P-38 Lightning - nearly a great fighter?
Mon Feb 02, 2009 9:18 am
Just been reading through the Wiki page on the P-38 (I know, I know). However, it raised a number of questions, and like a lot of history, what we think we know is actually a gross simplification of a much more complex story - which could have developed differently.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-38_Lightning
Or:
http://www.vectorsite.net/avp38.html
There's a couple of easy ones for our P-38 experts here.
I look forward to being eddicated, but be careful - I'll be looking for weak arguments, too...
Have a look at the page (or your preferred P-38 ref(s) - feel free to mention them) FIRST, then consider and discuss:
1a. Was it a failure by the USAAF training structure to enable pilots to get the best of of the aircraft early on? 1b. Or was it too complex an aircraft for the job?
2. Is there any real evidence the Germans really called it 'The Fork Tailed Devil'?
3. Were any of the P-38s problems down to it being an unconventional type in looks and thus it was treated with more scepticism than equivalent conventional types?
4. Was it the US that refused the turbos for the British or French, or did the British (and/or French) not want them and ask for them to be taken out?
5a . What was needed to ensure that the P-38 was available for long range escort for the 8th AF from the earliest days? 5b. Could the P-38 have done the job the P-51 did in 1944-5 earlier?
6a. The loss of the 'plane carrying the 'dive flaps' to Europe held up their fitment and left a restriction on operating capability. Was that important? 6b. What (if any) other technical shortcomings were particularly significant in operational terms? 6c. Could they have been 'fixed' earlier?
7. If we accept that dogfighting is a partial failure in air-combat (much better to hit the other guy before he sees you or can retaliate) could different tactics have enabled better results for P-38 units earlier? (Bear in mind that the USN and USAAF learned 'not to dogfight with the Zero' yet mastered the aircraft with better tactics excluding dogfighting - including dive & zoom, an area the P-38 had advantages over any USN type.)
8. Given the different rates of sucess and failure in air combat of the P-38 in the ETO, MTO and PTO, how much do different training and operational cultures (rather than operational differences - climate, enemy etc.) affect achievement in different theatres?
9. Could the range achievements pioneered by Lindbergh in the Pacific have been achieved in the ETO and MTO?
10. Is the P-38 under-rated or over-rated?
I won't be awarding marks, as I sure don't have 'the answers' but it should be interesting. I've just numbered to questions to make it easier to pick one or two to tackle. Chew as much (or as little) as you like, but don't become incomprehensible! 
And PLEASE don't just repeat the same old semi-mythology, be prepared to support your statements with evidence.
Thanks,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-38_Lightning
Or:
http://www.vectorsite.net/avp38.html
There's a couple of easy ones for our P-38 experts here.
I look forward to being eddicated, but be careful - I'll be looking for weak arguments, too...
Have a look at the page (or your preferred P-38 ref(s) - feel free to mention them) FIRST, then consider and discuss:
1a. Was it a failure by the USAAF training structure to enable pilots to get the best of of the aircraft early on? 1b. Or was it too complex an aircraft for the job?
2. Is there any real evidence the Germans really called it 'The Fork Tailed Devil'?
3. Were any of the P-38s problems down to it being an unconventional type in looks and thus it was treated with more scepticism than equivalent conventional types?
4. Was it the US that refused the turbos for the British or French, or did the British (and/or French) not want them and ask for them to be taken out?
5a . What was needed to ensure that the P-38 was available for long range escort for the 8th AF from the earliest days? 5b. Could the P-38 have done the job the P-51 did in 1944-5 earlier?
6a. The loss of the 'plane carrying the 'dive flaps' to Europe held up their fitment and left a restriction on operating capability. Was that important? 6b. What (if any) other technical shortcomings were particularly significant in operational terms? 6c. Could they have been 'fixed' earlier?
