Great raids trick question.

RyanShort1 · **Posted:** Tue May 15, 2012 8:36 am

CDF wrote:

JDK wrote:

It seems 'delivery' wasn't an objective of the task, just a possible solution to 'logistical misplacement'.

Yes it was

Quote:

In the first month after the United States entered World War II, the Air War Plans Division put forth a plan to establish a major fighting air command in Burma to turn back the Japanese' sweeping advance into China. That new command was to be designated the 10th Air Force, and in mid-January Operation Aquila was employed to begin the initial buildup necessary to establish that command. Operation Aquila was a 5-point program designed to provide fighters, bombers, and a supply chain to the theater.

....The bomber element of the new 10th Air Force was to originate from two separate, highly secret projects.

The first was a volunteer group of B-25 pilots under command of Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. The twenty-six medium range bombers were tasked with making a carrier-borne assault on Tokyo in what would become Doolittle's famous Tokyo Raid. Theirs was a two-part mission. After making the historic attack on the Japanese capitol, the raiders were to fly to China where pilots, crews and their B-25s were to be absorbed by the 10th Air Force. (It was the loss of all 26 bombers that distressed Doolittle to the belief that he would be court-martialed, despite the success of the first part of his mission.)

Long-range bombing missions in the China-Burma theater would be carried out by a group of twenty-three B-24s under the command of Colonel Halvor "Hurry-up Harry" Halverson. This was the element that became known, by those few planners aware of its existence, as the Halpro Group (Halverson Project.) The group was tasked with flying EAST to reach China after completion of the Doolittle Raid. From their airfields in China, the Liberators would be within bombing range of Tokyo and able to continue the work from the west of Japan, that Doolittle's men started from an aircraft carrier east of the islands.

http://www.homeofheroes.com/wings/part2/09_ploesti.html

For starters there's a really obvious error there. 16 bombers were used, not 26...

And in fairness, the bombers might have made it to their destinations in China anyway if communications had gone better, they would have launched as scheduled, and the beacons had been set up on the other end.

Also, I think from what we know now, it's likely that the Japanese DID know where the bombers came from - the carriers - they just (of course) mis-judged how close the carriers would have to be to launch aircraft and were thus unable to capitalize on that knowledge.

Ryan

shrike · **Posted:** Tue May 15, 2012 9:20 am

OK, I'll give it a shot.

The Ploesti raid was intended to knock out refineries, and while some damage was done, and strategic resources may have been reassigned, the net effect long-term effect on petroleum production was minimal. The attrition rate was also unacceptably high (hows that for understatement?)

The Dam raids while spectacular, also failed to have the real long-term consequences hoped for. The disruption was only temporary, and the attrition rate was also very high (although smaller in absolute numbers)

The Doolittle Raid's target was 'Japan'. While there were specific point targets, hitting Japan at all was enough to cause major problems and long-term strategic effects, both with the retention of home-defense forces and the mistake of going after Midway. The attrition, in aircraft at least, was 100%

So, the Tokio raid was the only one that had any worthwhile follow-up effects, and that at a minimal (relative) cost

Mark Allen M · **Joined:** Fri Feb 03, 2012 1:48 pm **Posts:** 7805

JDK · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 4:27 am

Mark Allen M wrote:

Quote:

In what was do you think it wasn't 'fully successful'?

Well looking at the raid in it's most simplistic form, the loss of all 16 mitchells would summate to not fully successful and the fact that minimal damage was inflicted on the Japanese homeland would also be added to the equation. those two alone would equate to my assessment that the mission wasn't fully successful. But as already stated in previous posts, the overall result of what the raid achieved for American moral would be the final assessment of whether the raid was a success or failure. IMHO

Ah, I disagree. We must remember that losses are important, but they are 'costs' while they have to be balanced against results, or 'benefits'. If it costs a lot but achieves the desired result, it's successful. (The reverse is helpful: if it has a low (or no) cost but doesn't achieve the desired outcome, it may be economical, but it's primarily unsuccessful.)

Regards,

JDK · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 4:31 am

Thanks for the responses! Several posters are on the lines of what I was thinking of, so it's no big revelation (not a surprise given the spelling and precision issues with the original question! Smacked own wrist, there...)

Tidalwave, despite being a valiant and costly effort, failed to disrupt production:

Quote:

The mission resulted in "no curtailment of overall product output", and so was unsuccessful.[7].

