Guadalcanal TBF Avenger questions

[Dan K]

Dave,

To summarize, on March 14 a USAAF C-47 served as navigation plane for 13 TBFs of VMSB-143 and 9 F4Fs of VMF-214 during a ferry flight from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal.

While over the Coral Sea, the C-47 led the formation into a storm. 5 of the TBFs (with 9 men aboard, including the XO Capt. Wilfred Park) were lost without a trace.

[Tailspin Turtle]

The USN/USMC TBF Avenger pilot both flew the plane and navigated. There was no full-time navigator in the crew. The rest of the crew consisted of a radioman who also operated the radar (if one was installed; it could depict islands/coast lines) and the gunner. On long, one-way, over-water ferry flights, a larger plane with a full-time navigator who could augment dead reckoning with star and sun sights might be provided to lead the chicks to where they were supposed to go but I doubt that one was used on combat missions. For one thing, combat missions carrying bombs/mines instead of internal and/or external fuel tanks were fairly short-range flights that didn't have a high degree of navigation difficulty, particularly when flying from a shore base. Of course, it proved too hard for the pilots in Flight 19 and it might very well have been the operational procedure used for the missions that you cite.

[Dave Homewood]

Thanks Dan, so that eliminates those losses from being related to lost after a combat mission then. But maybe it does tell something about the C-47 lead ship not being up to the mark.

Tailspin Turtle wrote:

The USN/USMC TBF Avenger pilot both flew the plane and navigated. There was no full-time navigator in the crew. The rest of the crew consisted of a radioman who also operated the radar (if one was installed; it could depict islands/coast lines) and the gunner.

Huh, that is different from how our RNZAF Avenger squadrons operated with crew allocation. Ours had a Pilot up front who was a normal pilot, then in the middle was the navigator (who in fact would have been a trained Obesrver rather than a straight navigator as he also operated the wireless; RNZAF Observers were navigator, wireless op, air gunner and bomb aimer all in one trade but they stopped training those guys in mid 1942). In the back was the gunner, who's actual trade would have been Wireless Operator/Air Gunner as all air gunners who went overseas were wireless trained too, but in this aircraft they only acted as gunners. So it seems our crews were a bit more versatile than the US Navy crews.

On long, one-way, over-water ferry flights, a larger plane with a full-time navigator who could augment dead reckoning with star and sun sights might be provided to lead the chicks to where they were supposed to go

Yes the RNZAF also performed this exact same task, Hudsons being the usual escort for fighters or our Avengers or Dauntless, etc.One of the main reasons they went with the little chicks was also they carried air droppable rafts for rescue purposes. The RNZAF sent two Hudsons on these ferry flights so if a fighter went down one would stay with it till a PT boat or Dumbo Catalina came along and the other carried on with the fighters.

but I doubt that one was used on combat missions.

For one thing, combat missions carrying bombs/mines instead of internal and/or external fuel tanks were fairly short-range flights that didn't have a high degree of navigation difficulty, particularly when flying from a shore base.

I can assure you it definately happened. I have copies of No. 3 Squadron's entire Operations Record Book from 1941-45, which details all these flare escort flights. I have copies of some of the individuals' logbooks who flew on the flights. I have written accounts of these missions by airmen and I have oral anecdotal accounts. Face it, it happened.

As for duration, take the last of these missions which occurred on the night of the 22/23 May 1943, John Winefield's Hudson took off from Cactus at 01.15hrs and touched back down at 05.40hrs. That's 4 hours 35 minutes.

By comparison a Hudson ferry flight the same day from Cactus to Button lifted off from Henderson Field at 09.25hrs and landed at Pallikulo, Espiritu Santo at 13.35hrs. That's 4 hours 10 minutes.

Of course, it proved too hard for the pilots in Flight 19 and it might very well have been the operational procedure used for the missions that you cite.

What was Flight 19? Was that the Close Encounters Avengers? The ones that disappeared 2 and a 1/2 years after the period I am talking about??

