Warbird Information Exchange

We'll have to agree to disagree on that one. What starts this sort of misinformation going is that the sort of standards for the need for references was not adhered to in the first place. However, if the problem is that there wasn't verifiability in the first place, then a further lack of references not going to solve the problem.


You are unfortunately correct that misinformation is often repeated in a self-fulfilling feedback loop and that the desire for "verifiability" tends to perpetuate it. However, as above, using the cause of that problem as a justification for using that same problem to address it would just cause further issues.

On that subject, I have a sort of informal maxim that "the more well known a fact is, the more likely it is to be incorrect". There are two reasons for this. The first is essentially the same problem as the game of telephone - the more hands a piece of information passes through, the more likely it is to be garbled. The other is that outstanding or extreme claims - such as the nicknames “ensign eliminator” or “ensign eater” - are more likely to be eye catching. (On that note, aircraft nicknames are a particular interest of mine. I have a thread about the etymology of the name "Flying Fortress" that deals with some of these same issues.) People want to repeat the most outstanding claims.

Trust me when I say I've experienced this first hand. I have had to explain to museum visitors numerous times how "the whole nine yards" did not originate from the length of gun belts, or no, WASPs did not ferry aircraft overseas, or that people weren't really shorter "back then". The problem is that people repeat things they have tangentially heard, but never did the research themselves. It's the reason I strictly instruct our docents to admit to guests when they don't know an answer to a question and not to make one up.


By any chance have you read Calum Douglas's piece about the need for detailed research? I really think you'd really enjoy it as it is exactly what you are talking about.


You are correct, the statement was a misunderstanding of what you wrote. My apologies.


Could you speak to why Rex Beisel decided to go for such an unorthodox design with the F7U? Wikipedia claims that it was the result of influence from German designs, but it doesn't exactly state why this was thought to be a benefit. I assume part of it was a desire for a greater weapons load?


Fair point. A poor choice of words on my part. Perhaps the better term is "upgrading".


Is there a place where I can find a such a study? My best guess is your book, correct?

Since you are familiar with the accident record of the airplane, I'm going to copy-paste a couple of accidents, as written on the Wikipedia article for the aircraft, below as I would like to hear your thoughts on them:

(Source: Wikipedia)

I am particularly interested in these because they all sound like pretty clear cut cases of design faults. If this was indeed not the case, what were the actual causes? (Keep in mind, I don't know the answer here and I'm not trying to be accusatory.)


Have you recorded any of these talks? They sound like they'd be really interesting to listen to. I'm always plugging the Veterans History Project to all of the veterans that stop by the museum so that these stories aren't lost.


And thank you for yours! I really appreciate all of the detail in your posts.

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Tri-State Warbird Museum Collections Manager & Museum Attendant

Warbird Philosophy Webmaster

This thread will be the 2023 standard moving forward. Great information and well stated by all involved. Hope for more like it.

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“Knowing what’s right, doesn’t mean much unless you do what’s right.”

For what it’s worth, here are some pages from the F7U-3 Flight Manual concerning operating from an aircraft carrier.

Normal Procedures

F1CB20A6-2AE7-43C0-8E15-6538AB1E8910 by tanker622001, on Flickr

37EE302F-2D5F-4BDF-9761-31969E1CAEE7 by tanker622001, on Flickr

0EF1AF7B-DF2D-4EA9-AEB7-409CF6589636 by tanker622001, on Flickr

Some of the Emergency Procedures from the F7U-3 Flight Manual including a single engine approach to landing on an aircraft carrier

CDCF16DB-8B9C-4849-9C76-486CDB11DBD6 by tanker622001, on Flickr

C0D7ECF4-B5C2-4CDE-B559-D61EA53663C8 by tanker622001, on Flickr

577488AF-E2E0-4E87-A110-6CB70B61804E by tanker622001, on Flickr

9F35BC7B-8965-477A-9966-09CFCA146C8C by tanker622001, on Flickr

My apologies for the delay - was flying last night until late.

So, allow me to address these accidents highlighted on Wikipedia in reverse order, as the first listed accident differs from the rest.

