Fri Dec 04, 2009 1:59 pm
gunnyperdue wrote:Both airplanes did indeed participate in Escort missions.... operational issues got in the way. For the P-38 the engines had trouble with the cold/humid weather and until the 38L compressibility and Roll Rate were huge limits on it's effectiveness as a Fighter (not to mention visibility from the cockpit)... in short it was outclassed as a defensive fighter ( and VERY difficult to employ). The P-47's main issue was range and speed.... all that was solved by the 47N model but too late to be of any real impact on the ETO... the Wolfpack used the Jug throughout the war and achieved outstanding results. In particular it was the better strafer of ground targets. The P-51 was easy to fly and employ.... even for the average guy... that aspect makes a huge difference.
But the real issue here is not a fantasy question of whether this or that airplane could accomplish the mission better.... but the fact that Escort was NOT the mission that resulted in fewer bombers being shot down. Escort is a defensive mission and the results clearly show that we didn't start to win air superiority until Doolittle let the Fighters go on the offensive (I did my masters thesis on this subject) after doing their stint at Escort. Break up and shoot down the bogies before they become a threat to the bombers... take the fight to the enemy... don't wait for it to come to you. The P-51 excelled at that mission more than any other.... even the P-38 or F6F in the Pacific IMHO.
gunny
Fri Dec 04, 2009 2:54 pm
drgondog wrote:.............
Gunny - I agree with you. At the end of the day, post January 11(?), 1944 directive, the 8th AF BC not only was the strategic arm of the USAAF in ETO, they were the 'bait'. The award of same credit to ground scores also encouraged the returning escorts to get on the deck and raise heck on the way back.
The tactics did start to evolve however, even before the famous Doolittle directive. The Zemke Fan was a classic example of a superb leader devising tactics to get out in front and find the LW before they hit the bombers. The evolution from there depended on individual Group and Squadron CO's as far a 'parceling out' of flights and sections and finally squadrons when really big LW strike forces were encountered.
So the mantra was be aggressive - but still 'protect the bombers'.
Fri Dec 04, 2009 6:55 pm
Fri Dec 04, 2009 8:44 pm
muddyboots wrote:If the P51 had never existed, could we still have found a way to defend our heavies over Germany?
Fri Dec 04, 2009 9:12 pm
John Dupre wrote:muddyboots wrote:If the P51 had never existed, could we still have found a way to defend our heavies over Germany?
I read that Robert S. Johnson, Thunderbolt ace par excellence, and Republic Aviation employee said once that if the N model P-47 had not been delayed no one would ever have heard of the Mustang... How did its' range compare to the Mustang?
Fri Dec 04, 2009 9:54 pm
drgondog wrote:Gunny - I would agree to a point. There were three, maybe four distinct phases of 8thAF Ops. The first phase of growth to the August-October 1943 timeframe was all about pursuing the USAAF strategic doctrine of heavy bombers getting to the target - unescorted. That didn't work out so well as Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Munster, etc proved.
The second phase was 'regrouping' and rebuilding the losses of summer and fall combined with the influx of most of the 8th AF FC groups in the September through January, 1944 in which the new groups were bloodied, the P-38 experiment was tested and the P-47 was inadequate for target escort. It was here that the decision to replace the 38 with the 51 occurred, the 9th AF Mustangs were 'loaned', the 357th FG was swapped for the 8th AF 358th Jugs and the future of air superiority was bet on the P-51.
The third phase was 'destroy the Luftwaffe' prior to Invasion along with settling on Petroleum industry as strategic focus of 8th AF, then 15th AF. This was the 'bait phase for B-17 and B-24 crews' of February through May, 1944. This was truly the period in which the Battle of Germany bled the experienced LW dry of most experienced fighter pilots drawn from NE, Ost, SE fronts into Germany. This was the absolute and lingering most important contribution of the new Mustang groups including the 4th, 352nd, 354th, 355th, and 357th FG - few in relative numbers fighting against the LuftFlotte Reich - IIRC the last time the 8th AF lost >5% of the total mission forces was on May 12.
then the 339th, 359th, 361st then the 364th/20th and 55th (converting from P-38's) brought critical mass to provide substantial escort target coverage to all three bomb divisions in the May-September timeframe.
The 479th was interesting for a variety of reasons but were perhaps the most effective of the P-38 groups with the late model J's. Zemke had to be a major factor there.
The 78th, 353rd and 356th were way late in swapping Jugs for the 51's - by that time their involvement in big air battles were essentially limited - with some contributions for the Bulge and Bodenplatte.
The final phase was systematic and effective (but not 100%) destruction of Oil, Chemical and Synthetic Fuels targets which doomed the Luftwaffe from ever hoping to rebuild..
Fri Dec 04, 2009 10:08 pm
Fri Dec 04, 2009 10:19 pm
gunnyperdue wrote:To be fair the RAF didn't either, most of their pilot training was done in the US from the early days... it's hard to train new guys in a combat zone.
Fri Dec 04, 2009 11:10 pm
Sat Dec 05, 2009 12:36 am
gunnyperdue wrote:I see you disagree with my point and then proceed in defining it much better than I did in the beginning.... don't actually see the disagreement.
I should have mentioned Canada (all of the Eagle pilots that flew for the RAF were trained in Canada).... I should have said the majority of RAF pilots were trained in the US and Canada because of the exposure to combat in the UK and of course the wx... in the US the EATS was called the Arnold Scheme (a very good friend of mine was a product of it).
As for Post BoB RAF tactics... I don't see that they had much choice if they desired to stay in the air war... by the LW reaction (pulling most of their forces to the East) you can see that they didn't worry about the RAF incursions too much.
