Warbird Information Exchange

From time to time, people have reccomended books on the forum. I recently finished Barrett Tillman's book "WHAT WE NEED". I can't reccommend this book highly enough, it deals with a lot of issues facing the military today, and has some info about procurement of fighter replacements that is fascinating in light of the F15 problems. Barrett Tillman has a great perspective on the use/need for airpower in the War on Terror.

I would love to hear Randy Haskin's views on this book. It has some fairly unflattering things to say about the need for Fighters vs. Trash Haulers.

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Eric

"I spent most of my money on alcohol, women and skyraiders....and the rest of it I just wasted."

Haven't read it, but I'd be interested in seeing it.

Can you summarize some of the main points?

The USAF is in a very precarious position currently with respect to "what we need".

When the Cold War ended at the end of the 80s, the USAF took a big risk; in light of the overall US forces drawdown and the associated reduced budget, the AF decided to "bet" that within a decade the money floodgates would open back up and replacements for aging aircraft fleets would be purchased. They tightened the belt and retired the F-111s and the B-52Gs and F-4s and OV-10s and SR-71s and T-33s and C-141s and A-7s and F-5s...reducing the fleet sizes everywhere.

This meant that ALL the fleets (outside of the bomber fleet, which had the B-2 coming, and the mobility fleet, which had the C-17 on the way) were now going to soldier on for at least 10 years longer than intended, if not more. Even the F-22 was put on essentially the back burner because of the huge reduction in funding.

Guess what...that bet crapped out. The flood gates NEVER re-opened. Needed replacements for KC-135s and C-130s and B-52s were never purchased. The ones that were -- B-2s and C-130Js and F-22s -- were all procured at numbers SIGNIFICANTLY lower than what was originally intended.

So, here we are now 18 years after the Wall fell and are still flying with essentially the SAME fleet we were then. It is leaving us with our pants down on so many fronts it's not even funny.

When the mobility/tanker guys say that THEY are really hurting and need replacement aircraft the most -- they're right. So are the fighter guys that say they need replacements the most -- they're right to. And so are the bomber and helicopter and trainer guys.

Everyone is hurting...and everyone has a valid and legitimate argument why their piece of the puzzle is going to result in the failure of the USAF to perform its intended mission if "the big one" (e.g. China, or North Korea, or Russia) happens in the next 10 years.

While it's not practical to put too many of his points in one post, you are very much inline with his thesis. He does however think that we are buying in the wrong area first; F-22s and JSFs are certainly needed, but that we need heavy, logistical transport (C5 and C-17) replacement, desperately. Also he has a very strong analysis of the poor refueling capability and the fact that the A-12 program failing, left the Navy in a horrible position and relying heavily on the Air Force to bail them out, at a time when no excess real excess capacity exists. He breaks down (no pun intended) the devastating effect that mobilizing the C141s for Desert Storm had on the Starlifter Fleet. By his analysis, we used @ 30% of the useful life of that fleet in one year and never addressed it in any meaningful way, afterwards.

The air logistical portion of the book is great, but the rest is even more interesting. He breaks down the "Asymmetrical War" argument in great detail. He explains with many examples, why it's really an "Asymmetrical force" fighting a very symmetrical war. Generally, poorly trained marksmen against poorly trained marksmen. Through no fault of their own, he believes we are fighting with outdated equipment at the individual soldier level (read M-16 etc.) We keep acquiring sophisticated weapons systems that we will surely need elsewhere, but are not acquiring much that we can use, face to face, in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Before everyone gets fired up, about this being accurate or not, I really urge you to read the book. It's thought provoking and a little sad. Twenty years ago when I was a special ops sergeant, we fired and trained live fire all the time, after I went to flight school we fired very little, both aircraft and personal weapon. Seems like some things never change. Tillman disusses in detail, why the Special Ops folks are so good but the support types are really poorly suited to engage the enemy as riflemen, and are more likely than ever to have to do so.

