Warbird Information Exchange

Gunny - I agree with you. At the end of the day, post January 11(?), 1944 directive, the 8th AF BC not only was the strategic arm of the USAAF in ETO, they were the 'bait'. The award of same credit to ground scores also encouraged the returning escorts to get on the deck and raise hell on the way back.

The tactics did start to evolve however, even before the famous Doolittle directive. The Zemke Fan was a classic example of a superb leader devising tactics to get out in front and find the LW before they hit the bombers. The evolution from there depended on individual Group and Squadron CO's as far a 'parceling out' of flights and sections and finally squadrons when really big LW strike forces were encountered.

So the mantra was be aggressive - but still 'protect the bombers'.

Given a candid review of the Combined Bomber Offensive report on effectiveness after the war.... the primary mission of the Bombers were as bait in a war of attrition with the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm..... Lot's of aggressive leaders (Blakeslee being one of them) stretched the 'escort' directive... it took Doolittle to set them free.....

My masters was in History and I specialized in the ETO.... you can talk a history prof into almost anything<g>... and the best part is it was the University of California<G>....

gunny

_________________
Scott 'Gunny' Perdue
www.scottperdue.com

Gunny - I would agree to a point. There were three, maybe four distinct phases of 8thAF Ops. The first phase of growth to the August-October 1943 timeframe was all about pursuing the USAAF strategic doctrine of heavy bombers getting to the target - unescorted. That didn't work out so well as Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Munster, etc proved.

The second phase was 'regrouping' and rebuilding the losses of summer and fall combined with the influx of most of the 8th AF FC groups in the September through January, 1944 in which the new groups were bloodied, the P-38 experiment was tested and the P-47 was inadequate for target escort. It was here that the decision to replace the 38 with the 51 occurred, the 9th AF Mustangs were 'loaned', the 357th FG was swapped for the 8th AF 358th Jugs and the future of air superiority was bet on the P-51.

The third phase was 'destroy the Luftwaffe' prior to Invasion along with settling on Petroleum industry as strategic focus of 8th AF, then 15th AF. This was the 'bait phase for B-17 and B-24 crews' of February through May, 1944. This was truly the period in which the Battle of Germany bled the experienced LW dry of most experienced fighter pilots drawn from NE, Ost, SE fronts into Germany. This was the absolute and lingering most important contribution of the new Mustang groups including the 4th, 352nd, 354th, 355th, and 357th FG - few in relative numbers fighting against the LuftFlotte Reich - IIRC the last time the 8th AF lost >5% of the total mission forces was on May 12.

then the 339th, 359th, 361st then the 364th/20th and 55th (converting from P-38's) brought critical mass to provide substantial escort target coverage to all three bomb divisions in the May-September timeframe.

The 479th was interesting for a variety of reasons but were perhaps the most effective of the P-38 groups with the late model J's. Zemke had to be a major factor there.

The 78th, 353rd and 356th were way late in swapping Jugs for the 51's - by that time their involvement in big air battles were essentially limited - with some contributions for the Bulge and Bodenplatte.

The final phase was systematic and effective (but not 100%) destruction of Oil, Chemical and Synthetic Fuels targets which doomed the Luftwaffe from ever hoping to rebuild..

I read that Robert S. Johnson, Thunderbolt ace par excellence, and Republic Aviation employee said once that if the N model P-47 had not been delayed no one would ever have heard of the Mustang. Was the N model somehow delayed? How did its' range compare to the Mustang?

_________________
"I can't understand it, I cut it twice and it's still too short!" Robert F. Dupre' 1923-2010 Go With God.

(Internal tanks alone)
P-51D: 950 miles
P-47N: 800 miles

(Maximum drop tank load)
P-51D: 2300 miles
P-47N: 2350 miles

_________________
It was a good idea, it just didn't work.

Not bad for a quick and dirty analysis..... all of that stressed the LW... what gave them the coup de grace was their own mission... Operation Bodenplatte on Christmas Day '44.... ill conceived and poorly executed they never recovered from the losses of that day. Fighter production and even fuel were not the limiting factors for the LW Fighter Force.... it was pilots, they had no safe haven to train replacements and after the New Year they just fed new guys into the maw, sacrificing them in the vain hope of re-gaining an advantage. You can't fight for 5-7 years with much expectation of living afterwards...... the German center of gravity was not fuel, ball bearings, production/manufacturing... it was people, and they never built an effective training system. To be fair the RAF didn't either, most of their pilot training was done in the US from the early days... it's hard to train new guys in a combat zone.

gunny

_________________
Scott 'Gunny' Perdue
www.scottperdue.com

Good point on pilot attrition, I remember reading one RAF ace pilot, not sure but I think it was Johnnie Johnson that said toward the end of the war they were not encountering as high a quality pilots among the Germans as in the early years. The RAF had the same attrition earlier in the war, while there was a shortage of top planes, the experienced pilot shortage was more desperate.

