Robin Olds fighter-bombers idea

[RyanShort1]

James,

You have some valid points, and frankly I think some of the issues raised (like what to do with all of the B-24s and B-17s already there) are probably why the idea was not taken more seriously. Practically, at least with the P-38 it might have been workable, but would've taken some work to perfect.

Ryan

[michaelharadon]

RE: Robin Olds and bombing with P-51's

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazi ... 8olds.aspx

Scroll down to: From P-51's to P80's.

[JDK]

Thanks, Ryan, as I said, just how I see it.

Good find Michael. My emphasis:

He put forth the idea that 70 P-51s armed with 500-pound bombs could do more damage to a target requiring precise accuracy than a formation of 1,000 B-17s.

As an idea, it was 20 years ahead of its time—and it ran directly contrary to USAAF philosophy.

And really, then current capability, IMHO.

It was the first of many of Olds’ ideas whose time had not yet come, a condition that would frustrate him over the years, and helped induce in him flamboyant behavior that worked against both his acceptance and his advancement.

Or he could've been arrogant and just wrong!

However the idea could have been very viable for one-off surprise raids - like an attack on Penemunde, or similar. However there's an assumption that the bombing of targets like Berlin and the Ruhr were a case of 'needs-must' rather than being a core part of 1930s 'strategic bombing' concept, which assumed a different (to modern views) and flawed understanding of the vulnerabilities of 'nerve centres' and morale - which we know now didn't work like that.

Some lessons on fighter attrition in Rubarbs vs Ramrods etc. in the RAF's leaning into France campaign would be relevant, IMHO.

Cheers,

[RyanShort1]

James,

One other point. While it may not have worked in the P-51, it really might have worked with the P-38, if they'd had the numbers.

According to Bodie's book the 20th did try the system out on April 19, 1944. Apparently they'd flown 43 aircraft (28 carrying 1,000 pound bombs) on an earlier mission on April 10th that ended up aborting when the weather was too bad. The mission (from Kingscliffe) on the 19th was to Gutersloh, Germany against an airfield and included 38 P-38s (8 aborted and 28 dropped bombs from 20,000 ft) with the 359th FG's P-47s providing cover. Results were allegedly good and apparently only one aircraft was lost. The 20th also claimed 8 aerial victories and 46 ground kills that day as well. Another mission was flown against Antwerp's docks with the P-38s carrying TWO 1,000 pound bombs (the lead ships were each carrying two 2,000 pounders). The bombing took place from 16,000 ft. Results were moderate, not spectacular. It's worth noting that this wasn't exactly a trained bomber group and I would expect some of the results to improve with further training and work on accuracy.
I personally think that with sufficient numbers of P-38s, the idea had a lot of merit and might've been very successful. While there might have been some interesting situations with aircraft being forced to dump their bombs prematurely, the Germans would've also been forced to change their tactics a bit. A few meetings with "bombers" that weren't might have been really interesting.

Ryan

[CAPFlyer]

James, you really need to step away from the historical. We are speaking of a theoretical discussion on whether fighter-bombers would be more effective than multi-engine bombers in the ETO during WWII. This requires that you assume that the heavy bombers (or even the medium bombers) weren't available or were rendered useless for some reason. Then you move forward from there.

Here's the basic assumptions -

1) You have the same number of escorts no matter what the bombers are (single engine fighter-bombers or multi-engine bombers)

2) You have the same opposition in AAA and Fighters.

3) You have the same targets.

4) The bombing platform is being used in the best method for effectiveness (i.e. Bombers on mid- to high- level bomb runs, fighter-bombers on low-level or dive delivery).

Theoretically, you would be able to put more pounds of bombs on the target ITSELF with a single-engined fighter than multi-engined bombers. This is because of two things - fall time & maneuverability.

The single-engined fighter will be bombing from a lower altitude and thus its bombs will not be falling as long and thus not have as long to be pushed around by the wind. The single-engined fighter will also be able to maneuver to throw off flak and ensure that the proper target is hit much more easily than a bomber (even if unencumbered by a formation).

The Soviets used IL-2's with excellent results for airfield and AAA attacks on the Eastern Front during WWII suggesting that single-engined fighter-bombers or attack aircraft would be able to penetrate and attack with accuracy not possible with the Norden bomb sight simply because it was unable to fully account for shifting winds.

[JDK]

James, you really need to step away from the historical.

Don't hafta do anything I don't wanna.