This said, a lot of things in these listed accidents will serve to highlight my consternation with Wikipedia and their "verifiability versus truth or fact" campaign. Frankly, I find it funny to even be engaged in a conversation that condone's that the truth is not the first and foremost desired outcome, but so be it! For my part, what I offer here are the checked and triple-checked "facts", "verifiable" by Wiki or not....

MILLIARD ACCIDENT

Regarding the Milliard accident: First off, the accident occurred on 01 November 1955, not 04 November. The fourth is when he succumbed to his injuries. Secondly, the pilot was a LTJG, not a Lieutenant. To follow up in this vein, the Wiki review indicates that the "nose gear malfunctioned and drove a strut into the cockpit which triggered the ejection seat" Although "verifiable" since this tripe has been repeated in print so many times its better known than the words to Happy Birthday, its still a bunch of bunk. The facts of this accident are these: George Milliard, who went by "Barry", held off after receiving the cut from the LSO and bypassed all the cross-deck pendants (arresting wires). That was human error #1. As he proceeded up the antiquated axial deck of the USS Hancock (which allowed no bolter capability due to aircraft spotted on the foredeck) his arresting hook engaged the #2 Davis Barrier cable (which is meant to assist in stopping an errant aircraft by engaging it's landing gear, not its arresting hook). This cable, to exacerbate matters, was mis-rigged by the Hancock's ship personnel for the possible engagement of an AJ Savage heavy bomber/tanker aircraft. This meant that the payout of the cable would be far more firm than that required for a much lighter fighter aircraft. Human error #2. As a result, the aircraft pitched forward causing the aircraft's nose gear to then engage the #5 Davis Barrier cable and its associated straps, (but again, due to the mis-set tension, was subjected to forces far in excess of design specifications set by BuAer and met completely within contract parameters by Vought in the aircrafts construction). Human error #2.5 The aircraft, still proceeding forward engaged the Barricade, (designed to arrest the forward motion of the aircraft by engaging its wings in a last ditch effort to avoid incursion into the pack of aircraft spotted forward), and straddled one of the vertical barricade straps. The F7U had a "Barricade Strap Cutter" mounted on its lower nose gear to cut the vertical barricade straps to preclude the full force of the barricade's impediment forces from acting upon the nose gear and not the airframe. This cutter was unfortunately fouled by the Davis barrier strap and was not cut, instead taking the full force of the barreling aircraft on the bottom of the nose gear. The force subjected to the nose gear, which was far in excess of ANY designed or specified requirement, caused the upper trunnion that supported the nose-gear's actuation cylinder to shear from the back of the cockpits armor plate. This trunnion, which has a portion that protrudes through the aft canopy turtle-deck to provide an attach point for the canopy actuation cylinder, sheared through the turtle deck vertically, allowing the nose gear to collapse. Important point: All this occurred BEHIND the cockpit.....No nose gear EVER breached an F7U's cockpit, nor was ANY pilot ever "speared" as is often written by all those "verifiable" source authors. In a freak circumstance, the canopy, which was now dislodged from the aircraft due to its actuator being displaced, departed the machine, arming the ejection seat as designed (when the ejection sequence is normally initiated, the jettisoned canopy pulls the arming pin from the seat allowing it to be fired). The canopy actuator, now broken from its mount point, swung forward and struck the left hand firing cam of the ejection seat as well as knocking out the safety pin of the firing cap, which fired the seat. The pilot was propelled forward into the pack of AD's and struct the vertical tail of one of the parked aircraft, resulting in soon-to-be mortal injury.

The result of this accident, as with lessons learned from all accidents, resulted in modifications and guard placement to prevent another such freak occurrence. It must be emphasized, that this accident was precipitated by multiple human errors, which caused structural stresses above and beyond any design limitations and would have resulted in catastrophe no matter the aircraft type. The shore-basing of the squadron (VF-124) was undertaken in an effort to facilitate investigation of the accident prior to further carrier operations, which was normal protocol for incidents affecting new aircraft on initial deployments.