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Eric

"I spent most of my money on alcohol, women and skyraiders....and the rest of it I just wasted."

I've not read the book, but agree with Randy's assessment.



You will get the parochial turf battles centered around MAF, CAF, & SOF. In reality, you need it all - no one piece is more important than the other - sure there are specific scenarios where one might be relied upon more heavily than the other, but in the end, we need it all.



We just did that with the C-130E in Afghanistan - they're all mostly grounded (or, at best, very restricted) due to center wing boxes.

The SOF fleet is next. MC-130H are now hour limited & AC-130U are rapidly overtaking them.

The F15 fleet has already been discussed here, but currently grounded with serious consequences.

The BUFF will fly for a century.

The acquisition model is flawed, slow, & overpriced. We have the ingredients for a graveyard spiral as a fighting force...

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Daddy always said, "If yer gonna be dumb, you gotta be tough" and I'm one tough sonofagun!

I think we're all ready there. The sad part is that so many people both inside and outside the military are focused on what is needed in the GWOT that we are mortgaging our future capability on it.

My squadron spent a bunch of time training to fly CAS in the months preceding our deployment to Afghanistan -- so we could be good at the job we were going to be asked to do. We did it at the cost of NOT training to the other air-to-air and air-to-ground missions and threats that my unit is tasked to do.

As soon as we returned from deployment, we went back to training against the much more difficult high-threat scenarios against SA-10/12/20 SAMs and Su-30MKKs and PL-12 missiles -- threats that are equal to or better than our current equipment. Why? Close Air Support can't be flown if we don't own the skies. In order for the US to own the sky, that is the threat we are going to have to perform against...and the relative lack of threat in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the last 4 years has lulled us into an over-bloated sense of security that will be our downfall if we actually start to believe in it.

In many ways I thank God for the F-15C accident and subsequent grounding. I have had enough of uneducated politicians, pundits, bloggers, journalists -- even some people on this very website extolling their "wisdom" and telling the world that "we don't need the F-22 and JSF -- the F-15 and F-16 are all ready better than anything else in the world." Reality check, guys -- they're not. It's just too bad that it took a Class A mishap for people to wake up and smell the coffee, but some "experts" just can't be bothered to listen to the "facts" when they have all ready made up their minds.

It is NOT the current war we should be concerned with. It is the next one that will do us considerable harm if we are not ready for it. One only needs to look at the equipment and readiness level that was on duty the morning of 7 December 1941 to see why that is the most important need.

If that means we need new tankers, so be it. New rescue helos...great. New AWACS...yep. Whatever it takes, I'm behind it. The F-22 is everyone's favorite whipping boy, but I challenge you to look at the 2006 and 2007 USAF budget priorities (the 'top 10' list) and find the Raptor on it. If people are blaming ANY financial woes on the Raptor, they are showing serious ignorance about what is really happening in the DoD budget currently.

To the people who cry 'foul' and think my viewpoint is heresy when there are still men on the ground fighting and dying every day, I have only one thing to say: will winning today's war even matter if we lose tomorrow's?

Interesting...if we "keep acquiring" this stuff, how come nobody is actually using it?

Asking The USAF to secure air dominance for the United States for the next 30 years with the CURRENT equipment is as criminal as sending current troops into harm's way with M1903s and M1 Garands.

Bombs from enemy aircraft have not rained on US troops since Korea. The minute that STARTS happening, everyone will want to Court-Martial the USAF leadership that allowed it to happen...that allowed the USAF to fail its mission so egregiously. People who only worry about today, and NOT about tomorrow, are the ones leading the US military down that path.

Randy Haskin wrote:



Just to be clear, that's not my position. After reading Tillman's book, I still believe we need just about everything, again. I will say this though, it seems we need very little of what the AF and Navy need for GWOT. The "what we need" for the Army and Marines is an immediate need for GWOT. As usual, from a politician’s point of view, it is easier to "get behind" the Raptor or any big project, than it is to get behind getting a new rifle or body armor, or any "small" need of the ground forces.