We are speaking of a theoretical discussion on whether fighter-bombers would be more effective than multi-engine bombers in the ETO during WWII.

Oh, are we? I was exploring why Old's was told 'no', rather that setting up random criteria to justify my 'solution'.

Seriously, it's all very well, as you've outlined, but it's less realistic than arguing 'what if the 8th AF had jets' for instance. As I said several times, I was including the real forces available to the bomber generals, and the training and production system really feeding the US war machine of the time. Ignoring those is fine, but then we aren't looking at the real scenario Olds was operating in.

Theoretically, you would be able to put more pounds of bombs on the target ITSELF with a single-engined fighter than multi-engined bombers. This is because of two things - fall time & maneuverability.

The single-engined fighter will be bombing from a lower altitude and thus its bombs will not be falling as long and thus not have as long to be pushed around by the wind. The single-engined fighter will also be able to maneuver to throw off flak and ensure that the proper target is hit much more easily than a bomber (even if unencumbered by a formation).

The Soviets used IL-2's with excellent results for airfield and AAA attacks on the Eastern Front during WWII suggesting that single-engined fighter-bombers or attack aircraft would be able to penetrate and attack with accuracy not possible with the Norden bomb sight simply because it was unable to fully account for shifting winds.

Il-2 and single engine fighters were, AFAIK, never used over the huge strategic targets that the 8th AF and Bomber Command were attaching - cities and the Ruhr - Your scenarios above are invalid due to the weight of flak and the nature of the targets mean low level attacks were out. Think Ploieşti except with a lot more flack. During a heavy Bomber Command raid, you couldn't fly over the target at anything less than (aprox) 8,000 ft minimum because of the size of the configuration - four engine bombers of the RAF were tossed about at height due to heat, explosions, junk in the air, and critically, smoke. Now you choose - either the fighter bombers can operate because they don't create that level of conflagration (ergo fail) or if the do create it they can't sustain it because they can't get in to bomb. (ergo fail 2) Oh, and you are looking at six times the number of aircraft and due to greater accuracy they are going to achieve a better result - except that's six times as many aircraft you want to put into the target at the same time. (For this kind of strategic bombing you need some time concentration as well as location concentration.)

Oh, yes, and another thing. Numerous strategic targets were deep underground or heavilly armoured, such as the U Boat pens, secret production facilities, etc. (In some cases, the only way those were destroyed was by using supersonic bombs from a very high altitude. Otherwise, just like in the cartoons, the bombs would bounce off.)

Most strategic targets were larger areas with more flak over that greater area. They also had significantly more flak protecting them than an airfield did.

All the proposals so far are about tactical level bombing, not strategic as understood in W.W.II; the destruction (not pinpoint raids - mass destruction) of the enemy's production capability and morale.

The RAF certainly undertook low level precision raids - the Amiens Prison raid being a good example of that, and the Mosquitoes used being 'fighter-bomber' types in a sense. However that only was viable for certain raids - not all.

If I understand Randy's point correctly, he's saying that due to the changed nature of war, what was 'tactical bombing' is 'the new strategic' - kind of makes sense to me, although I don't know enough, and I'll take Randy's word for that - however you can't reason backwards that what works now should work then. It didn't.

Olds' idea had some limited utility, like the Mosquito raids, and as Ryan says the P-38 may have had more application than the under-armed single-seat 'fighter bombers' but neither were able to provide decisive strategic bombing weight - IMHO.

Can I quit now?

Last edited by JDK on Thu Jan 22, 2009 11:23 pm, edited 1 time in total.

[muddyboots]

the USAAF was pretty good at implementing good ideas

everything but the job of close air support.
How many grunts died because of the lie that bombers can win the war from 30 grand? Navy did just fine with it once it became apparent that it was a force multiplier. Marines never had any doubt about why there were airplanes. Air Force, however, didn't even have a dive bomber, and refused to consider it on a serious basis until well after the war was won. Heck, it's not until after Desert Storm that we finally beat some sense into them? How may times was the A10 slated for the boneyard?

That A10 force is old and knock kneed. And what do we have slated to replace it? Nada. Zip. Nothing. Oh, they SAY the new figherts will replace them. I'll see it when I believe it. If it does work out it'll be more expensive, barely more capable (if that) and need far more support than a purpose driven aircraft like the A10.

And as long as I am complaining: I want my Broncos back!

