rreis wrote:
JDK wrote:
on the other hand Chamberlain and Daladier knew very well neither country was ready for war in 1938 (France still wasn't in May 1940) so for whatever reasons, Chamberlain did have to buy time.
hmmm... my perception was that neither the UK or France were ready for the perception they had of the German army. Am I wrong?
Yes, see my post - No.5: "while France and Britain had to some degree been overawed by some smart PR by Hitler and Goering, on the other hand Chamberlain and Daladier knew very well neither country was ready for war in 1938 (France still wasn't in May 1940) so for whatever reasons, Chamberlain did have to buy time."
In other words, Britain and France couldn't go to war - they didn't have the equipment. They were certainly over-awed by Germany's propaganda of the German forces, which were certainly overstated. Most assessments say that the German forces weren't ready for more than the equivalent of the invasion of a smaller neighbouring state - most of what they had wouldn't seriously threaten Britain (outmatched by the RN) but we tend to forget that no one had heard of or believed in 'Blizkrieg' in '38, as it hadn't happened yet.
So whatever the real or perceived strength of the German forces, Britain and France had no "big stick" to back up their "speaking softy" at Munich. (And while the USN's air arm was the best in the world in '38-9, the rest of the US forces were in a parlously poor state. No better options there, even without the political tone.)
By delaying the war a year, it's possible it became a world war that it mightn't have otherwise (unlikely, see Italy and Japan) but they certainly entered a war in 1939 they had a better chance of winning. But that's a lot of "what ifs."
Regards,