[Dan K]

Thanks Dan, so that eliminates those losses from being related to lost after a combat mission then. But maybe it does tell something about the C-47 lead ship not being up to the mark.

I think that about sums it up.

The author paraphrases the stories of VMF-214 survivors of the flight, including one who bailed out and another who crash landed. Both formations of F4Fs (to the C-47's starboard) and TBFs (port) apparently tightened formation upon entering the storm, so as not to lose the leader. The author speculates mid-air collision by the TBFs, but as of the book's writing had no physical evidence to prove it.

The surviving Marine pilots appeared critical of the C-47 pilot for not turning back to Buttons. Before the flight took off, the VMF-214 CO (a Major George Britt), was described as being "chafed" over 2 things: 1) a recent decision from ComAirSols that all ferry flights to Guadalcanal required a navigational lead plane, and 2) that the C-47 pilot was an Army Lieutenant. Britt apparently had considerable overwater navigational experience while flying patrols off the USS Wasp in the Atlantic.

[JDK]

Fascinating discussion.

but I doubt that one was used on combat missions.

For one thing, combat missions carrying bombs/mines instead of internal and/or external fuel tanks were fairly short-range flights that didn't have a high degree of navigation difficulty, particularly when flying from a shore base.

I can assure you it definately happened. I have copies of No. 3 Squadron's entire Operations Record Book from 1941-45, which details all these flare escort flights. I have copies of some of the individuals' logbooks who flew on the flights. I have written accounts of these missions by airmen and I have oral anecdotal accounts. Face it, it happened.

Just before this gets to snafu, Dave, I think Tailspin Turtle's going on from his earlier remarks to say that type of navigation wasn't standard operating procedure, not disputing your material. (And let's just ignore Flight 19 and the triangle, except to note navigational errors are common...)

Going on - There's two aspects of nationalist approaches here, which have been picked up. The USN expected their pilots to navigate and fly, while the Commonwealth, British based system of Naval aviation ops often recognised that an observer would navigate and observe; famously requiring RN FAA fighters to be two seaters. This made more sense in bomber and torpedo aircraft, rather than loading the pilot with two roles and having someone to 'just' use the radio. (The USN system also gave the Avenger and Dauntless pilots infamously short control sticks to sit below the pull-out chart table.)

Secondly this is a classic example of allied disjunction. Junior or smaller forces like to show how much better/smarter/cleverer/more useful they are than the big allied guys in the field. True or not (and unlike Dave's case, there are often not) they are often / usually forgotten by the bigger force either because they aren't seen as important, or part of the 'main story', or also, sometimes because they are embarrassing.

No one group has all the best ideas...

If we are really after the real story, we need to put aside the natural tendency to a home-team bias. As Dave's already said, the RNZAF often just had a couple of years combat experience start on sometimes green USN guys; no discredit to the latter.

Now back to your normal broadcast...

Regards,

[Dave Homewood]

Fascinating discussion.

Just before this gets to snafu, Dave, I think Tailspin Turtle's going on from his earlier remarks to say that type of navigation wasn't standard operating procedure, not disputing your material.

My apologies if I misread it. I was not trying for snafu. Honest.

(And let's just ignore Flight 19 and the triangle, except to note navigational errors are common...)

Indeed. Many pilots were lost here in NZ through them too.

Going on - There's two aspects of nationalist approaches here, which have been picked up. The USN expected their pilots to navigate and fly, while the Commonwealth, British based system of Naval aviation ops often recognised that an observer would navigate and observe; famously requiring RN FAA fighters to be two seaters. This made more sense in bomber and torpedo aircraft, rather than loading the pilot with two roles and having someone to 'just' use the radio. (The USN system also gave the Avenger and Dauntless pilots infamously short control sticks to sit below the pull-out chart table.)

Just a note here, RNZAF pilots, ilike RAAF, RAF and others, were all given a lot of experience at navigation throughout their training and could all navigate up to a high standard, without the aid of a specialist nav beside him. They did loads of navigational exercises and cross countries etc. regardless of whether they were to be a fighter or bomber pilot. So really our bombers had two trained navigators aboard - especially the Hudsons and Venturas as the School of General Reconnaissance course the pilots of those aircraft went through was intensive navigation at low level.

In fact the Hudson crew had two pilots and a Navigator, so they had three experienced men in the role aboard. It should be noted that a good proportion of the Avenger pilots in the RNZAF came from General Reconaissance backgrounds so would have been through the School of GR training too. So we had a specialist navigator where the Americans didn't but the Pilot was not inexperienced if you see what I mean. Not that it matters to the big picture here.

Secondly this is a classic example of allied disjunction. Junior or smaller forces like to show how much better/smarter/cleverer/more useful they are than the big allied guys in the field. True or not (and unlike Dave's case, there are often not) they are often / usually forgotten by the bigger force either because they aren't seen as important, or part of the 'main story', or also, sometimes because they are embarrassing.

One of the overwhelming things I have gathered from looking at the topic of kiwis flying at Cactus and Santo is the mutual respect that the kiwis and the US units at Cactus seemed to have for each other. They seemed to work well together as one big team and the Americans certainly sent through numerous letters of congratulation and commendation to the kiwis for various tasks completed successfully.

On a personal level the two cultures didn't always seem to see eye to eye or perhaps understand each other - NZ was not then swamped with US media and culture as it is nowadays so kiwis only knew the Yanks from Hollywood cowboy films and that's it back then. The Americans mostly had no idea of NZ before the war either.

But I have never gained from the records or the veterans any sense of one group trying to out-do the other or trying to say they were more experienced and clever, etc. It seems to have just jelled nicely. The US Navy had a need for the role the Hudsons could perform and requested them as they had nothing themselves to fill the role at the time. The kiwis arrived and got on with it, and the Americans soon found that rather than a bunch of amateurs flying airliners to war as some has initially thought, they found them to be experienced professionals who did the job well. So well that the US command kept bumping new tasks and special duties their way as the high command knew they could rely on the kiwis to do it right.

Looking at diary accounts and talking with veterans there were many great, great friendships struck up between airmen of the two countries too.

In my questions here I have tried to not push the kiwis forward as the savours of the flare dropping mission Avengers, I have tried to simply present the evidence of their part in the missions and try to find out the reason behind their inclusion to see if it is the same as what anecdotal evidence suggests. I have also tried to stare away from suggesting anything against the US Avenger pilots or crews' abilities even though that is what is in question anecdotally. All I want is the truth behind the planning of these raids, what actually happended that made the command bring the Hudsons in. Was it really because Avengers were getting lost on the way home? Or was it just thought to be a prudent idea when planning the mine drops and nothing else behind it?

No one group has all the best ideas...

That's right. And every individal group grows stronger by looking at what others are doing and learning from their techniques. I just wish I could find something concrete behind the reasoning of the flare drop missions.

If we are really after the real story, we need to put aside the natural tendency to a home-team bias. As Dave's already said, the RNZAF often just had a couple of years combat experience start on sometimes green USN guys; no discredit to the latter.

As I tried to say above, I have tried to stare away from any bias, and present the facts and ask the questions accordingly. I really hope I have not come across as being biased because that has not been the intention at all. I have huge respect for all the guys who flew from Guadalcanal, and the whole reason I started this thread was because I didn't want to blindly believe the anecdotal evidence that the US Navy pilots were getting lost in the dark, without checking it out and giving them the benefit of the doubt, and getting the facts straight for the book.

[Tailspin Turtle]

Except for a handful of the the first production TBFs, the USN/USMC Avengers didn't even have a crew seat in the compartment directly behind the pilot except for some special mission aircraft. The enlisted radioman's position was in the fuselage in the vicinity of the lower compartment door, behind the bomb bay and ahead of and below the turret. His duties would include backing up the pilot in utilizing the YE-ZB homing capability. As importantly, he operated the primitive ASB radar fitted early on that used two independently aimed antennas; a well-trained and proficient radioman could locate big ships and islands and even establish distance and bearing to prominent coastline features. So he could function as an assistant navigator if the pilot trusted him to know his stuff. (At various points in the Avenger's career, the radioman was also a bombardier and an assistant tail gunner, firing a "stinger" .30 caliber located forward of the tail wheel.)

