Thanks, Shrike, but I think you're missing the question/s. Critically, we are talking about HH Arnold's 'advocacy' of dive bombers (presumed) in the
late 1930s, specifically during the order and development of the A-36 Apache in 1940-1, and
all prior to 1943. Whatever post '43 views were, the USAAF should've had a developed doctrine and numerous units of dive bombers in 1942 - but apart from a couple of ill-trained groups with
mixed equipment, they didn't. If Arnold was a dive bomber advocate, it seems he was definitely doing so without much commitment, which could be explained, legitimately in a number of ways. But buying a pursuit type with dive bomber money isn't serious advocacy. (Note that the first USAAF Mustangs were configured also as photo recon types - seems like they really didn't know what to do with them!)
What was conventional wisdom of post '43 isn't applicable (and incidentally, the USN persisted with the SB-2 Helldiver well past 43, but arguably proving the point, in that there was never a decisive use of the type in the way that the SBD was vital at Midway, in 1942 changing the course of the war by one incidence of a dive bomber attack).
To continue on the
later period (off topic) general dive bomber theme! The conventional critique of dive bombers is true in parts, but not complete, such as:
shrike wrote:
By 1943 dive bombing had been thoroughly discredited in the US, with articles in popular print pointing out that the attacking aircraft presented a long, near zero-deflection target to gunners on the ground. As long as the gunners held their ground and manned their guns. This was especially true on board ship, where said gunners had no place to retreat (or flee) to.
Not true. The efficacy of the Luftwaffe (and
Regia Aeronatica) against the Royal Navy in the Med with Stukas sunk an awful lot of tough ships with tough men 'staying at their posts' and firing back, and that included some of the new anti-aircraft destroyers. The claim that it required men staying at their posts is a canard, the need was better AA
equipment on ships, which is why all navies spent much of the mid-war period upping their AA facilities or facing the consequences.
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The Germans had had their early successes,...
Which included the effective conquest of continental Europe by the application of the
Blitzkrieg concept, a critical part of which was the use of Stukas to hit pinpoint tactical targets to enable the army to keep moving. Let's not under-rate the revolutionary nature of that achievement.
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and dive bombing was a personal favorite of AH owing to it's potential precision. Hitler,as a veteran of the western front, loathed the indiscriminate nature of artillery barrages, and of the concept of 'strategic' or 'carpet' bombing as well.
More critically, and far from just Hitler's own preferences, strategic and carpet bombing would simply not have done the job. However the Stuka as dive bomber and part of
Blitzkrieg never failed in that task; all failures (Battle of Britain, Russia) were due to other elements - air superiority, logistics - failing their part of the combined offensive. In 1939-41 provided the fighters did their job, and the logistics kept up, the
Blitzkrieg prevailed. And staying at the guns to shoot back here is a canard also. The shortfall was not in tenacity, but in effective AA, all European armies (and the US forces of the period) having inadequate anti-dive bomber guns and systems. Despite the claims that the dive bomber was an easy target to determined gunners, it clearly was not, or it wouldn't have prevailed over a good dozen or so
different armies
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While the Germans eventually gave up on dive-bombing in practice, the requirement to be able to do so detrimentally influenced aircraft design throughout the war.
Absolutely, it became an
idée fixe.
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The Japanese were doctrinally somewhat hidebound. While very advanced at the start of the war, mainstream Japanese tactics never seemed really able to adapt to changing conditions. Their early successes were against under-defended and unprepared targets, but unlike the Luftwaffe, they continued until attrition of their trained pilots made in untenable.
One can argue that. The early Japanese successes - including in China etc in the 1930s tell a different story, and the allies held onto various strategies that proved ineffective, but he weight of allied (US material, Russian humans in Europe) ultimately prevailed, overcoming doctrinal shortfalls of the allies. Certainly there were adaptations and failures to do so by all nations in the war, but lets not congratulate the Allies for innovation when it was ultimately Napolions 'big battalions' which ensured victory, and made innovation and secret weapons a time and resource saving luxury rather than a vital answer.
(See the USN's adherence to the SB-2 mentioned earlier past any effective potential use, or the RAF and USAAF's denial of any effective use of the Vengeance specifically, despite the occasions they were used in the Far East very effectively and with greater precision, economy and lower losses than fighter bombers. Doctrine dictates what is believed as much as it sets a structure and approach to problems.)
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The Italians, who produced the fined aerobatic aircraft ever to carry guns (NOT great fighters), appreciated the glory and elan of dive-bombing even in the face of it's ever decreasing effectiveness.
Not really sure what to make of this; it's true enough of the
fighters, the main use of Italian-built dive bombers was in the 1930s against tribesmen in Abasynia etc. (just like the RAF and French air policing, although with more mustard gas). The Italian W.W.II era dive bomber designs were all (AFAIK) failures, but the Italian use of Stukas, and their invention of skip-bombing, taken up later by the USAAF among others, was their contribution - and an effective one after the decline of the
Aerosluranti torpedo bomber heroes. But yes, the 'elan' and admiration of
bomber heroes over fighter jocks was part of the Italian way; albeit ultimately failed by (as you've said) the decline of the dive bomber, and their industry and materiel.
IMHO, the summary of the dive bomber is this - dive bombers were
the ideal answer in 1939-42 for tactical pinpoint bombing (remember through W.W.II no-one was very good at hitting targets with medium or high level bombing). By mid 42, aircraft structures and engine power improvements meant a single-engine, single-seat fighter was tough enough (for most dives) to do essentially the dive bombers job, and fight its own way out of trouble after or at the cost of its bombs, on the way in to target. Like the torpedo bomber which was decisive in the Med and Pacific, by mid war, it was no longer even a good answer.
Good points, though! Good discussion.
Regards,
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