gear up C-17 Bagram AB

[CAPFlyer]

The manufacturer has always been involved with major repairs like this. Boeing had many teams working out of Tulsa and other locations during the several re-skins of the KC-135 wings for example or any of several dozen accidents and incidents with C-130s going back to Marietta and Lockheed, not to mention the C-5 and C-141 modifications being done there as well. Whenever an aircraft had a major accident but was being repaired, it was typical for the manufacturer to have people on site or for the aircraft to be taken to a manufacturer's facility for repairs, especially when the Depot was fully utilized or when it was simply easier to send it to the manufacturer.

It also depends on the contract terms as well. Too often we forget the "acquisition cost" of an aircraft often includes a certain level of repairs to be provided by the manufacturer for a given period of time.

[Sully]

There are also damages beyond the standard SRM to be considered.
The OEM can best evaluate and develop a plan with their own people.

Sully

[bdk]

I agree with Randy, but I am sorry to see that the Air Force can't take care of its planes without help from the contractor. I'm not saying anything against the pilots and personnel who make them fly- our government needs to make a force that is self sustainable in the field . Without that, how are we going to sustain our operations in the future? Bad JuJu- we might as well line them up wing tip to wing tip and wait for the worst.

For one, the contractors can do it much less expensively and have the tribal knowledge from the original design team. The only depot doing significant amounts of C-17 maintenance is Warner-Robins and they are ridiculously expensive and cannot compete with the private sector's cost structure, namely the Boeing facility in San Antonio. The reason they are even in the game though is because of the perception you speak of (per congressional mandate). If you have ever worked with any of the USAF depots, you might change your tune. Nonetheless, Boeing personnel are on site and Warner-Robins is only doing mods designed by Boeing anyhow. Warner-Robins doesn't have design authority for anything more than what is already in the tech order Organizational & Intermediate level repair manuals.

You must also realize that the Boeing designed improvements being made in the production aircraft in Long Beach are generally getting retrofitted at the depots, so your argument falls flat on its face there. There would be no point in having the depots have design cognizance because the designs are already done!

Another fact that may have escaped your attention is that a depot repair manual has never been funded for C-17 which forces all depot repair procedures to be overseen by Boeing. Of course if that repair manual were to be funded, Boeing would be paid to write it, just as Lockheed was for the C-130, C-141 and the C-5.

For a completely obsolete aircraft where only long-term support is envisioned (general upkeep and life enhancement), USAF depots make sense. How else would you support the A-10 for instance? (P.S. Boeing got the contract to redesign and build the A-10 life extension replacement wings)

I'd sure like to see Brad's opinion on this...

It also depends on the contract terms as well. Too often we forget the "acquisition cost" of an aircraft often includes a certain level of repairs to be provided by the manufacturer for a given period of time.

That repair will be "over & above" the support contract.

[CAPFlyer]

BDK is of course correct that this repair would be well outside the scope of any contract, but I was making a general comment in response to a general comment about not using the manufacturer and the cost of using private sector. My point was that some of the cost of using the manufacturer or private contractor is covered already by the acquisition contract.

[bdk]

BDK is of course correct that this repair would be well outside the scope of any contract, but I was making a general comment in response to a general comment about not using the manufacturer and the cost of using private sector. My point was that some of the cost of using the manufacturer or private contractor is covered already by the acquisition contract.

Boeing has a seperate support contract that can be competetively bid against other contractors like Lockheed. The other option is to "go organic" where the depots take over the support.

There is plenty of pricing history to show the inefficiency of the depots. C-5 and C-17 aircraft are similar in size to commercial airliners. Plenty of data exists comparing the depot cost of repairing radomes and overhauling engines to that of the airline industry and thier suppliers (best commercial practice) The C-17 program competed out engine overhauls to the airline industry for instance since the engines are the same as found on a 757. A depot is the inverse of a competetive bidding process- a sole source.

[The Inspector]

RAM is the MickeyD version of Boeings AOG teams. Boeing inherited
RAM when MD took control of Boeing-no, you DIDNOT read that wrong! Boeing may have purchased MD but most of the idiots who rode MD into a smoking hole now hold prominent positions within Boeing.
Boeings AOG is famous for going to weird places and getting the airplane out of the swamp or Ocean and back in the air faster and cheaper than ordering, building, and delivering a new airframe from Renton or Everett(something that ERRORBUST will not do and has no teams to accomplish those types of repairs).
If you watched the program on Nat Geo a few months ago, AOG removed the entire 46/48 section of a 767-300 to replace a pressure dome damaged in a pushback incident. They work simular miracles every day, either in some remote locale or in the factory if ain't nuthin' shakin' elsewhere. Someone screws up a body panel or hits a section in the factory and AOG is called in to do the repairs. A couple of years ago they replaced four skins, a couple of forged frames, and lots of stringers that were misdrilled by someone mislocating an MTE drill tool on a 777 in the panel jig. Took the team about 4 days (12 shifts) to R&R everything, AOG is incredable to see in action, zero lost motion, all elbows and a$$holes around the clock until the aircraft is repaired-so doing the repair on the C-17 is an everyday deal for the real pros at this type of work.