Again, I was reading another book where the RAF leader is about to take his squad up to hard combat and he asks the new guy how much time he has in fighters (Hurris), and the answer comes back brightly, " 8 hours, sir."

_________________
Bill Greenwood
Spitfire N308WK

Very interesting thread, lots of thought provoking material here, great stuff.

I've always been suspicious of the 'sole solution' of the P-51Ds to Berlin story, and to (over-)simplify the earlier remarks, the Mustang was best solution at the time, but there were alternatives, no?


!

Can't agree with that at all.

There were certainly arguably shortfalls in the operational-to-combat level training, but that was always an issue for all air forces with the shock effect of real combat and the difficulty of dragging training to deal with that into operational training units (OTUs) in the Commonwealth.

While the US participated in Commonwealth training, with US bases and facilities (not to be forgotten) the majority of the training was elsewhere, called the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) among other names - Canada, primarily, and not for the RAF alone but for the Commonwealth forces. The main advantage was training without risk for enemy interdiction and in better weather conditions (mostly) than in Europe or the Pacific - issues that the Luftwaffe had to deal with.

I'd be interested in any data that actually shows that the EATS training was ever compromised significantly or cut down or interdicted by enemy activity as was the case for the Luftwaffe. The Germans planned on a couple of years of war, to occupy Europe and Russia, and almost got there - all before the arrival of any US (rather than volunteer) forces. Their training regimen - and their technological planning was focussed to this. From 1941 onwards they were trying to catch up from this failure of longer-term planning.

Conversely the British Empire planned for a longer war (albeit on fewer fronts) and the EATS was very successful - despite the horrendous losses in Bomber Command in producing more airmen than were needed throughout and out of the end of the war. The only time I'm aware that the RAF were running short of pilots (and experience) was in mid-late 1940. Much is made of this training time shortfall in 1940, as touched on in Bill's post above. After 1940 this was certainly not the case. That may have been an issue, but the real issue was always poor adaptation of newly required tactics by the RAF, something I have the impression that the American forces were more flexible, i.e. better about. Certainly the US forces learned quickly and acted on that learning in combat in many ways.

Simplistically in short, the Axis (Italy, Germany and Japan) all failed the long-term training plan test, while the allies, excepting Russia, perhaps, laid good quality (by the standards and expectations of the time - it'd be regarded as a meatgrinder today) training plans that delivered. AFAIK, the US and Commonwealth training systems were both reasonably effective and I've never seen evidence of significant superiority or shortfalls in either - interested to see 'em though.

It's also perhaps worth noting that the British policy of 'leaning into Europe' from prior to the arrival of the USAAF, with Rhubarbs, Ramrods et al which was successful in applying limited pressure to the German forces, but also cost a lot of experienced fighter airmen, such as Bader and Tuck most famously. There probably weren't alternatives, but loss of experience is also a factor when flying over enemy territory.

And we mustn't forget the giant in the East, which is where Germany was bled dry.

Regards,

_________________
James K

"Switch on the underwater landing lights"
Emilio Largo, Thunderball.

www.VintageAeroWriter.com

I see you disagree with my point and then proceed in defining it much better than I did in the beginning.... don't actually see the disagreement. I should have mentioned Canada (all of the Eagle pilots that flew for the RAF were trained in Canada).... I should have said the majority of RAF pilots were trained in the US and Canada because of the exposure to combat in the UK and of course the wx... in the US the EATS was called the Arnold Scheme (a very good friend of mine was a product of it). My point was the RAF responded to the problem of training pilots by outsourcing it... the German's could not and paid the price for it. The average Fighter Pilot hitting the continent in '44 had 200-400 hours and specialized training.... it made a huge difference (a friend of mine, Norb Ruff had no experience beyond AT-6's before being thrown into a P-40/400 and combat early in the war, by late '44 the new P-38 pilot in the combat zone had 100 hours in the P-38 learning combat tactics in the airplane he would fight in).

As for Post BoB RAF tactics... I don't see that they had much choice if they desired to stay in the air war... by the LW reaction (pulling most of their forces to the East) you can see that they didn't worry about the RAF incursions too much.