ALKIRE ACCIDENT

The most famous ramp strike in history is also one of the least understood. I have heard everything from slow spool-up time for the engines, to no visibility from the cockpit as causes for this incident. To diverge from the accident a bit, a few " facts"..... the F7U's J46 engines were not slow to spool in the approach. One would say, "all those old engines were slow to spool!!" But the J46 operates completely different from all other engines.....it is 100% "spooled" in all regimes past a percentage above idle (which varies engine-to-engine ). Thrust is changed by the modulation of the afterburner's petals (or eyelids, if you so prefer). This means that during the approach, you are always fully spooled (insert foot-stomping here!) What was cumbersome, was that if you so desired to use afterburner to dig yourself out of a hole you flew yourself into, the selection of burner initially resulted in the opening, or dilation of the petals to unload the burner allowing it to light-off. This resulted in a momentary LOSS of thrust just when you needed more thrust, until the burner lit and then became effective. As much as this was always a factor in carrier approaches, it really wasn't the cause of the Alkire ramp strike.

Alkires ramp strike was due to one thing and one thing only: attitude. Im not talking about the aircraft's attitude either, although one begets the other.

LCDR Jay Alkire was a land-based patrol pilot who in BuAer's infinite wisdom of the day, transitioned to fighters through the ubiquitous F7U training program.....one week ground school, blindfold cockpit checkout, and a tap on the helmet with the words "good luck son". After joining VF-124 as it's executive officer, he amassed a sizable amount of time (146 hours) in the F7U, but was known to "push" things. When advised by the junior officers in the squadron when he arrived about the advisability of taking the wave off, or aborting an approach if things got low and slow, he admonished them "I've never taken a wave-off in my life, and I never will!" Well, that "attitude" didn't work so well in the end. Alkire launched during work-ups for the deployment over 1000 pounds in excess of maximum landing weight, (human error #1) and to his credit completed one circuit to a successful arrested landing. Following the second launch, still over weight, he turned final long in the groove and began to settle. The LSO, Tom Reilly saw the excessive deviance from the glide path and issued a wave-off signal, which was ignored. As the aircraft began to settle farther and farther, Reilly's wave-offs continued.....all ignored. Afterburner was initiated, and became effective just prior to impact with the ramp, but was precipitated by continued aft-stick forces resulting in an exponential increase in drag versus lift (See the excerpt of the manual so kindly posted which addresses this). Of course, only Alkire can speak to what he was thinking or dealing with, but an analysis of the accident by BuAer found no reason other than pilot error to blame for this horrific accident.
For the record, again in defiance of all oft-repeated "verifiable" sources, NO other personnel were killed in this accident. And this comes directly from the ships logs, gentlemen.

TOM QUILLAN INCIDENT

Oft repeated for comedic effect, the "Number Five (or pick a "verifiable" number) in the Emergency pattern" story is used to disparage the F7U and make it out to be a mechanical disaster waiting to happen. What the magazine and Wikipedia reviewers fail to mention, is the reason why these aircraft all suffered electrical failures after launching. The investigation into the incidents revealed that the starter power cables on the NC-5 "self-propelled electric power plant" being used to start the squadron's alert-line aircraft were reversed following routine maintenance. This caused a reversal in the field of both aircraft's generators in each aircraft, causing complete electrical loss following takeoff. Ironically, this same scenario played out aboard USS Intrepid during the same squadron's (VA-83) deployment, when a similar mistake was accomplished by ship's personnel. Not the F7U's fault.

LCDR HARWELL

More time in a parachute than the airplane....haha ha, ooooh-wee! An oft-chortled knee-slapper to be sure!