Short range referred to relative distance, not time. A four-hour mission including marshaling, time on target, etc is about 250 miles out and 250 miles back. Ferry range was about 2,500 miles with a bomb bay tank. It's a lot easier to get lost when you're flying 10 times as far. Ask Amelia. Oh, wait...

As noted, carrier-based missions included an additional degree of difficulty because the place where the food was could be 100 miles or more away from where airplanes took off. So navigation training was a really big deal and as JDK said, the pilot had a pull-out board almost the width of cockpit and plotting tools for the most precise dead reckoning. (The carrier air staff told them what the carrier's course and speed would probably be after their takeoff.) It helped that they usually had plenty of endurance for a search pattern if they didn't find the carrier immediately upon their return to its projected location.

However, and importantly for the operations that you are researching, I think it's true that at the time USN/USMC night missions were pretty much theoretical and not well-defined, much less trained for or practiced, doctrine for the crews of carrier-type airplanes. I'd certainly have welcomed a flare path to show me the way to go home.

Thanks for the info on the joint Kiwi/US operations at Guadalcanal. New to me and an innovative operational concept.

[JDK]

Just a note here, RNZAF pilots, ilike RAAF, RAF and others, were all given a lot of experience at navigation throughout their training and could all navigate up to a high standard, without the aid of a specialist nav beside him. They did loads of navigational exercises and cross countries etc. regardless of whether they were to be a fighter or bomber pilot.

I'm not sure, but I don't think that was the case for RN FAA pilots, who would rarely fly alone. I also know from interviews that RAF and RAAF pre-war general duties pilots had very poor standards of navigation skill; in fact the RAF learned the hard way relatively late on to raise that standard; for Bomber Command navigation failure was part of the Butt Report's conclusions as late as 1941. I can't comment on the RNZAF, but clearly Dave's info points in a different direction.

In short, the RAF saw navigation as a minor part of the pilot's role, and developed the specialised navigator task in the late 30s; the RN naturally saw navigation as a specialist role, and took that into the air when they flew. I'd suggest the RNZAF's later development may have driven a different approach than the other 'clone' air forces of the Commonwealth.

Any which way you cut it, IMHO, having a pilot responsible for the core navigation in the 1930s (and a couple of years after) was a bad idea. A pilot could carry out dead reckoning navigation perfectly well, but to get a fix by sextant or Direction Finding (when available) was not best carried out by someone also flying the aircraft. In single seaters it was a necessary evil, however in multi-crew aircraft it was not, I'd suggest, best use of the resources.

In the USN it seems (correction welcome) that the pilot would be the officer, responsible for the direction of the flight, literally, accompanied by enlisted men - i.e. not officers. (Note that the USAAC and USAAF heavies had an officer navigator.) In the RN's multi-crew strike aircraft, the pilot was essentially the driver, and the observer (usually a naval officer when the other aircrew were RAF officers in the 1930s) would always be an officer, responsible for the navigation, intelligence collection and direction of the flight's tasking.

Talking globally, naval, civil and air force until W.W.II it was not universally seen (as it is today) that the pilot was the important person aboard in all cases; often seen as a chauffeur for others in specific cases.

Sadly aerial navigation isn't an area well documented in aviation history. Another loss due to the excessive focus on drivers, airframe we get.

Secondly this is a classic example of allied disjunction. Junior or smaller forces like to show how much better/smarter/cleverer/more useful they are than the big allied guys in the field. True or not (and unlike Dave's case, there are often not) they are often / usually forgotten by the bigger force either because they aren't seen as important, or part of the 'main story', or also, sometimes because they are embarrassing.