[bdk]

RAM is the MickeyD version of Boeings AOG teams. Boeing inherited RAM when MD took control of Boeing-no, you DIDNOT read that wrong! Boeing may have purchased MD but most of the idiots who rode MD into a smoking hole now hold prominent positions within Boeing.

I think your facts are somewhat lacking here. In fact, McDonnel Douglas did buy Boeing using Boeing's money.

Seriously though, McDonnel Douglas was doing quite well when the merger occurred. Although MD-11 sales were slumping, McDonnell Douglas had just launched the MD-95 (renamed 717) program with a huge order from Valu-Jet/Air Tran and the C-17 (and other military programs) were going like gangbusters. The stock has just split two-ways and then 3-ways and had been making huge gains for a few years. The synergy in the merger was McDonnell Douglas' strong military programs and Boeing's strong commercial airliner position.

So who from heritage McDonnell Douglas now holds a prominent position within Boeing?

Please don't think that all at McDonnell Douglas felt like the merger was a good deal for them either. The expectation was that Douglas Aircraft's commercial production would be killed by the merger, and it was. Maybe it was dying anyhow, but the merger sure cut the life five or ten years shorter. Of course the locals blame the death of DAC on the McDonnell merger too, so complaints about changes coming about from mergers are not unique.

RAMS stands for Recovery and Modification Services.

[The Inspector]

My short synopsis is in the same vein as the Businessmans version of the rock classic 'Inagodadavida'. The album cut runs over 17 minutes, the BMV is about 8 bars the first four and the last four-there are a great number of ex MD folks in all levels of in charge @ the old kite store here in the Northwest. Perhaps the most prominent former resident of Lakewood Blvd. was good old Harry Stonecypher, Mr. 'ethical and moral' who was removed after it was revealed that he was doing a bit more than patting his secretary on the bottom, thereby causing Boeing to cough up $615M in cash to the EEOC as a penalty for unethical business behavior and causing every employee of BAC to have to sign an 'ethics and morality' form every year.
It's obvious to a lot of old timers around here that small, but very stupid things are being put in place as policies as time goes by, and former MD employees can only say 'seems like they did this to us back in 92, and it just made things worse'.
In any case, AOG is the best there is at fixing big airframes quickly and efficiently.

[bdk]

Yeah, we can spend a lot of back and forth time complaining about the folks that USED TO BE THERE, but as long as the bad apples are gone and the good ones remain, that is what matters. There are some really great folks that came out of heritage Douglas, so please don't discount them automatically.

I can guarantee you that Harry Stonecipher was far better than John McDonnell as a McDonnell Douglas CEO!

[The Inspector]

I'm pretty much a Douglas design philosophy adherant. Love the continuing 'KISS' and how things that worked, like landing gear or flaps stayed the same just scaled up or down to fit the project. Learned a great deal of respect for all the airpalnes while learning to teach DC-8/9/10 while @ BADWRENCH, made lots of strong believers out of mechanics there after starting out teaching FORD to a bunch of CHEVY guys, and they got to be very, very good @ MD-80 slat cable changes and slat rigging-I like the airplanes
In fact, the first time I looked into the nose gear well on the 787, I broke out in laughter, it's nothing more than squared off DC-10 NLG.

[A2C]

The inspector is jogging my memory.

I heard somewhere that some corporation's legal department disallowed a guy building a P-26 replica from using their drawings from 70 years ago under the threat of lawsuit!

I think there were a few other things that struck me as interesting as well.

[The Inspector]

Boeings lawyers, Perkins, Kooey, & Woods occupy a 22 story office building on the Southwest Corner of 4th & Union St. in downtown Seattle.

'Product liability' you know..................................

[A2C]

And don't they hold all North American products as well under threat of lawsuit? Airplanes they didn't build?

[bdk]

Uh oh! The dreaded "pilot error" strikes again!

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/05/airforce_c17_bagram_050809/

Wheels-up C-17 crash caused by pilot error

By Bruce Rolfsen - Staff writer
Posted : Tuesday May 12, 2009 11:42:17 EDT

Pilots of a C-17 Globemaster failed to lower the transport’s landing gear, forcing them to make a crash landing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, an Air Mobility Command investigation concluded.

None of the six onboard were injured; the repair bill for the $200 million aircraft, however, totaled $19 million.

