Warbird Information Exchange

I am reviewing, for Aviation History Magazine, a not-yet-published Mustang book. The book spends many pages detailing everything from conspiracy theories to industrial favoritism to outright payoffs to Air Force officers as reasons for the military's initial indifference to the P-51.

I had always thought that the reasons were far simpler: the P-51A languished at Wright Field because it was comparatively small and lightweight and that such characteristics were held in low regard by the Air Force at the time, and that with its Allison engine was a noncontender in the high-altitude dogfight sphere.

Was I wrong?

Would the P-51 ever have existed if the UK hadn't asked North American to build P-40s for the RAF? Would North American have produced their design independently and would the USAAF have been interested in it?

I was always given the impression that the P-51 was "ignored" (at least at the highest levels) because it wasn't anything that the USAAF was looking for. The Mustang was designed and built to fit British needs, not USAAF so while they were watching the development, there wasn't any official interest. It was only after the US entered the war and the P-51B/C entered production with the Merlin and became a truly viable high-altitude, long-range fighter that the USAAF became interested in anything more than an interim or "also bought" aircraft.

According to Norton's fairly recent American Fighter Development it wasn't a simple case of "Not invented here".

Rather, as CAPFLYER suggests, the weren't looking for something like that.I

Or to put it more succinctly, (and at the risk of over simplifying Norton's considerable research on the subject), They didn't think they needed another fighter at that stage of the war.
Remember, They had the P-38, 38, 40, 47...plus other promising prototypes and proposals.

And remember too that North American was known for building the T-6 series (the Mustang was developed at the same time as the B-25, so that wasn't in NAA's product resume), hardly a fighter powerhouse like Curtiss or even Seversky/Republic.

Finally, think about the Mustang's greatest claim to fame...as a long range escort fighter.
In 1940-41, the AAF didn't know it would need an escort fighter. Back then, the motto was "The bomber will always get through", (coined by past and future UK prime minister Stanley Baldwin in 1932, having been influenced by Douhet) it wasn't until later in the war...'42 or '43, that the assumption was proven incorrect.

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I figure if you wanted my opinion on items unrelated to this forum, you'd ask for it.

I believe so. The design was well under way when the British approached NAA about building P-40's. Lots of preliminary thought and work had been done. Which is why the prototype was built in 120+ days after signing the contract. Schmued says as much in the book about him:

"Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51" by Ray Wagner

"As far back as 1934-1935, Ed (Schmued" was designing various installations that later would be found in NAA aircraft - particularly the P-51."

As to why the P-51 was initially ignored, there's a detailed description of the politics and personalities involved in that in the book:

"Development of the P-51 Long Range Escort Fighter Mustang" by Paul Ludwig.

Chapter 5, page 69 entitled: "Unsatisfactory for Combat: Echol's Resistance to the Mustang" starts off:

"In 1940 [Major General] Oliver Echols was angered by NAA's agreement to design a fighter rather than build P-40'
s. One of the facts of life is that military organizations control sections of industry and many manufacturers owe their existence to military contracts. The Materiel Command in 1940 lost their control of NAA and Echols neither forgot nor forgave that. When the Mustang became the subject of a possible buy for the Air Corps in 1942, Echols tried to stop NAA's production of fighters for the US."

And the chapter goes into some detail on that. But the book also touches on all the other designs contemporary with the P-51 in detail. And the reasons others, here, have mentioned, are discussed as well. It's a pretty thorough book.

While I agree that MGen Echols dislike for NAA and their development of the P-51 was real, I heavily discount how much influence he really had over the P-51 development or acquisition. Materiel Command, unlike other acquisition branches, had very little actual power to determine who got contracts for major systems. Those decisions were made at higher levels and then MC's job was to make sure it was successful. This isn't to say they didn't have sway, just that they didn't have the ultimate say. There's multiple examples on the ground side where Ordinance was heavily against something but because the Field wanted it, HHQ told Ordinance to make it happen. Same with AAF. It was HHQ who made the final decision and they leaned heavily on the field units to tell them what was needed and made it happen.