...
But I have never gained from the records or the veterans any sense of one group trying to out-do the other or trying to say they were more experienced and clever, etc. It seems to have just jelled nicely. The US Navy had a need for the role the Hudsons could perform and requested them as they had nothing themselves to fill the role at the time. The kiwis arrived and got on with it, and the Americans soon found that rather than a bunch of amateurs flying airliners to war as some has initially thought, they found them to be experienced professionals who did the job well. So well that the US command kept bumping new tasks and special duties their way as the high command knew they could rely on the kiwis to do it right.

That's not disputed. What I was pointing at was later views (assumptions of national capability by more modern Americans, in this case) and more senior and home-front or general views of the time.

It's a matter of record that MacArthur did not want any credit going to any non-US forces where it could be avoided, while Admiral King was an anglophobe of a remarkable degree.

There might be low-level stores going 'back home' in things like LIFE and Stars and Stripes regarding great co-operation with our exotic allies, but there would not be acknowledgement of a need fulfilled by those allies due to a gap in home-team capability.

Add to that the general drive to smoothing the grand narratives of history, wrinkles and oddities like this get dropped out sooner or later; not to mention the tendency of less scrupulous historians to gloss (lightly or more) over the less edifying aspects of the armed forces story. For instance, in case anyone thinks this some anti-American diatribe, you have to do a bit of digging to find out that the RAAF was completely screwed up in it's high command at the latter stages of the Pacific war due to appalling behaviour by several of the senior commanders. It's there, but it's embarrassing and so it doesn't go front and centre in all accounts - understandably.

In short, there may have been period recognition of the RNZAF role in this case, and there will be contemporary operational, local records; but finding much beyond that is less likely as it will have been overlooked, ignored or dropped as minor, peripheral (or even embarrassing) in other secondary American accounts.

But it's well worth looking, and has got the thinking juices going!

Of course these are just some views and general context.

HTH

[JDK]

In Talispin Turtle's account of the USN use of radar for navigation, it seems there is a relative lack of appreciation of its best use in that role (i.e. mandatory use by the aircraft's navigator) as a legacy of the pre-war training, rank and crewing systems of the USN meaning the introduction of a dedicated navigator officer to two and three-seat aircraft was not easily done.

Conversely the development of H2S by Bomber Command as a dedicated navigation aid is a contrast - but I'm not aware of RN use of airborne radar for navigation - another interesting question.

[Dave Homewood]

I'm not sure, but I don't think that was the case for RN FAA pilots, who would rarely fly alone

.

That depended on which squadron they were in of course. Those who flew Martlets, Buffaloes, Sea Hurricanes, Sea Gladiators, Seafires, Corsairs, Hellcats, etc all flew withough observers.

I also know from interviews that RAF and RAAF pre-war general duties pilots had very poor standards of navigation skill; in fact the RAF learned the hard way relatively late on to raise that standard; for Bomber Command navigation failure was part of the Butt Report's conclusions as late as 1941. I can't comment on the RNZAF, but clearly Dave's info points in a different direction.

For the RNZAF, before the war most of our very few regular full time service pilots had previously trained in the RAF, and those who trained in NZ did so under the guidance of the ex-RAF types. The training system was probably exactly that of the RAF I'd guess, as NZ was training pilots for the RAF under their Short Service Commission scheme.

The majority of active operational pilots in the immediate years pre-war were in fact in the Territorial Air Force. They flew Baffins and Vincents on general reconnaissance training every weekend from Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The majority of those pilots were also Aero Club members, many were Aero Club instructors and a fair few were airline pilots, and some like Walker had flown long distance across the world. Also many were ex-RAF. And one or two were even barnstormers. One was a flying soldier of fortune wh'd been to the Antarctic, China, Spanish Civil War where he was an unofficial ace, and more. So there was a fair bit of experience there inn the TAF.

I'm not sure when cross country navigation became a strict part of the pilot's syllabus, maybe pre-war, maybe during. I don't know. But most pilots I have talked to say at the Service Flying Training School level they began the navex's and even part of their trade testing involved navex's. This continued as they moved into OTU and then Squadron work up level. I am talking about both single engine stream pilots and multi pilots.

At squadron level the Kittyhawks and Corsairs for example while working up at Ardmore before heading off on a tour to the Pacific spent a month or more flying daily rhubarbs up and down the country in flights of maybe twelve in tight formation at low level, but they also got sent off on naxex's as solo pilots and in pairs and sections of four.

In short, the RAF saw navigation as a minor part of the pilot's role, and developed the specialised navigator task in the late 30s; the RN naturally saw navigation as a specialist role, and took that into the air when they flew. I'd suggest the RNZAF's later development may have driven a different approach than the other 'clone' air forces of the Commonwealth.

I had never really thought about the training systems being different before but as you say maybe our NZ training was more nav concious than the RAF. Many pilots I have spoken with reckon in England you cannot get lost, as there are so many recognisable landmarks like spires and villages, and you just had to find a railway line and read the sign at the station; perhaps not the same here in 1940's NZ where you have hours of rolling hills and forest below.

Any which way you cut it, IMHO, having a pilot responsible for the core navigation in the 1930s (and a couple of years after) was a bad idea. A pilot could carry out dead reckoning navigation perfectly well, but to get a fix by sextant or Direction Finding (when available) was not best carried out by someone also flying the aircraft. In single seaters it was a necessary evil, however in multi-crew aircraft it was not, I'd suggest, best use of the resources.

Agreed, but regardless if there was room in one of our aircraft for a second person doing the navigating he was carried, only the fighters didn't have them.

Actually a key point here is that the RNZAF and its predecessor the NZPAF never trained Observers before the war. The first Observers were trained by the Territorial Air Force. They learned on the job at weekends for some time initially and then as war loomed the majority of them arranged time off work and went into camp at Wigram in mid-1939 for a few months to train up to top level in navigation, wireless telegraphy operation and air gunnery and bombing. They had planned another course to follow but Hitler intervened. So these men became the backbone of the General Reconnaissance force training others on the job operationally and at the GR School, etc.

Before these guys did this mid-1939 course the role of navigator in a crew was done only by a second pilot. Even into the early war months while there was a shortage of Observers the patrols were often flown with two pilots, one doing the nav work.

Its also worth mentioning that in December 1939 the Auckland (General Reconnaissance) Squadron was split in two, with one Flight of aircrew, groundcrew and aircraft going to Ohakea to for the Air Gunners and Air Observer's School, where they all became instructors for newbies coming into the RNZAF to be trained for the RAF.

All this detail will be in the book... as they say...

Talking globally, naval, civil and air force until W.W.II it was not universally seen (as it is today) that the pilot was the important person aboard in all cases; often seen as a chauffeur for others in specific cases.

It reminds me of when I interviewed Tony Pierard who flew Hawker Hinds in No. 20 Army Co-operation Squadron in Northland, NZ, he told me he was given the task of flying an old school Army captain on a job one day. Tony was doing his preflight cockpit checks and awaiting the green light when the Captain tapped him and said "You can take off now, pilot". He felt as if the guy thought he was his chauffeur. He said at the end of the flight he had a look and made sure the Captain his his monkey strap on, then gave him a few aeros. He said the Captain never treated him like a chauffeur again after that.

Sadly aerial navigation isn't an area well documented in aviation history. Another loss due to the excessive focus on drivers, airframe we get.

I agree with that too. And so many different systems of navigation were deloped too, you could write a good book on it.

That's not disputed. What I was pointing at was later views (assumptions of national capability by more modern Americans, in this case) and more senior and home-front or general views of the time.

If what you mean is that, with all due respect, most Americans these days have no idea of the contribution and sacrifices made by the likes of Australia and New Zealand and Britian and India and other Allied forces in the winning of the Pacific War, I agree. It has been quietly whitewashed out of their history for the most part, and even somewhat out of ours sadly. The aviation fans here on the forum will know more than the average joe blow Yankee, but even they seem to know little about the remarkable efforts of the RNZAF.

How many realise the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm's part in the Battle of Okinawa? Most don't know the FAA were even involved, or that kiwis made up one in every four of the FAA's aircrew members, and were all officers.