It makes me ill, to think that we spend @ 4% of GDP (440 Billion) on defense (very much in line with historic norms, by the way) and so little of it goes to the bottom line. I pay much more each month in taxes now than I made in a year when I got out of the Army as a CW2, and I am fortunate to be able to do it, but I really feel like most of it is wasted through inefficiency.

http://www.amazon.com/What-We-Need-Extr ... 284&sr=8-1

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Eric

"I spent most of my money on alcohol, women and skyraiders....and the rest of it I just wasted."

I wasn't referring to you when I wrote that, Eric. Apologies if it came off that way.



But, you see..that is not the point. NOWHERE is there somebody who is having to make the choice, "do I buy more Raptors, or body armor?"

That's the fallacy of that argument. We're not stealing new rifles and body armor away from soldiers and marines to buy Raptors or Lightnings. For some reason people are convinced that there is this binary choice, and that is simply not true.

By the way, speaking of asymmetrical warfare: owning the skies is our asymmetrical advantage. Having a Predator follow someone around for 3 days and then kill him the minute he separates from his civilian shields is our asymmetric advantage. That any coalition troop with a radio can call in a 500-pound bomb or 30mm bullets that will hit directly on top of an enemy is our asymmetric advantage. That coalition troops NEVER have to wonder if the aircraft sound overhead is friendly or enemy...that's our advantage. Every troop I've talked to who has actually been under fire would not trade that for a different rifle or a different bit of body armor.

Randy,

You asked me to list some of the points from the book, the quote you highlighted was Tillman's not mine. He agrees with your point of view, that we are sorely lacking in all areas of procurement for all services. But also that most "planners" are only focused on GWOT and not on all of the possible threats to come. Far be it from me to under emphsize the importance of the Air Force. I was just trying to give a flavor of the book as a whole, which obviously can't be done without reading the whole thing. I would be willing to bet that if you read it you will agree with more than you find inaccurate.

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Eric

"I spent most of my money on alcohol, women and skyraiders....and the rest of it I just wasted."

Randy wrote:



Here, we disagree. If one let's their house fall into such disrepair that it needs just about everything, new roof, windows, gutters, etc., there is only a certain amount of hosehold income to go around. Something has to give. I think we are very much there. But to carry the example further, it's much worse, we have chosen to plant flower in the neighbors lawn and to landscape the common ground, before repairing the house.

Again this isn't about the Raptor (sore spot?, perhaps), I am in agreement about air superiority, no question. The part of the book about # of new Fighters vs New Heavy Haulers vs. refueling capacity is interesting. Need all of it, he just discusses very wisely, how to go about all of it.

PM me an address, I'll send you the book, then we can really go at it.

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Eric

"I spent most of my money on alcohol, women and skyraiders....and the rest of it I just wasted."

I shouldn't be asking this because I work for Pratt but where do the UAV's fit in?

Phil

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A man's got to know his limitations.

AFSOC has done the same. We have "leadership" who thinks we work for JFACC, have sacrificed capability on the altar of safety, and have violated every SOF Truth out there. We are so myopically focused on what we're doing today, we're completely ignoring tomorrow. It is a culpably negligent path that will only result in more losses.



Here ACC leadership has it in spades over AFSOC leadership. We have not gone back to our traditional training. We're trying to figure out how to cut training & flying hours to support GWOT. WTF,O?



AFSOC leadership believes it. They believe we're never going to have to penetrate hostile airspace ever again. AFSOC/DO, speaking about the low-level penetration mission, actually said, "There's not a JFACC in the world who's going to let you go in alone, unarmed, & unafraid." Yeah, that might be true, but the JFACC doesn't decide what SOF does, JFSOCC does. JFACC may actually work for JFSOCC (depending on mission), but JFSOCC never works for JFACC.

This isn't parochial willy-waving, I'm just illustrating the point that leadership is so focused on current operations they're losing sight of the bigger picture.