Also, I will point out that the P-51 wasn't the only aircraft developed "outside" of Materiel Division/Command's direction during WWII. So it's not like NAA was unique in this, so that too discounts somewhat the theory that politics were that heavily involved.

A complex question requiring some detailed examination of Both Army Aviation and NAA history, beginning in 1935 as NAA absorbed Fokker, as a General Motors subsidiary, and entered the world of military aircraft contract competition. NAA got its foot in the door XO-47, then the BT-9 - which launched NAA as a competitor, followed by BC-1 and various export versions leading to the Harvard/AT-6.
Point 1
Someone mentioned above that NAA was pigeonholed in the trainer/medium bomber 'category'. Ths statement is true, even at the level of Arnold in the 1936-1939 timeframe as the buildup of US airframe manufacturer base was rapidly expanding. The medium bomber 'approval' by AAC began as the XB-21 received favorable impressions against Douglas B-18, followed by the NA-40 - which was also very well received by AAC - but DB-7/A-20 won. That however led to a direct contract to design, fabricate and produce the NA-62 (B-25), without prototype and test phase.
Point 2
Lee Atwood had a BS in Engineering out of Univ Texas, worked at Wright Field in 1932 where he became thoroughly knowledgable and competent in USAAC_Materiel Division Handbook of Instructionsfor Aircraft Designers - leading to hiring by Kindelberger at Douglas and significant contributon to DC-1 and D-2 as chief, Airframe Structures. Atwood met and worked with both Echols and Kelsey.
Point 3
When the Allison became accepted by MC as the only in-line engine it opened the door for both collaboration with sister GMC company Allison, but also became the basis for a succession of overtures by Kindelberger to enter Pursuit Aviation. Dr. Milliken at GALCIT and in held in high esteem by Arnold) performed a funded NAA study on the desirable features of a hypothetical High Speed Pursuit utilizing 1000hp engine (Allison), including production recommendations for form and fit and reduction of parasite drag, as well as prop types etc for 'optimal' perfrmance. Kindelberger sent the study to Arnold and a copy to Echols, followed by an offer to report findings on his near future trip to Great Britain and France and Germany. It is about this time that Schmued started doodling with preliminary layouts for such a fighter but not in more detail than General Layouts for equipment, weights and balances, Cg locations and high speed arfoils. However these led to P-509 and incorporated Merdith Effect based radiators for glycol and oil coolers imbedded in fuselage aft of cockpit.
Point 4
Atwood and Kindelberger were also considering the Brits as a possible customer for Hgh Speed pursuit and solicited the latest British Specification F.18/39 Operational Requirements Requirement OR.73 for Replacement of Spitfire and Hurricane - which BPC delivered in January 1939. The requirement was for 'next gen' fighter ultimately leading to Martin-Baker MB3. This sets the stage for more expansion int the politics between NAA, AFPC (Joint French and Brit Purchasing Commision), and USAAC- MC leading into Jan 1940.
Critical in the above discussions are:
1. Arnold, Milliken were closely connected
2. Atwood as NAA Chief, Engineering was thoroughly knowledgable regarding Airframe Design Standard demanded by Echols group at Wright Field and all NAA designs were to those standrds.
3. One year before negotiatons regarding the P-40 at NAA, NAA was also familiar with Brit 'future design' Specifications.
4. Kindelberger solidified his relationship in 1939 with Arnold on a direct 'pick up the phone' basis.
5. Following the delivery of the Milliken study, NAA was included in the MC requests for Information and concepts - but not yet actual qualified bidder on Pursuit proposals.
6. NAA had successfully modified the BC-1 with larger engines, increased armament, bomb racks, etc for export and were approved by AAC/State Department as exporter of combat aircraft.
7. Atwood had a friendly relationship with Echols as 1940 began.

More to follow.