There might be low-level stores going 'back home' in things like LIFE and Stars and Stripes regarding great co-operation with our exotic allies, but there would not be acknowledgement of a need fulfilled by those allies due to a gap in home-team capability.

I do have an article that appeared in the US periodical called Air Force Magazine from September 1944 which details the Kiwi contribution to the Allied war effort in the Solomons very well. Interestingly it is written by Air Commodore Sidney Wallingford, who was RNZAF and had previously been the Officer i/c of RNZAF in the Pacific.

Also Flying magazine in October 1944 ran an article called One Ally about how the kiwis and US Navy were working as one group, not as seperate units.

They are both pretty positive articles on the relationship. There may have been others too but I have not had luck in finding them. I only found these two as they were in the No. 3 Squadron scrapbook, at the Air Force Musuem of New Zealand's archives.

But as you say at the time things are publicised but later they get forgotten and pushed aside.

Add to that the general drive to smoothing the grand narratives of history, wrinkles and oddities like this get dropped out sooner or later; not to mention the tendency of less scrupulous historians to gloss (lightly or more) over the less edifying aspects of the armed forces story. For instance, in case anyone thinks this some anti-American diatribe, you have to do a bit of digging to find out that the RAAF was completely screwed up in it's high command at the latter stages of the Pacific war due to appalling behaviour by several of the senior commanders. It's there, but it's embarrassing and so it doesn't go front and centre in all accounts - understandably.

Really? I had no idea there was problems in the RAAF heirachy. What's the gen on this? Was that scoundrel Bluey Truscott involved?

In short, there may have been period recognition of the RNZAF role in this case, and there will be contemporary operational, local records; but finding much beyond that is less likely as it will have been overlooked, ignored or dropped as minor, peripheral (or even embarrassing) in other secondary American accounts.

Yeah, so what you're saying is it's very unlikely that I will find the true answer to my original question by asking people here as they simply are unlikely to know the details. And though the discussion has been fascinating and enlightening I agree with you on that considering that American people generaly seem to not know the RNZAF were involved so intrinsicly in the US operations in the Solomons, and I have to wonder how will they ever know details like I need to find.

But it's well worth looking, and has got the thinking juices going!

Sure has. I have learned a fair bit.
Cheers

Tailspin Turtle wrote:

Except for a handful of the the first production TBFs, the USN/USMC Avengers didn't even have a crew seat in the compartment directly behind the pilot except for some special mission aircraft. The enlisted radioman's position was in the fuselage in the vicinity of the lower compartment door, behind the bomb bay and ahead of and below the turret.

Another interesting post. I am now re-evaluating my knowledge of the kiwis who flew in these aeroplanes. What I know is that our Avengers certainly seem to have had a seat in the cocpit behind the pilot's cockpit. I have looked at wartime photos I have of kiwi Avengers and you can see crew in there on flights in some shots, but in other shots they are not present. I am trying to recall, did that compartment have an access down into the rear fuselage? Could someone go up and down internally or did they only have access from the wing?

I think i might have to talk with my mate Wally Ingham about this to clarify where the Observer/Navigator sat on an operation. He was on No. 30 Squadron as a Fitter and he runs the No. 30 Squadron Association.

Short range referred to relative distance, not time. A four-hour mission including marshaling, time on target, etc is about 250 miles out and 250 miles back. Ferry range was about 2,500 miles with a bomb bay tank. It's a lot easier to get lost when you're flying 10 times as far. Ask Amelia. Oh, wait...

Yes I see your point.

Thanks for the info on the joint Kiwi/US operations at Guadalcanal. New to me and an innovative operational concept.

The RNZAF had a system where its squadrons within New Zealand and at Fiji came under NZ command, but any further up the Pacific chain came under US command, but within the US command structure were also NZ officers placed at key points to ensure the working relationship worked. I have interviewed kiwi fighter pilot John Arkwright who flew a couple of tours on Kittyhawks and was then promoted to Wing Commander and placed onto the staff of the General in charge of air operations in the Solomons, and he was actually appointed as the general's deputy with a responsibility for overseeing several US fighter squadrons as well as the New Zealand Fighter Wing. He got to fly the P-38, F4U-4, Hellcat and other types on those squadrons, something most kiwis only dreamed of at that stage of the war. Sidney Wallingford, Geoff Roberts and Sir Robert Clark-Hall all filled similar roles working as RNZAF leaders within the US high ranks.