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tidal_Wave

The Dam Busters raid was, likewise, expensive in crews and aircraft, but planned with great hopes of a material effect on enemy production, yet we now know it had a very limited effect in that:

Quote:

After the operation Barnes Wallis wrote, "I feel a blow has been struck at Germany from which she cannot recover for several years." However, on closer inspection, Operation Chastise did not have the military effect that was at the time believed. By 27 June, full water output was restored, thanks to an emergency pumping scheme inaugurated only the previous year, and the electricity grid was again producing power at full capacity[citation needed]. The raid proved to be costly in lives (more than half the lives lost belonging to Allied POWs and forced-labourers), but in fact no more than a minor inconvenience to the Ruhr's industrial output.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_ ... on_the_war

Both raids had very important propaganda elements, and huge allied benefits in propaganda and morale-boosting but they were not propaganda raids alone - real damage was expected to the enemy's ability to wage war.

Conversely, the Doolittle raid on Japan was primarily intended as a propaganda attack; no significant damage was expected on the targets. The propaganda result was fully achieved, and, more, it changed major aspects of Japan's war planning and deployment and put elements of a defensive mindset into the Japanese thinking for the first time in the war. While there were losses of crew and all the aircraft, that was actually very economical given the results achieved. (We must acknowledge here the unforeseen (by the planners) stupendous Japanese brutality towards the Chinese, including unbelievable numbers killed.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doolittle_Raid#Impact

So, in short, Tidalwave and Chastise were valiant failures, with a notable side benefit of propaganda and morale enhancement; the Doolittle raid was a full success in its primary propaganda aim, and had unexpectedly large benefits of diverting and compromising several elements of Japanese expansion.

That's of course my take, and open to further debate. Regarding recent points, I'm afraid the 'homeofheroes' website has multiple issues, as Ryan's started pointing out; while the Hap Arnold memo on Hyperwar that CDF also pointed us to states:

Quote:

The purpose of this special project is to bomb and fire the industrial centers of Japan.

It is anticipated that this will not only cause confusion and impeded production but will undoubtedly facilitate operations against Japan in other theatres due to their probably withdrawal of troops for the purpose of defending the home country.

An action of this kind is most desirable now due to the psychological effect on the American public, our allies and our enemies.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/rep ... ecial.html

How much damage and how much the propaganda role was balanced in the memo is debatable and interesting; there was plenty of evidence that a dispersed raid such as the 16 mediums undertook would always have a limited impact. Dangerous word, but we can 'assume' the planners would have been aware of that.

So, as ever, always something new to consider and explore - thanks for all the contributions, and more comment, corrections, welcome. As they say, discuss!

Regards,

The Inspector · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 10:07 am

Maybe we didn't 'Shack it' but we were all, I believe within the CPE

Mark Allen M · **Joined:** Fri Feb 03, 2012 1:48 pm **Posts:** 7805

k5083 · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 12:30 pm

One point to be made about the success of the Doolittle raid is that we don't often see reliable info cited from the Japanese side about its effects on Japan. We know that it was a successful propaganda raid as measured by its impact on the home front, but much of what has been said, during the war and since, about its impact on the Japanese psyche and conduct of the war could be part and parcel of that propaganda. Some of the stories told about the impact of the raid are obviously so. For example, any Japanese confusion about where the bombers came from was certainly eliminated within days, if not hours; their intel network was at least good enough to pick up what every American newspaper reader and newsreel watcher learned very quickly. Did the Japanese rethink home defense or any other part of the conduct of the war as a result of the Doolittle raid? It isn't so easy to tell, nor can we really gauge how much, if any, shock, disbelief, vulnerability, or any other emotion was felt by either Japan's military or civilians. More than most powers in the war, Japan has been prevented by language and cultural barriers from fully contributing its experience to the Western narrative, which is why we see no counter to many patently untrue old saws, e.g. the notion that the Japanese called the Corsair "Whistling Death" or the Hellcat's supposed umpteen-to-one kill ratio. So, to answer James' original question, one reason why the Doolittle raid might seem the most successful is that we still know less of the full story than of the other raids.