As for other solutions to the Fighter Sweep/ deep penetration/ Escort role.... I am not a big fantasy guy... it was what it was, and it happened to be a close run thing... the P-51 was successful for many reasons, it was not the best at anything... but it was very, very good and it was easy to fly.... Blakeslee converted the 4th to the Mustang with no down time... some of the guys even got a 3-5 hours in the Mustang before taking it into combat<g>... they were successful right from the start.... That is the key to it's success... in my experience learning how to employ the airplane is the hardest part of the mission.... if it is hard to fly as well it increases the problems. As I've stated before I wouldn't mind fighting the P-38 offensively, but would have hated being defensive (the problem is you can never predict, nor totally control the role exchanges).... the Mustang is dead easy.... I've never flown the Jug, but folks who do talk about cramped cockpit, hard to see out of and other issues. The interesting thing is to note the points upon which things (battles, airplane designs, tactics, winners/losers) hinged... and then try to extrapolate that interplay of reality and planning with the unknown to something like the future.

gunny

_________________
Scott 'Gunny' Perdue
www.scottperdue.com

Hi Gunny,

I read your remark as the RAF failed to train effectively, not as you intended, apparently, that 'they trained elsewhere'. I though it an oddity in your posts where I otherwise agree!

Also what I see in this discussion is the normal better knowledge of 'local' history, which, sometimes in combination with the 'not invented here' syndrome and the human tendency to put greater weight on what 'we' did rather than 'them' can give a partial picture or understanding. (I don't claim any expertise, but this fascinating discussion does fit into a bigger, wider picture, some elements I'm drawing in might be relevant, I hope.)

Again I'm not an expert on the training, but the Arnold Scheme was a parallel to the EATS, not part, and (comparatively) very small - so yes, not mentioning Canada where the vast majority of Commonwealth airmen were trained is an omission! Just to clarify, Canada trained "167,000 students, including over 50,000 pilots, from May 1940 to March 1945. While the majority of those who successfully completed the program went on to serve in the RAF, over half (72,835) of the 131,553 graduates were Canadians" while between '41 and '43 the Arnold Scheme took 7,885 cadets and delivered out 4,493.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Co ... lan#Canada
http://www.arnold-scheme.org/

Of course it wasn't just Canada and the USA - "Australia undertook to provide 28,000 aircrew over three years, which represented 36% of the total number of aircrew proposed to be trained under the scheme." These airmen were trained in Australia, as well as many going onto Canada. By March '45, "over 37,000 Australian airmen" had been trained.
http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_14939.asp
And there was Southern Rhodesia, New Zealand and these countries provided training for many other nation's airmen training. And meanwhile South Africa, in another parallel to EATS, the Joint Air Training Scheme, trained 33,347...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Co ... ining_Plan

In short, as you've said, training was one area where (all) the western Allies won; and there's a big lesson there.


Certainly Stalin agitated for more activity on the Western Front from 1941 onwards. However we can easily make a case that the entire post '41 activities in the West were less critical in combating Germany than the Russian effort. Standing back from a bias or knowledge-base of East or West, there is unarguably more cost and loading on the Eastern front in the defeat of Germany.

Those RAF airmen did their best to 'worry' the Luftwaffe and I'd be wary of dismissing their activities (which did require based Luftwaffe units across the Western European area - not to mention the Luftwaffe owned Flak and defensive units combating Bomber Command) so lightly. Certainly the previous activities and the saving of the UK from German activities provided a base and time for the USAAF to operate from in Europe.

Your books are all factual?

More seriously, recently I was reading an historians discussions on the role of 'what if' and counter factual history - a big dividing issue. Certainly historians must be prepared to recognise some what would have happened if cards had fallen a different way, even if they don't go into the alternative worlds approach. However, like scientific based 'controls' alternate paths certainly do have something to teach us, if handled sensibly - as this thread and your input is showing, I think.

That's interesting. Obviously the canopy / vision thing was changed by the employment of the bubble canopy, and IIRC, that was trialled using a British Tempest (or Typhoon) canopy before the P-47 switched and then the P-51 joined the bubble party - or am I wrong? Secondly the RAF opinion of the P-47 was that 'the cockpit was so big that evasive manoeuvres consisted of undoing the straps and running around inside'. But many of these pilots were coming from Spitfires, a famously 'intimate' cockpit. Last time I looked the P-47 cockpit certainly looked larger than the P-51, to me - better qualified comment? Not a lot of current Jug pilots out there, I guess. Like the P-38's yoke, other items might be factors, of course.

Not to give the impression I disagree overall - as I said at the start, it's a fascinating discussion, and I like (and am learning from) the points made.

Regards,

_________________
James K

"Switch on the underwater landing lights"
Emilio Largo, Thunderball.

www.VintageAeroWriter.com

More on topic than my diversion above! - Was it Dolittle who made an order to switch the 8th AF to P-51D and to withdraw P-38 and P-47 types from the units? (Or something similar.) I vaguely recall reading this account, but can't remember where, or even if I recall correctly. I think we discussed it here before and some people very kindly provided comment, but I can't remember the conclusion - if we reached it - and the search didn't throw it up this time.

So as we are in that arena... Anyone?

_________________
James K

"Switch on the underwater landing lights"
Emilio Largo, Thunderball.

www.VintageAeroWriter.com

Sometimes I think it would be easier to talk in person than do these forum posts.... I end up just doing a quick draw and say something cryptic that leaves a lot of background out.... easy to mis-understand.



I didn't intend to give a detailed, fact rich argument about the scope of the training programs... maybe I should have... I was just trying to make a point. But you do make an excellent one about the rest of the Empire and the role they played in supplying trained crews. In fact my T-6 was one of over 700+ the US gave to South Africa to train pilots (there you i go again... 'local' history, parochial yank<g>). I didn't intend to dismiss the rest of the Allied world (I'd like to keep a good reputation in Australia and NZ.... two places I seriously want to visit soon).





This may be another mis-understanding point.... I do not feel that I was dismissing their activities at all.... I think they even knew what they were doing was not having a serious impact (I seem to remember reading that in a book by a Spitfire pilot of the time).... it was the only thing the Fighter force could do to stay in the war... a direct result of the short range defensive nature of their aircraft... since Bomber Command went to nights there was no impetus to improve the range of the RAF fighters. Certainly a case can be made that their experience leavened the combat knowledge and seasoning of the crews. A footnote.... of the top of my head I can't remember whether it was 121 or 133 squadron, but they lost 13 Spitfires on one mission... ran out of gas... most ditched on the French side... if you've seen he movie "The Great Escape" the American wearing the RAF uniform (Hedley as I remember, it's been awhile) was one of those Eagle guys. There is no doubt the missions were costly.




Point taken... but to this point I haven't been an alternative history kind of guy.... maybe I should be... have you read my book? I do agree that a well thought out alternative history can teach us a lot about those 'swing points'. What I want to avoid is the pissing contest of what airplane is better and I like this one..... yadee yadee ya....


......



I don't know the provenance of the bubble canopy off the top of my head.... but the canopy wasn't introduced on the Jug until well after production of the D model (around block 25 IIRC which was contemporaneous with the 51D which had it from the beginning). The P-51 cockpit is straight up on the sides and wide enough for a fairly big guy like me to have plenty of room to twist and turn.... the Jug narrows up to the canopy rails and bumps the shoulders and the canopy arch is smaller.... plus it is hot... that big radial produces a LOT of heat. The Spit, well I think the typical Brit was undernourished because a corn-fed American would have a lot of trouble fitting in the cockpit<g>.... the 38 is just '30's technology, lots of frames, rails and obstructions where you don't need them.... the dash is quite far away and while the yoke gets to be second nature it is a big clunky thing that definitely gets in the way.

I agree, not a bad discussion.....

_________________
Scott 'Gunny' Perdue
www.scottperdue.com

Thanks for that, Gunny, I agree it we miss a lot on internet discussions over face to face, but on the other hand it's a global village for WIX members who know some people outside don't think this kind of thing is relly relly important.

I agree I was dashing off into side-aspects of the discussion, but I also think that's part of the fun of WIX. Buuut...

So everybody, back on topic please, don't get distracted.

Do drop me a line if you manage to get to the Melbourne area, and we can at least have a go at your suggestion of a face to face discussion over cold ones.

Regards,

_________________
James K

"Switch on the underwater landing lights"
Emilio Largo, Thunderball.

www.VintageAeroWriter.com

Gunny - the modest disagreement was strictly that the bombers were and remained bait.

I apologise for the 'tutorial' to a guy with an MA in history on the subject but trying to present my views on the phases and the transition periods.

My godfather was Clay Kinnard who 'replaced' Blakeslee and admittedly was NOT a fan of the 4th FG pilots while he was there. 'Nough said. The 4th's record stands by itself.

The fighter pilots themselves were (most) very conscientious about protecting their Big Friends, some group leaders were more focused on that role and those groups in general had lower air to air scores.

Johnson was wrong. Remember the 354th FG (Pioneer Mustangs) was equipped with 51's and the 363rd and 357th FG (Yeager/Anderson) followed closely. The 9th AF was already committed to P-51s and only made the switch when 8th AF swapped first the 358th FG (Jugs) for the 357th and committed the P-38s to 9th AF in return for Mustangs (20th, 55th and 364th FG). The first re-equipped Mustang Groups were the 355th and 4th and their Jugs went immediately to the new 9th AF TAC wings in March, 1944

The P-47M was deployed to 56th FG before the wiring harness/electrical problems were worked out - just because the 56th needed more range and the N only became operationally deployed in February/March 1945 scheduled for long range escort in Pacific.