Regards,

Bill Marshall co-author "P-51B Mustang; North American's Bastard Stepchild that saved the 8th AF"

My Co-author Lowell Ford has an extensive collection of NAA correspondence, project files, specifications, etc from many years as NAA employee through the Rockwell acquisition. He has also been a major contributor toward expanding the Boeing collection as well as written several excellent articles about the early pre-mustang history and relationship with Allison

Part 2. Echols question?
Fact 1. Echols was confronted by limitations of Curtiss production regarding bringing XP-46 into production while executing on P-40 conracts and felt like NAA had both the talent and capacity to introduce P-40 production - and therby make available resources for the P-46 at Buffalo. Speculation not supported by his own writings, but by evidence of actions he suppored to keep NAA out of 'Pursuit' status are numerous after NAA rejected the P-40 at NAA agenda.
1. He aproved several 'luke warm' flight test reports by Wright Field test pilots inclding Ben Kelsey in late 1941/Ja 1942 - in contrast with glowing reports of XP-51 by 20th Pursuit Group pilots who tested against P-38D, P-40E and P-64, citing its superior speed and manueverability. That memo to General Ryan CO 4th Interceptor Command was forwarded to Arnold in Jan 1942. Eaker, former CO of 20th PG, en route to 8th AF assignment, visited NAA to fly Mustang - was impressed though noting altitude limitations of the Allison recommended that Arnold pay a visit to NAA - whch he did in January 1942.
2, Unquestionably, Echols put the XP-51#2 on ice after orignal flight tests in December at Wright Field. XP-51#1 was dispatched to Eglin for 20mm tests then sent to NACA Langley.
3. Refusal to place orders for Mustang when Kindelbeger approached him in February - noting that the Mustang Line would complete the Mustang I and IA in October 1942.
4. Refusal to consider Low Level Attack (NA-83 Mod which became A-36), designed in late 1941/Jan 1942 and sublitted for dive bomber funding. His current 'choice' as the slow but powerful Brewster XA-32.
5. Outright opposition to NA-97 (A-36) when the Pentagon Plans and Requirements division and CAS Directorate over-rode Echols and approved the contract for 500 in April 1942. General Muir Fairchild pearheaded that, and succeeding, actions to get the P-51A and introduce options to change to P-51B as desired - based on real Merlin/Packard performance.
6. His attempt to insist that once the 500 A-36 were complete that NAA abandon Mustang and fill replaced production capacity with more B-25s.

It was on or around summer of 1942 when the Rolls-Royce Merlin conversion and the NAA XP-51B with Packard 1650-3 development was in full stride and the estimated performance figures for the Bastard Mustang were submitted, when he finally visited England and R-R to view the future Mustang X first hand. Even then the discussions he had included those to have NAA send NA-91 airframes to Britain to have complete assembly and installations there with Merlin 61 series.

It is clear however, that once he realized that the Mustang ship had moved on without him, when both the P-51A and P-51B contracts were agreed, that he put his War Production Board membership in support to give NAA A1 Priority for all necessities tied to P-51B/C, including Packard 2S/2S 1650-3. Note; This is the 'real' reason Lockheed and Curtiss never had allocations for P-38K and P-40N extensions.

It is important to note that the Directorate, Close Air Support was given priority for the P-51B/C as battlefield superiority and recon - NOT as Long Range escort.

More Later.

Bill Marshall

Respectfully, I disagree. Materiel Command/Division was the AAC/AAF center for Research and Development. They were sole source for RFP/RFQ composition and release to Requirement and Plans (HQ) directives for 'Needs' - and subsequent authority to award 'winner's and recommend purchase for production subject to budget. Until the A-36, contracts for airframes were all approved (or rejected) by Echols/MC. MC/MD had branches for R&D, Flight Test, Production, Services and Materiels.

They were also the center for Flight Test until Eglin finally got control after major issues were encountered in combat due to untested phases (like high altitude/extreme cold for P-38) which plagued combat ops.

Thank you all. Obviously my naive initial view of the situation (see my first post) was quite wrong.

Last but not least - there were no more Fy 42 $$ remaining save for Dive Bombers - which NAA collected with Low Altitude Attack Pursuit modification of the Mustang - the A-36.