7. If we accept that dogfighting is a partial failure in air-combat (much better to hit the other guy before he sees you or can retaliate) could different tactics have enabled better results for P-38 units earlier? (Bear in mind that the USN and USAAF learned 'not to dogfight with the Zero' yet mastered the aircraft with better tactics excluding dogfighting - including dive & zoom, an area the P-38 had advantages over any USN type.)
8. Given the different rates of sucess and failure in air combat of the P-38 in the ETO, MTO and PTO, how much do different training and operational cultures (rather than operational differences - climate, enemy etc.) affect achievement in different theatres?
9. Could the range achievements pioneered by Lindbergh in the Pacific have been achieved in the ETO and MTO?
10. Is the P-38 under-rated or over-rated?
I won't be awarding marks,
as I sure don't have 'the answers' but it should be interesting. I've just numbered to questions to make it easier to pick one or two to tackle. Chew as much (or as little) as you like, but don't become incomprehensible!
And PLEASE don't just repeat the same old semi-mythology, be prepared to support your statements with evidence.
Thanks,
Mon Feb 02, 2009 9:45 am
The P-38 was a cutting edge fighter at the time of her development and WAS very complicated and tricky to get the best out of. I'll have to dig into some research on you specific questions, some of which I have heard voiced before, especially if the "Fork-tailed devil was PR Myth or not...kind of like the "Whispering Death" debate. For an aircraft with it's design roots in the late '30s, it held it's own pretty well, but any long range fighter of that time frame would have issues with going up against short range interceptors. NOT ITS JOB. It was designed to be a high altitude bomber interceptor, not a dogfighter, IIRC. The bf110 was supposed to fit this role as well...but that is a different thread altogether!
On the turbos NOT wanted by France and the UK, this site states that it was asked for this way by them. No reason given, but is a pretty good site with a lot of info.
http://home.att.net/~ww2aviation/P-38.html
I am at work so I will have to dwell on these questions for a while!
On the turbos NOT wanted by France and the UK, this site states that it was asked for this way by them. No reason given, but is a pretty good site with a lot of info.
http://home.att.net/~ww2aviation/P-38.html
I am at work so I will have to dwell on these questions for a while!
Mon Feb 02, 2009 11:53 am
Most of what I've learned about the P-38 comes from a book called "The Lockheed P-38 Lightning" by Warren M. Bodie. He addresses all of your questions in it, but the thing that struck me about the P-38 from reading the book is that it really wasn’t suited for the climate of Northern Europe. The high humidity and sub-freezing temperatures at altitudes the P-38 was required to operate in were very hard on the turbo regulators, causing frequent failures. The Allisons, operated at high boost from the turbos, did not like the lower octane fuels used in Britain at the time of the P-38’s introduction, also causing frequent failures. The book states that the engines acquired the nickname of “Allison Hand Grenades”. The problems were much fewer when operated on US fuel in the MTO and the PTO.
Of course, the book is one man’s opinion, and I don’t know what kind of reputation Mr. Bodie enjoys among aviation historians. Again from reading the book, it would seem that the story of using external fuel tanks for range extension is a long and complex one, and in hind sight, almost criminal that it wasn’t done earlier.
Of course, the book is one man’s opinion, and I don’t know what kind of reputation Mr. Bodie enjoys among aviation historians. Again from reading the book, it would seem that the story of using external fuel tanks for range extension is a long and complex one, and in hind sight, almost criminal that it wasn’t done earlier.
P-38
Mon Feb 02, 2009 12:08 pm
I'll take a stab at a few of the questions.
1A. Training was always a problem, but early on, the biggest problem, in North Africa for example was that we had green pilots going up against the Luftwaffe's cream of the crop.
3. One problem with it's unconventional appearance was it was easily recognized by the enemy at at distance.
4. Supposedly the Brits wanted them without turbos and handed engines to keep them in common with the engines for the P-40s they were buying.
Actually they didn't have much choice since GE had trouble building enough turbos for US aircraft.
5a. More P-38s. They were initially sent to England but went to North Africa. Lockheed could not keep up with production demands.
5b. Given the number of bugs encountered by early models in the Northern European environment, probaby not.