Flying the Globemaster were aircraft commander Capt. Anthony J. Mione and co-pilot 1st Lt. Chad M. Dugie. Also in the cockpit: a second co-pilot, 1st Lt. James A. Linnehan, sitting behind Mione; and an airman riding as a passenger sitting behind Dugie. Loadmasters Staff Sgt. Matthew J. Conn and Airman 1st Class Kylor R. Eutsler were below in the plane’s cargo bay.

The aircrew was assigned to the 16th Airlift Squadron and 437th Airlift Wing at Charleston Air Force Base, S.C. The pilots have been grounded pending a command review of the accident investigation report, an AMC spokesman said.

Rumors that crew members hadn’t lowered the landing gear have circulated since the Jan. 30 crash after photographs from inside the plane’s cockpit showed the landing gear controls in the up position.

Mione and Dugie knew each other well, having flown 34 sorties together since deploying to the Persian Gulf, the report said. Minoe had logged 826 hours in C-17s and 751 hours in C-21A executive jets. Dugie had just 149 hours in C-17s, logging 96 of those hours in the previous three months. Linnehan was only slightly more experienced, with 248 C-17 hours.

While the pilots were distracted by a series of minor problems as they approached Bagram in the dark, the aircrew could have avoided the crash by following checklist procedures, a basic Air Force rule.

“Had they lowered the gear, the mishap would not have occurred,” concluded Col. Richard D. Anderson, accident investigation board president.

The automated “ground proximately warning system” that would have instructed the crew to lower the wheels was apparently accidentally turned off, said Anderson, who is qualified as a C-17 instructor pilot and serves as vice commander of the 621st Contingency Response Wing at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J.

The crash marked the second time in fewer than three years that the crew of a large Air Force jet forgot to lower the landing gear before skidding down a runway.

In May 2006, a B-1B Lancer bomber touched down wheels up on a runway at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The crew had turned off a landing gear warning system before touching down.

Normal flight until landing
As the C-17 neared Bagram, the flight was uneventful, the report said. The jet left Kuwait City International Airport about 6:30 p.m. with 21,000 pounds of cargo and one passenger.

For most of the flight, co-pilot Dugie flew the plane. Mione, a new instructor pilot, assisted him.

When the pilots made radio contact with Bagram air traffic controllers, the crew learned the airfield’s approach radar was not working and they would need to land using visual flight rules. The requirement meant they needed to focus on their plane’s speed and altitude and to watch for other aircraft.

To help spot mountain ridges surrounding Bagram and other aircraft, the pilots put on night-vision goggles.

The crew also went through the descent checklist and approach checklist.

About 10 miles from Bagram and flying about 250 mph, the crew extended wing slats and lowered flaps to slow down the plane, the report said.

As the plane was about three miles out, the pilots removed their night-vision goggles and aircraft commander Mione radioed “short final” to prompt the control tower for clearance to land. There was no response from the tower.

The crew continued to gradually lower the flaps, slowing the jet.

With 28 seconds left until landing, Mione took control of the jet and radioed the tower, “short final.”

The tower controllers answered this time, clearing the C-17 to land. The controllers failed to make the required reminder call — “Check wheels down.”

As the plane passed below 300 feet, Dugie didn’t announce the required alert “300 feet.”

Now, the plane was also flying at 172 mph, 42 mph faster than approach rules called for.

If Mione had followed correct procedures, he would have aborted the landing because of the high speed and made a second approach, the report said.

Instead, Mione continued to descend. The three pilots didn’t realize they missed the “before landing checklist.”

With the landing gear still up, the plane’s ground warning system should have sounded out “too low gear.” The alarm didn’t activate because the pilots accidentally turned off the system, Anderson concluded.

Mione and Dugie claimed the ground warning system must have malfunctioned, but there was no evidence the system wasn’t working, the report said.

As the jet lined up on the runway centerline, the plane touched down at 150 mph, 21 mph too fast.

With the landing gear nestled inside the wheel wells, the jet’s aluminum alloy belly ground into the concrete runway. The plane slid in nearly a straight line for 4,528 feet before coming to a stop. A fire broke out on the plane’s rear left side but was extinguished by firefighters minutes later.

Moving the grounded jet took two days and the efforts of more than 200 people and a 120-ton crane. The team moved the jet by using the crane and airbags to lift the plane high enough to lower the landing gear.

http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/AIBreport.pdf

[brucev]

The tower call “Check wheels down.” threw me for a loop the one time I heard it, while landing at a dual military / civilian airport in Michigan (name escapes me now) I heard from the tower controller "... cleared to land runway XX, check gear down". Threw me for a bit wondering what the heck, military thing I guess.