August

RyanShort1 · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 3:16 pm

k5083 wrote:

One point to be made about the success of the Doolittle raid is that we don't often see reliable info cited from the Japanese side about its effects on Japan. We know that it was a successful propaganda raid as measured by its impact on the home front, but much of what has been said, during the war and since, about its impact on the Japanese psyche and conduct of the war could be part and parcel of that propaganda. Some of the stories told about the impact of the raid are obviously so. For example, any Japanese confusion about where the bombers came from was certainly eliminated within days, if not hours; their intel network was at least good enough to pick up what every American newspaper reader and newsreel watcher learned very quickly. Did the Japanese rethink home defense or any other part of the conduct of the war as a result of the Doolittle raid? It isn't so easy to tell, nor can we really gauge how much, if any, shock, disbelief, vulnerability, or any other emotion was felt by either Japan's military or civilians. More than most powers in the war, Japan has been prevented by language and cultural barriers from fully contributing its experience to the Western narrative, which is why we see no counter to many patently untrue old saws, e.g. the notion that the Japanese called the Corsair "Whistling Death" or the Hellcat's supposed umpteen-to-one kill ratio. So, to answer James' original question, one reason why the Doolittle raid might seem the most successful is that we still know less of the full story than of the other raids.

August

That's a fair point.
How many of y'all know that an aircraft carrier conversion was hit during the Raid, and delayed by some months from completion?
I do think that overall the damage, while really light, was sufficient to really make the Japanese think about their defenses and it does seem to have affected their war plans and distribution of forces.

Ryan

Mark Allen M · **Joined:** Fri Feb 03, 2012 1:48 pm **Posts:** 7805

k5083 · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 4:08 pm

RyanShort1 wrote:

I do think that overall the damage, while really light, was sufficient to really make the Japanese think about their defenses and it does seem to have affected their war plans and distribution of forces.

But we don't know for sure, or if so, how much, for how long. Don't forget that the Japanese never had to make the slightest ghost of a credible threat to attack the west coast of the continental US, yet great resources were expended in an almost hysterical effort to secure California against a strike and even invasion. If there had been no Doolittle raid, the Japanese may have allocated similar resources to home defense anyway -- especially after Midway, less than two months later. But like you, I'm speculating. We know not to trust contemporary American accounts or conventional wisdom about the raid's impact, but there isn't a credible alternative source of info nor, so far as I am aware, a competent published analysis of the question. So we're left with a self-perpetuating legend -- not necessarily such a bad thing, although I know it irks many B-25 buffs to hear the aircraft associated single-mindedly with the Doolittle raid when in their opinion it made far more significant contributions to the war at other times and places.

August

Mark Allen M · **Joined:** Fri Feb 03, 2012 1:48 pm **Posts:** 7805

me109g4 · **Posted:** Wed May 16, 2012 9:48 pm

On the subject of the Dams raid,, tonight is the 69th aniversary of said raid, as this is posted, 69 yrs ago the surviving aircraft were heading home.

old iron · **Posted:** Thu May 17, 2012 10:47 am

Perhaps we should keep in mind that had there not been a commitment to the Doolittle Raid then there might well have been four American Carriers at the Battle of Coral Sea.

This is something for the alternaitve history buffs and there is no telling what the longterm ramifications might have been, but I think a decisive victory at Coral Sea would have been far better for moral than the twelve lost bombers association with the Doolitle Raid.

Dave Homewood · **Posted:** Mon May 28, 2012 11:23 pm

I have given this some thought and I would say that the Dams Raid by No. 617 Squadron was indeed a massive success.

Not only were the three target dams breached and the Ruhr valley flooded as planned, knocking out industry, farmland, transport ways and other amenities needed for the Nazi war effort, for some time, it was also a turning point in stepping up more raids on the Ruhr as Bomber Harris realised that the dams breach and flooding ruined the water pressure in the mains water supply for fire fighting so more damage could be made on raids.

But there was much more to the success of the raid. It had also been the proving of the theory that Barnes Wallis had been trying to champion for years that the RAF needed bigger and bigger bombs, and the aircraft to carry them. He realised long before anyone in the Air Ministry that mere 250lb bombs did little to no damage at all and the raids were a waste of men and machines. he had striven for approval to build larger bombs that could actually damage infrastructure.

Had he not been given the opportunity to have a go at the dams he'd likely have given up, or at least never have gained permission, in his quest. His genius saw development of large bombs like the Grand Slam and Tallboy. Where would Britain have been without his large bombs come the invasion (using them against bunkers, etc) and countering the V1 sites, U-boat pens and rocket factory installations, etc.

The Dams Raid allowed all that subsequent development to happen, and I doubt the war would have ended when it did without it. Nothing else could touch the grand work he and his team did in developing bombs that actually made a difference.

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