As for other solutions to the Fighter Sweep/ deep penetration/ Escort role.... I am not a big fantasy guy...
I've never flown the Jug, but folks who do talk about cramped cockpit, hard to see out of and other issues.
Sat Dec 05, 2009 5:16 am
Sat Dec 05, 2009 6:10 am
JDK wrote:....
I read your remark as the RAF failed to train effectively, not as you intended, apparently, that 'they trained elsewhere'. I though it an oddity in your posts where I otherwise agree!
Also what I see in this discussion is the normal better knowledge of 'local' history, which, sometimes in combination with the 'not invented here' syndrome and the human tendency to put greater weight on what 'we' did rather than 'them' can give a partial picture or understanding. (I don't claim any expertise, but this fascinating discussion does fit into a bigger, wider picture, some elements I'm drawing in might be relevant, I hope.)
In short, as you've said, training was one area where (all) the western Allies won; and there's a big lesson there.
Certainly Stalin agitated for more activity on the Western Front from 1941 onwards. However we can easily make a case that the entire post '41 activities in the West were less critical in combating Germany than the Russian effort. Standing back from a bias or knowledge-base of East or West, there is unarguably more cost and loading on the Eastern front in the defeat of Germany.
Those RAF airmen did their best to 'worry' the Luftwaffe and I'd be wary of dismissing their activities (which did require based Luftwaffe units across the Western European area - not to mention the Luftwaffe owned Flak and defensive units combating Bomber Command) so lightly. Certainly the previous activities and the saving of the UK from German activities provided a base and time for the USAAF to operate from in Europe.
As for other solutions to the Fighter Sweep/ deep penetration/ Escort role.... I am not a big fantasy guy...
Your books are all factual?![]()
I've never flown the Jug, but folks who do talk about cramped cockpit, hard to see out of and other issues.
That's interesting. Obviously the canopy / vision thing was changed by the employment of the bubble canopy, and IIRC, that was trialled using a British Tempest (or Typhoon) canopy before the P-47 switched and then the P-51 joined the bubble party - or am I wrong? Secondly the RAF opinion of the P-47 was that 'the cockpit was so big that evasive manoeuvres consisted of undoing the straps and running around inside'. But many of these pilots were coming from Spitfires, a famously 'intimate' cockpit. Last time I looked the P-47 cockpit certainly looked larger than the P-51, to me - better qualified comment? Not a lot of current Jug pilots out there, I guess. Like the P-38's yoke, other items might be factors, of course.
Sat Dec 05, 2009 6:45 am
Sat Dec 05, 2009 11:29 am
gunnyperdue wrote:I see you disagree with my point and then proceed in defining it much better than I did in the beginning.... don't actually see the disagreement. I should have mentioned Canada (all of the Eagle pilots that flew for the RAF were trained in Canada).... I should have said the majority of RAF pilots were trained in the US and Canada because of the exposure to combat in the UK and of course the wx... in the US the EATS was called the Arnold Scheme (a very good friend of mine was a product of it). My point was the RAF responded to the problem of training pilots by outsourcing it... the German's could not and paid the price for it. The average Fighter Pilot hitting the continent in '44 had 200-400 hours and specialized training.... it made a huge difference (a friend of mine, Norb Ruff had no experience beyond AT-6's before being thrown into a P-40/400 and combat early in the war, by late '44 the new P-38 pilot in the combat zone had 100 hours in the P-38 learning combat tactics in the airplane he would fight in).
As for Post BoB RAF tactics... I don't see that they had much choice if they desired to stay in the air war... by the LW reaction (pulling most of their forces to the East) you can see that they didn't worry about the RAF incursions too much.
As for other solutions to the Fighter Sweep/ deep penetration/ Escort role.... I am not a big fantasy guy... it was what it was, and it happened to be a close run thing... the P-51 was successful for many reasons, it was not the best at anything... but it was very, very good and it was easy to fly.... Blakeslee converted the 4th to the Mustang with no down time... LoL. He 'stole' the 355th FG Mustangs for the late February through March 6 raid by making and meeting this commitment!some of the guys even got a 3-5 hours in the Mustang before taking it into combat<g>... they were successful right from the start.... That is the key to it's success... in my experience learning how to employ the airplane is the hardest part of the mission.... if it is hard to fly as well it increases the problems. As I've stated before I wouldn't mind fighting the P-38 offensively, but would have hated being defensive (the problem is you can never predict, nor totally control the role exchanges).... the Mustang is dead easy.... I've never flown the Jug, but folks who do talk about cramped cockpit, hard to see out of and other issues. The interesting thing is to note the points upon which things (battles, airplane designs, tactics, winners/losers) hinged... and then try to extrapolate that interplay of reality and planning with the unknown to something like the future. Very good perspective. My father entered combat in the Mustang with 5 take off/landings at Goxhill (2.5 total P-51 time) before transferring to 355th and shot his first airplane (Stuka but a nice 'trainer' to start with) on his first day of combat on D-Day. But - he had 2200 hours being stuck in Training Command for four years! Experience is everything when talent is equal.
gunny
Sat Dec 05, 2009 12:11 pm
John Dupre wrote:muddyboots wrote:If the P51 had never existed, could we still have found a way to defend our heavies over Germany?
I read that Robert S. Johnson, Thunderbolt ace par excellence, and Republic Aviation employee said once that if the N model P-47 had not been delayed no one would ever have heard of the Mustang. Was the N model somehow delayed? How did its' range compare to the Mustang?