6abc. Delayed resolution of the compressibility/dive flap issue was probably less of a problem than it would appear. The P-38s days in the 8th were numbered either way. Poor cockpit heating and overboost problems at altitude(to a lesser degree in the J and L models) were as much of a problem.
Initial rate of roll was poor making it impossible to quickly respond to a split S by the enemy aircraft it was after.
7. Who sees who first is important, and altitude usually determines that.
In Northern Europe the P-38 had trouble getting high enough, plus the opposition was pretty good at hit and run themselves.
8. Better success in the Pacific has been attributed to operating at lower altitudes than Europe. The may also apply to the MTO where the 15th Air Force, predominatly using B-24s, bombed from a lower altitude than the 8th.
Duane
1A. Training was always a problem, but early on, the biggest problem, in North Africa for example was that we had green pilots going up against the Luftwaffe's cream of the crop.
3. One problem with it's unconventional appearance was it was easily recognized by the enemy at at distance.
4. Supposedly the Brits wanted them without turbos and handed engines to keep them in common with the engines for the P-40s they were buying.
Actually they didn't have much choice since GE had trouble building enough turbos for US aircraft.
5a. More P-38s. They were initially sent to England but went to North Africa. Lockheed could not keep up with production demands.
5b. Given the number of bugs encountered by early models in the Northern European environment, probaby not.
6abc. Delayed resolution of the compressibility/dive flap issue was probably less of a problem than it would appear. The P-38s days in the 8th were numbered either way. Poor cockpit heating and overboost problems at altitude(to a lesser degree in the J and L models) were as much of a problem.
Initial rate of roll was poor making it impossible to quickly respond to a split S by the enemy aircraft it was after.
7. Who sees who first is important, and altitude usually determines that.
In Northern Europe the P-38 had trouble getting high enough, plus the opposition was pretty good at hit and run themselves.
8. Better success in the Pacific has been attributed to operating at lower altitudes than Europe. The may also apply to the MTO where the 15th Air Force, predominatly using B-24s, bombed from a lower altitude than the 8th.
Duane
Mon Feb 02, 2009 12:43 pm
We have discussed this in great debates for YEARS on my forum on us-aircraft.com.
The issue was would the P-38 been an ideal aircraft for the Finnish Air force post war? This was contradicted by the fact that the P-38 cost almost double then the P-51. While I would have loved to have seen some post war buys of the P-38 to other airforces the reality was that you could get more with the P-51 and at a cheaper cost. Although I would take a P-38 over a P-51 any day. The P-38 seemed to have been a good multi-role aircraft though. Always a good topic is the P-38 vs. Mossie.
That always brings up a good debate. 
The issue was would the P-38 been an ideal aircraft for the Finnish Air force post war? This was contradicted by the fact that the P-38 cost almost double then the P-51. While I would have loved to have seen some post war buys of the P-38 to other airforces the reality was that you could get more with the P-51 and at a cheaper cost. Although I would take a P-38 over a P-51 any day. The P-38 seemed to have been a good multi-role aircraft though. Always a good topic is the P-38 vs. Mossie.
That always brings up a good debate.
Mon Feb 02, 2009 2:20 pm
Every time I read the P.38 story I am reminded of American torpedoes in the same war.
The submariners were saying - well into 1943 - that the torpedoes did not work. The higher-ups (in this case at the Bureau of Ordinance) dismissed these claims with "those idiot submariners are not using the torpedoes properly" and refused to test or better develop their technology. It turned out that the torpedoes had three major design flaws - in the depth, magnetic exploder and contact exploder devices. Many important targets were attacked but not damaged because of these flaws. In actuality, all three of these flaws were determined and corrected in the field, not those responsible for designing, building and testing the torpedoes.
More or less the same for the P.38. Tactical assets and flaws were well appreciated by those in the field, but not acted upon by those at home. The P.38 was well appreciated in the Pacific theater early on - used again Yamamoto in early 1943. Meanwhile in Europe, the P.38 might have been able to do long range protectin of our bomber streams well before the arrival of P-47s and P.51s, but were not.
Were higher-ups making the same mistake with P.38s in Europe as the Bureau of Ordinance was doing with torpedoes in the Pacific?
Kevin
.
The submariners were saying - well into 1943 - that the torpedoes did not work. The higher-ups (in this case at the Bureau of Ordinance) dismissed these claims with "those idiot submariners are not using the torpedoes properly" and refused to test or better develop their technology. It turned out that the torpedoes had three major design flaws - in the depth, magnetic exploder and contact exploder devices. Many important targets were attacked but not damaged because of these flaws. In actuality, all three of these flaws were determined and corrected in the field, not those responsible for designing, building and testing the torpedoes.
More or less the same for the P.38. Tactical assets and flaws were well appreciated by those in the field, but not acted upon by those at home. The P.38 was well appreciated in the Pacific theater early on - used again Yamamoto in early 1943. Meanwhile in Europe, the P.38 might have been able to do long range protectin of our bomber streams well before the arrival of P-47s and P.51s, but were not.
Were higher-ups making the same mistake with P.38s in Europe as the Bureau of Ordinance was doing with torpedoes in the Pacific?
Kevin
.
Mon Feb 02, 2009 3:18 pm
The P-38 proved a much bigger success in the Pacific than other theaters, where its twin engines made for reassuring ocean flying, and its aversion to cold weather mattered little. It shot down more Japanese planes than any other US fighter.
In Europe, however, it proved to be a hand-numbing hangar queen ill-suited for European combat. The higher altitudes of European combat challenged both the P-38's engines and its pilots, who suffered a great deal from a lack of adequate cabin heat. It's twin engines also proved to be a liability in the war of the eyeballs, limiting it's own pilot's cockpit visibility while giving enemy pilot's an easily identifiable silhouette to spot. It did not have the same performance advantages over Luftwaffe fighters as it did over Japanese planes, either.
However, I think that the single biggest liability of the P-38 overall was its complexity. It was costly and difficult to produce, and was plagued by mechanical trouble. In a war of numbers, the P-38 just couldn't keep up, and it never really realized its full performance potential until cheaper and better alternatives were available.
The P-38 was a ground-breaking design that was ahead of its time. Unfortunately, that was exactly why it failed to live up to its promise.
Me262 anyone?
In Europe, however, it proved to be a hand-numbing hangar queen ill-suited for European combat. The higher altitudes of European combat challenged both the P-38's engines and its pilots, who suffered a great deal from a lack of adequate cabin heat. It's twin engines also proved to be a liability in the war of the eyeballs, limiting it's own pilot's cockpit visibility while giving enemy pilot's an easily identifiable silhouette to spot. It did not have the same performance advantages over Luftwaffe fighters as it did over Japanese planes, either.
However, I think that the single biggest liability of the P-38 overall was its complexity. It was costly and difficult to produce, and was plagued by mechanical trouble. In a war of numbers, the P-38 just couldn't keep up, and it never really realized its full performance potential until cheaper and better alternatives were available.
The P-38 was a ground-breaking design that was ahead of its time. Unfortunately, that was exactly why it failed to live up to its promise.
Me262 anyone?
Mon Feb 02, 2009 3:28 pm
old iron wrote:Every time I read the P.38 story I am reminded of American torpedoes in the same war.
The submariners were saying - well into 1943 - that the torpedoes did not work. The higher-ups (in this case at the Bureau of Ordinance) dismissed these claims with "those idiot submariners are not using the torpedoes properly" and refused to test or better develop their technology. It turned out that the torpedoes had three major design flaws - in the depth, magnetic exploder and contact exploder devices. Many important targets were attacked but not damaged because of these flaws. In actuality, all three of these flaws were determined and corrected in the field, not those responsible for designing, building and testing the torpedoes.
More or less the same for the P.38. Tactical assets and flaws were well appreciated by those in the field, but not acted upon by those at home. The P.38 was well appreciated in the Pacific theater early on - used again Yamamoto in early 1943. Meanwhile in Europe, the P.38 might have been able to do long range protectin of our bomber streams well before the arrival of P-47s and P.51s, but were not.
Were higher-ups making the same mistake with P.38s in Europe as the Bureau of Ordinance was doing with torpedoes in the Pacific?
Kevin
.
ahhh yes the old Mk. 13 torpedo. One of the worst in WWII.
Mon Feb 02, 2009 3:35 pm
To question #9...
Martin Caidin's Fork-Tailed Devil: The P-38 (1971 Ballantine Books)
Mr Caidin indicates that the reports resulting from Lindbergh's PTO research on extending the P-38's range were never acted on and contends that they were ignored by ETO & MTO staff.
Another premise by Mr. Caidin, right in the 1st page of the book:
"The pilots who flew theP-38 were largely responsible for modifications that made the Lightning one of the most effective aircraft of its time."
Martin Caidin's Fork-Tailed Devil: The P-38 (1971 Ballantine Books)
Mr Caidin indicates that the reports resulting from Lindbergh's PTO research on extending the P-38's range were never acted on and contends that they were ignored by ETO & MTO staff.
Another premise by Mr. Caidin, right in the 1st page of the book:
"The pilots who flew theP-38 were largely responsible for modifications that made the Lightning one of the most effective aircraft of its time."
Mon Feb 02, 2009 3:51 pm
The 38s could have been escorting the bombers from England from the beginning. There is some suggestion that the 38s were shipped to North Africa because the bomber doctrine guys were more intent on proving the bombers could go it alone.
I remember coming across information in the 54th FS history where they were testing the range of their 38Es with DTs in 42 and were able to prove the capabilty of long range flights in the worst conditions in the Aluetians. They claim to have actually, unofficially flown them to Japanese targets near the home islands from the Aluetians on one occasion.
If you go through the histories of the different groups you'll find that the 38 trained pilots were not enthused about the transition to 'Spam cans". But by mid 44 many of the replacement pilots were trained on 51s and Jugs and the complexity of the 38 became an issue for some transitioning to them from single engine fighters.
The 474th FG of the 9th AF worked hard to keep their 38s in the ETO. The MTO 38 groups all were there from 42 until the end.
Economically the 51 was easier to produce and maintain and certainly capable of doing the job.
I think the biggist 'sin' was sending the 38s to North Africa and letting the bomber guys pay the price for no escort for so long.
Someone suggested Bodie's book. He addresses that issue very well. It is THE book on the 38 in my opinion.
Martin Caiden must always be read with a skeptical eye as he never let the truth get in the way of a good story
(Insert the infamous YB40 vs Italian 38 story)
I remember coming across information in the 54th FS history where they were testing the range of their 38Es with DTs in 42 and were able to prove the capabilty of long range flights in the worst conditions in the Aluetians. They claim to have actually, unofficially flown them to Japanese targets near the home islands from the Aluetians on one occasion.
If you go through the histories of the different groups you'll find that the 38 trained pilots were not enthused about the transition to 'Spam cans". But by mid 44 many of the replacement pilots were trained on 51s and Jugs and the complexity of the 38 became an issue for some transitioning to them from single engine fighters.
The 474th FG of the 9th AF worked hard to keep their 38s in the ETO. The MTO 38 groups all were there from 42 until the end.
Economically the 51 was easier to produce and maintain and certainly capable of doing the job.
I think the biggist 'sin' was sending the 38s to North Africa and letting the bomber guys pay the price for no escort for so long.
Someone suggested Bodie's book. He addresses that issue very well. It is THE book on the 38 in my opinion.
Martin Caiden must always be read with a skeptical eye as he never let the truth get in the way of a good story
(Insert the infamous YB40 vs Italian 38 story)
Mon Feb 02, 2009 5:22 pm
Let's see what Yamomoto has to say.
Mon Feb 02, 2009 5:27 pm
To quote Pirates of the Caribbean, "Dead men tell no tales"!!
Mon Feb 02, 2009 7:12 pm
Did somebody mention P-38's and torpedoes in the same post ?
And then mention P-38's way up in Alaska ?
And then mention P-38's way up in Alaska ?
Mon Feb 02, 2009 9:02 pm
P-38 as a fighter.... I won't really address JDK's questions per se... but as a fighter pilot who has some time in P-38's I'll take a stab at evaluating it's good an bad points... in a rough, quick and dirty way...
-For the day (early in the war) it was pretty fast, could dive like crazy.... but you couldn't use that because of compressibility... BIG problem, at altitude it could outclimb a lot of the opposition... a good thing...
-Visibility anywhere but forward is poor... really poor, which is a BAD thing from a defensive standpoint... tactics can overcome that... but the tactics used in WWII by and large could not... which was a BAD thing...
-Firepower was centralized and concentrated... plus vis forward is fantastic... both of which are REALLY good things...
-With maneuver flaps it could turn very well slow speed... but the vis is so bad I'd hate to fight there.... keep your speed up and blow through would be the way to survive in this airplane...
-The airplane is WAY complicated to fly... from cruise configuration to combat configuration requires more than twice the moves a single engine fighter requires.... a REALLY bad thing... plus the vis in the cockpit ain't so hot either (hard to monitor what needs to be monitored... like airspeed)...
-Range was a good thing, reliability was so-so... two engines made up for some of that... but the whole mx question is a problem... that's pretty much why it wasn't used after the war...
-Training early in the war was pretty much takeoff, fly around, do it 2-3 times then go to combat... jeez I'm surprised the losses weren't larger.... late in the war guys would have 100 hours in the airplane before heading to combat.... a really good thing...
In short, would I fly it in combat... it wouldn't be my first choice.... but hell yes, any fighter is better than no fighter... and if you're wondering it is a HOOT to fly!
We can speculate for days about all that other stuff....
gunny
-For the day (early in the war) it was pretty fast, could dive like crazy.... but you couldn't use that because of compressibility... BIG problem, at altitude it could outclimb a lot of the opposition... a good thing...
-Visibility anywhere but forward is poor... really poor, which is a BAD thing from a defensive standpoint... tactics can overcome that... but the tactics used in WWII by and large could not... which was a BAD thing...
-Firepower was centralized and concentrated... plus vis forward is fantastic... both of which are REALLY good things...
-With maneuver flaps it could turn very well slow speed... but the vis is so bad I'd hate to fight there.... keep your speed up and blow through would be the way to survive in this airplane...
-The airplane is WAY complicated to fly... from cruise configuration to combat configuration requires more than twice the moves a single engine fighter requires.... a REALLY bad thing... plus the vis in the cockpit ain't so hot either (hard to monitor what needs to be monitored... like airspeed)...
-Range was a good thing, reliability was so-so... two engines made up for some of that... but the whole mx question is a problem... that's pretty much why it wasn't used after the war...
-Training early in the war was pretty much takeoff, fly around, do it 2-3 times then go to combat... jeez I'm surprised the losses weren't larger.... late in the war guys would have 100 hours in the airplane before heading to combat.... a really good thing...
In short, would I fly it in combat... it wouldn't be my first choice.... but hell yes, any fighter is better than no fighter... and if you're wondering it is a HOOT to fly!
We can speculate for days about all that other stuff....
gunny
Mon Feb 02, 2009 9:07 pm
The P-38 certainly was a well-designed aircraft for it's time, and perhaps with more careful employment might have done much more in the European Theater. I second the comments about the book by Mr. Bodie. I didn't know Jack Ilfrey of the 20th FG very well, but he send me two books on the P-38 including the book by Bodie. I'm pretty sure he was convinced that the '38 was a good plane even for Europe.
Here are a few shots from the Italian Theater.
Ryan
Here are a few shots from the Italian Theater.
Ryan