AFSOC's short-sighted grab for dollars & exponential growth for growth's sake is short-changing the real & challenging missions. It's greed & a lust for power, IMO. AFSOC lost their way in '99/'00 when they sold their souls to become a 3-star command.



A better pilot in a lesser plane will outmatch a lesser pilot in a better plane darn near every time though. I think that's where most folks who argue that F15/16 are "good enough" are leaning - they chalk it up to the training & ability of folks like you - unmatched in the world. But you cannot ignore the age of the planes & this recent Class-A was a huge wake-up call for many folks.


AMEN




I see both sides of this one. There must be prioritization at some level. I agree we acquire all in parallel, but when dollars run short, what gets cut first? There must be prioritization.

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Daddy always said, "If yer gonna be dumb, you gotta be tough" and I'm one tough sonofagun!

This is an eye openning thread considering where the inputs are coming from.

If the fleet is hurting then why do we see the supplanting of F-15C/Ds and the retirings of the F-117?

Granted at the end of the day it's 70's tech but then again so are the A-10, F-16 and F-15.

Are fleets wearing out like the previously mentioned Starlifters? Or is it just a matter of older tech?

And what about Extension programs?

The USMC has seemed to make good use of their Cobras and Hueys through Extension Programs.

I believe the USAF is planning on the B-52 and C-5 to continue on flying into the 2050s through these programs.

Is nothing similar planned for other types in the USAF inventory?

Thanks



Shay
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Semper Fortis

I put the topic about the Raptor on WIX. I never wrote we did not need it, but the article was food for thought. I think it might have been in a defense mag, or Time or both. It was not written by some prop loving, piston flying, Peacnik like me; rather by someone who was, I recall, some Pentagon defense analyst so maybe he had some credentials that I don't. In summary the Raptor was faulted as becoming too complex, too expensive, maybe less reliable and serviceable. Others on the site seemed to agree with this view. The part about F-16, F-15 being superior NOW, seems more in doubt. Just a non expert layman view, the B-52 is still viable and older than 15 or 16. Randy mentioned several Chinese threats. China is not now an enemy, and I hope we will not have an all out war between any major powers.
At the same newstand in Boulder I recently saw a similar article which Randy is going to love. I only glanced at the headlines and don't have the source. But the premise was we are buying fighters when it should be bombers. I don't have any details, but I don't think it was advocating more transports. Frankly it sounded a bit like tabloid defense news, but it is a more food for thought.

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Bill Greenwood
Spitfire N308WK

I spent 10 years in the AF, as a RADAR tech...the entire time I went through tech school, the RADAR sets were broken..lack of spare parts. Sure, you could order parts, but because of funding, only the operational outfits got them.

Ok, I can read theory in the books as well as anyone.

When I got to my first duty assignment, I finished my training on equipment that actually worked.

So I am there for a few months, and September rolls around (end of fiscal year) and all of a sudden, we're in a panic to SPEND MONEY. The higher ups budget "x" amount of dollars every year for each squadron to spend, and if you don't SPEND ALL OF IT, they will take it out of your budget for the next year. Never mind that you didn't need it .... So, we bought over $100,000 worth of ESD resistant cabinets for our TOs, tools, really cool flight jackets, etc. We were just one small shop on one small base, do the math.

Oh, and this same scenario happened EVERY YEAR that I was in the military.


9 years later, they combine my job (Radar) with the Weather maintenance folks and the Radio maintenance folks (totally different stuff) leaving a glut in the ranks with E-5s through E-7s in the "new" job, making sure none of us could ever qualify for a promotion/ pay raise.

Around that time, they came around and asked if any of us would take a years' salary in cash and 90 days of free leave/ househunting if we would voluntarily leave. I had been promoted below the zone every step up to this point,

Guess what I did?

Yes, military intelligence is an Oxymoron.

B

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documenting restored B-17s and those undergoing restoration to flight: