year’s model to hit the showroom floor, electing to walk in the meantime.
So this 25% “lost” or “destroyed in accidents” figure that is flung about with much aplomb and glee by the uninformed is inclusive of all these repairable damages which were administratively elected to be ignored…..and which by the way, were rarely caused by the aircraft. Pilot and maintenance errors were rampant not due to a fault of the machine, but by the soon-to-be ubiquitous complexity not seen before in the fleet. You cannot desire for capability and simultaneously lambaste the resultant complexity needed to achieve it.
This is but just one example of the “statistics” related to the F7U that without in-depth research into the “why” is often taken at face value after its repetition codifies it as “fact”. I certainly don’t fault you X-ray for mindlessly repeating what you’ve read and re-read countless times on Wiki and in the rags, but hope to instill the afterthought that perhaps when told with foot-stomping enthusiasm that the sky is silver or gold…. that perhaps you just might be being misled and there is more to the story…..
Next?