[JDK]

Mod Post: I've just split this discussion (with a new title) out of the 'painted canopies' thread as they were, IMHO, conflicted, and there were two interesting discussions going on. Hope everyone's happy with that.

[CAPFlyer]

James, my only thing to point out about your discussion is that only after it was realised that the bombers couldn't hit specific targets did they change to entire cities and large targets. Originally they wanted to hit airfields, rail yards, factories, and other singular targets that a single squadron of single-seat fighter-bombers could attack.

As for the Sub Pens and other hardened targets - again, they are specialized targets requiring specialized weapons (like 614 Sqn.). Whether you use fighter-bombers or not, the ultimate aim is to hit the target. You are ignoring the fact that the targeting strategy was modified to suit what they could achieve.

Also, the original question wasn't why Robin was told no, but if it would have really worked or not.

[JDK]

James, my only thing to point out about your discussion is that only after it was realised that the bombers couldn't hit specific targets did they change to entire cities and large targets.

Nope. As I said:

"...However there's an assumption that the bombing of targets like Berlin and the Ruhr were a case of 'needs-must' rather than being a core part of 1930s 'strategic bombing' concept, which assumed a different (to modern views) and flawed understanding of the vulnerabilities of 'nerve centres' and morale - which we know now didn't work like that."

I would also suggest that by the time the US daylight raids started they, and the night bomber command were good enough at hitting the large targets as heavily as was actually needed. I don't buy that the majority of the destruction of production could be achieved by smaller, more accurate pinpoint raids.

Also, the original question wasn't why Robin was told no, but if it would have really worked or not.

Well, either way up - I am assuming he was told 'no' because the USAAF command decided it wouldn't work. You can make all the assumptions you like; the commanders of the 8th had to utilize the equipment they had - all of it. I agree some precision fighter-bomber raids might have some merit, but they were not a strategic bombing solution.

Show of hands for '...because the bomber Generals were glory hunting'? My original objection was to that statement, where there are more rational explanations, IMHO.

And for Muddy - yes, independent air force doctrine leads to inefficient ground force support. But we aren't allowed to question that, it's air force heresy.

We know what happened, and, IMHO, like several other great fighter pilots (Bader comes to mind) the critical problem was Olds' iron self belief which just couldn't' accept that he was simply wrong. Not a bad idea, worth suggesting, but we are all wrong at times.

It's interesting, but I'm done.

[Chris Brame]

So far nobody's mentioned the A-20 in this thread - how would it compare in usefulness to the P-38 in missions like these?

[JDK]

So far nobody's mentioned the A-20 in this thread - how would it compare in usefulness to the P-38 in missions like these?

The RAF used Douglas Bostons for medium level (medium) bombing in Europe, with the USAAF joining later, and the RAAF (and USAAF of course) used them for low level interdiction on island harbours skip-bombing (as in Jack's excellent pics) but not low level or low-precision in Europe AFAIK.

[CAPFlyer]

The problem with the medium bombers is they don't have the range to hit the strategic targets that aircraft like the 4-engine heavies and long range fighters like the P-51, P-38, and P-47 could. This is why they weren't considered for more operations in any of the theaters on the strategic level. Their "bread and butter" was the support of troops and medium-level tactical targets like front-line and rear echelon formations and marshaling points.

[RyanShort1]

The problem with the medium bombers is they don't have the range to hit the strategic targets that aircraft like the 4-engine heavies and long range fighters like the P-51, P-38, and P-47 could. This is why they weren't considered for more operations in any of the theaters on the strategic level. Their "bread and butter" was the support of troops and medium-level tactical targets like front-line and rear echelon formations and marshaling points.

P-38s and P-51s could reach a ways, but I think that range would be another issue with the fighter idea. For sure the P-38 would have a slight advantage here as it was demonstrated by the 20th FG that they could go all the way to Germany from Kingscliffe with a bomb load. Don't know how the '51 would've fared.

Ryan

Last edited by RyanShort1 on Mon Sep 21, 2009 8:43 am, edited 1 time in total.

[CAPFlyer]

As the P-51s usually had a more than usable amount of fuel left in their drop tanks when they usually had to punch them, I don't see why they couldn't have made it with only a single drop tank and one bomb.

But here again - I think the P-38 would have been better as it could execute a dive bombing delivery with its dive flaps as well as a level or glide delivery, making it much more versatile in the role than the P-51. This would allow the P-51s to be used in their more effective role as an escort fighter to P-38 or P-47 fighter-bombers.