First off, details.....His name wasn't Paul Harwell in spite of being referred to as that in Wally Schirra's book "Schirra's Space". He was LCDR Payton O. Harwell, commonly referred to as "Po". Secondly, the accident occurred on 30 March 1955, not 30 May 1955, but hell, who cares about such things, as long as its repeated in multiple Wiki-Friendly sources! Anyway, Harwell was primarily a land-based multi-engine pilot (who eventually attended test pilot school) based at Moffett Field with Fleet Air Service Squadron Ten (FASRON-10). The Transitional Training Unit Pacific (TRANSTUPAC) of VC-3, tasked with checking out the senior officers of prospective F7U squadrons was also based across the field at Hangar 1 at Moffett, and Harwell was a constant visitor, wanting a crack at the Cutlass. His pestering, especially of then LT Walter Schirra, was such that finally VC-3's commander, CDR "Jig Dog" Ramage, gave in and issued the go-ahead to check Harwell out in the Cutlass.... if for no other reason than to stop the constant badgering. Po attended the VC-3 check-out program and was ready for his first (and intended to be ONLY) flight to satisfy his desire to fly the hottest jet in the Navy. Schirra was his wingman instructor pilot. The scenario plays out as reported, they took off and Harwell's aircraft started streaming flames, followed by an explosion which blew off the entire tailcone. Harwell ejected, and did in fact have more time in the chute than airborne in F7U-3 BuNo 128474. But what happened? Nobody seems to care after the chuckles subside and they saunter off to the next amusing anecdote. But what occurred, and actually occurred quite often, was that Harwell's aircraft was brought to the flight line following an engine change. The fuel line to the afterburner (sized like a small fire-hose) was left unconnected following installation of the burner. This resulted in raw fuel spraying all over the aft burner compartment following application of after-burning thrust for takeoff. The spraying fuel pooled in the compartment and lit off, eventually exploding when subjected to the normal high temperatures rushing through the burner at maximum military power. Quite a few F7U engine fire accidents occurred for this reason. I suppose a case can be made that the design of the aircraft precipitated the accident(s) by having the fuel line in a not-easy-to-be-seen location following engine change, but I would opine that perhaps the use of a CHECKLIST, or the employment of a pre-release INSPECTOR might just nip this issue in the bud. Naval aviation in the pre-NATOPS days was just as lax in the maintenance realm as it was in the cockpit, and the F7U bore a sizable brunt of this apathy for checking and double-checking one's work.

Finally.....

LTJG (Not LT) J.W. HOOD

Sad is the case of LTJG John Wylie "Foggy" Hood, USNR. I've left this for last because it is one of the very few cases that a Cutlass pilot was let down by his aircraft and not the other way around. Hood was a pilot for VF-81, the first squadron to receive the F7U-3. He was taking part in the pre-launch ceremonies for the USS Forrestal at Newport News, VA on 11 Deember 1954. Flying BuNo 129659, he along with a squadron mate, and two pilots from VF-83 were conducting high-speed formation fly-bys of the crowd during the launch and performing a very well rehearsed show for the public. He crashed at 450 knots, ejecting just prior to the impact, but not at a sufficient height to avoid a failure to separate from the seat prior to impacting the bay. The aircraft impacted just short of a tanker ship, the SS Pocahontas Fuel which was being actively loaded with bunker oil at the dock. The cause of the accident was revealed to be the engagement of the wing-fold centering unit, which was a system designed to center and hold firm the ailavator (elevon in non Vought-speak) when the wings were folded in order to prevent impingement on the vertical fins during the folding process. This system engaged in flight, either through mechanical breakage or detachment of fasteners, and locked his ailavators precluding any pitch adjustment. He was in a nose low attitude when the unfortunate engagement occurred and was unable to alter his course into the bay. The system was redesigned to preclude a repeat of this accident. So.....that one I'll give you - that was a bad design of that system, but it was rectified and never occurred again.

Hope this helps, despite my inability to not take the easy shots at Wikipedia!

Al

_________________
Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

Nice one Al - a very interesting, informative read. I'd also venture to suggest that you have the basis of a VERY interesting book there! Ever considered it?

Let's face it, some people like to perpetuate stories about "bad" items.

Maybe it's to make themselves feel better...that the engineers, Navy and who knows who else were "stupid" enough to buy a "flawed" aircraft (despite the fact they've never designed a jet or flown a fighter).

I see it in the collector car world all the time, stories damming a car...of course none of the guys badmouthing it have ever driven, let alone owned one...

Also, sometimes it is because they have an axe to grind with the builder, service or even whichever political party "bought" it.

I have a travel guidebook, it says of the XB-70 at the NMUSAF:
"...it's the only one of its kind NOT to crash"....if course it doesn't say only two were built and one was lost when another aircraft hit it.
It's much more fun to make points at the expense of objectivity.

_________________
Remember the vets, the wonderful planes they flew and their sacrifices for a future many of them did not live to see.
Note political free signature.
I figure if you wanted my opinion on items unrelated to this forum, you'd ask for it.

As mentioned, Tommy H Thomason and I have partnered on the full (Correct) story of the F7U-3 series (including -3M, -3P, A2U and proposals). We are hoping for release later this year.

_________________
Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

In the meantime, I've ordered Thomason's earlier Cutlass book.

_________________
Remember the vets, the wonderful planes they flew and their sacrifices for a future many of them did not live to see.
Note political free signature.
I figure if you wanted my opinion on items unrelated to this forum, you'd ask for it.

Mr. Casby, thank you for your extremely detailed and informative post. I very much appreciate the time and effort you took to write it.


Thanks for mentioning this. I didn't realize the book wasn't out yet.


For what it's worth, I was able to find a reference to support this and it has been corrected in the Wikipedia article.

While working on it, I did notice something interesting. The first issue of the Naval Aviation Safety Center's magazine, Approach, was published in July 1955 - the same month as the third of the four accidents noted above. It seems possible that it was the accidents with the Cutlass that had resulted in the realization that better awareness and training was necessary. (A caveat, it was preceded by the Naval Aviation Safety Bulletin.[1.1]) Indeed, the first issue more or less opens with the line: "Naval Aviation has progressed very rapidly during the past few years." This "rapid progression" certainly sounds like the the radically different, or advanced, if you prefer, design of the Cutlass.[1.2] As if to reinforce this notion, one of the eleven articles on the table of contents on the following page is titled "Landing the Cutlass".[1.3]

Presented without comment, a couple of videos of Cutlass accidents:

• F-0837 Vought F7U Cutlass Carrier Crash on USS Hancock Video
• Vought F7U-3 Aircraft Carrier Crash Landings

Lastly, on a very different note, as I mentioned in my previous post, I have a particular interest in aircraft nicknames. Mr. Casby, do you know anything specific about where the "Cutlass" nickname came from? (Vought clearly had a pirate theme going with their aircraft - that much is clear - and this makes sense given they are naval aircraft.) For example, aircraft are often named as the result of competitions with the winner receiving some sort of recognition. Do you know if this was the case with the F7U?

_________________
Tri-State Warbird Museum Collections Manager & Museum Attendant

Warbird Philosophy Webmaster

Ah - apologies: I thought you were referring to the Naval Fighters book, which I have I shall be getting the new one for sure.

Just a guess here, they all seem to deal with sailing or pirates. Corsair, Cutlass, Crusader, Pirate etc...

Lastly, on a very different note, as I mentioned in my previous post, I have a particular interest in aircraft nicknames. Mr. Casby, do you know anything specific about where the "Cutlass" nickname came from? (Vought clearly had a pirate theme going with their aircraft - that much is clear - and this makes sense given they are naval aircraft.) For example, aircraft are often named as the result of competitions with the winner receiving some sort of recognition. Do you know if this was the case with the F7U?[/quote]

_________________
Cheers!

Lance Jones

How did the stall angle of attack compare to other jets of the era? With the elevators on the wings, up elevator may have reduced the coefficient of lift on landing.

Though not a classic delta-wing configuration, to my eye it looks like it may have flown like one.

How did the stall speed compare to other carrier jets of the era?

Larry, could you please post the engine start procedures? Great stuff, thank you.

The normal start procedure from the F7U-3 Flight Manual

7C21735D-2CEE-4476-A1E0-9A62AF52F45D by tanker622001, on Flickr

0F58D198-8B16-45A7-B6C2-9B6445015C3B by tanker622001, on Flickr

Cold Weather start procedure

F60A05E6-56BA-47D8-8883-3959E195BD9A by tanker622001, on Flickr

The engine controls in the F7U-3 were quite complex.

6682EBAB-49B3-49CB-8C65-FD62DC5AFE26 by tanker622001, on Flickr

Incidentally, if you would like to buy the F7U manuals that I have, they are available for pdf downloads at a very reasonable price from here:

https://www.flight-manuals-online.com/p ... u-cutlass/

PayPal works best. I’ve been buying manuals from this outfit for 10+ years and have found them to
have the best price for what they offer and absolutely no problems.