[Dave Homewood]

James, regarding the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm using radar for navigation I'm not certain of the details on that, but an interesting fact is that the Royal Navy FAA developed radar significantly and that technology was used by Bomber Command and others. I know a wartime FAA pilot Nelson Tolerton who flew on a specialist development unit that was flying a variety of aircraft including a special Royal Navy Vickers Wellington. You don't hear much about the Navy flying them, do you?

[JDK]

I'm not sure, but I don't think that was the case for RN FAA pilots, who would rarely fly alone

.
That depended on which squadron they were in of course. Those who flew Martlets, Buffaloes, Sea Hurricanes, Sea Gladiators, Seafires, Corsairs, Hellcats, etc all flew withough observers.

I was referring to the doctrine and equipment thinking of the 1930s FAA for the RN. In 1939, the RN did not regard single seater over water operations as viable. All of the types listed were not in service, or under consideration at that point, except the Sea Gladiator, which was an emergency type, and intended for local (what was later called) Combat Air Patrol. The RN required that fighters be multi-role and carry a navigator; the FAA's main fighter in 1939 was the Blackburn Skua, with the Fairey Fulmar to come. The acquisition of the single seat fighters by modifying RAF aircraft or obtaining US types was a change of doctrine - a vital one, but not part of the pre-war planning.

Regards,

[JDK]

In short, there may have been period recognition of the RNZAF role in this case, and there will be contemporary operational, local records; but finding much beyond that is less likely as it will have been overlooked, ignored or dropped as minor, peripheral (or even embarrassing) in other secondary American accounts.

Yeah, so what you're saying is it's very unlikely that I will find the true answer to my original question by asking people here as they simply are unlikely to know the details.

No! Certainly not suggesting that WIX member's can't help - definitely not.

I'm saying that there will be references in the primary sources (operational documents of the time related to those ops) but much less likely in the secondary sources (histories and post-war accounts, and wartime rah-rah stories for the folks back home). WIX members may well have the answers you seek, based on primary data, not secondary. Already there's been some excellent WIX input - thanks to them for that.

Regards,

[Dave Homewood]

Again, yes I agree. I have really appreciated the WIX feedback and discussion on this, it has been great. I wish i could get that USMC link to work, as they would likely be a good place to find that primary sorce material.

Sorry regaring the single seaters - I didn't twig that you were referring to before the war.

As an aside I met a chap a few weeks ago who left NZ in 1936 and joined the RAF as a pilot, trained up and was posted to the FAA in 1938 and placed onto HMS Furious flying Swordfish. By the tiem the war began he was offloaded at Singapore and he flew Sqordfish and Vildebeests there a couple of years becoming very active when the Japanese entered the war bombing their footholds and airfields in Malaya. He flew on the Endau raid too! He escaped to Jakarta then Australia and then to India where he flew for the rest of the war. Not many prewar FAA pilots still around now I'd think. He's 94.

[Tailspin Turtle]

"I have looked at wartime photos I have of kiwi Avengers and you can see crew in there on flights in some shots, but in other shots they are not present. I am trying to recall, did that compartment have an access down into the rear fuselage? Could someone go up and down internally or did they only have access from the wing?"

The Avenger fuselage was open from behind the cockpit to the tunnel stinger-gun. The top of the bomb bay formed the floor of the area under the plexiglass between the pilots canopy and the turret. The lower compartment began at the aft end of the bomb bay. In the preponderance of USN/USMC airplanes, the left side of the upper compartment aft of the pilot was filled with avionics equipment, radios and associated hardware being considerably bulkier in those days. However, the crewmen in the aft compartment could crawl forward into that area.