Hi Dave,
Interesting post, and numerous good points, as you'd expect from that source. however I disagree about the link to conclusions...
Dave Hadfield wrote:
"I taught them all I knew about the Japanese. Day after day there were lectures from my notebooks, filled during the previous four years of combat. All of the bitter experience from Nanking to Chunking was poured out in those lectures. Captured Japanese flying and staff manuals, translated into English by the Chinese, served as textbooks. From these manuals the American pilots learned more about Japanese tactics than any single Japanese pilot ever knew."*
The Brits had none of this caliber of leadership there in the Far East.
I can't agree that the lack of
four years experience and tactical development is equal to 'calibre of leadership'. Experience can't be bought and can only be taught to a degree - ideally by integrating a few new personnel into locally experienced units.
It is an absolute of air combat that new crews have a savage learning curve when they first go into combat. if a 'green' unit faces a combat hardened enemy, it is always messy; without the moderating effects of experienced pilots in the flights and squadron.
Certainly many in the RAF (and RAAF) units assumed they had noting to learn and were working with an assumption of racial superiority - as Chennault found himself when the US forces would not take his experience on board until that mistake was exposed by early USAAF losses.
The Darwin raids were, as gemmer's pointed out, far from an accurate comparison. Half-formed units not even shaken down were rushed into action and suffered accordingly against IJN units. They actually recovered rapidly, after early failures. The rushing of the Spitfires (known as 'Capstans') into action was expected to be a magic panacea, as the name Spitfire is today to many enthusiasts, rather than part of a coordinated system.
This is not to offer excuses, but a comment not to draw the wrong conclusions from the facts.
On the other hand, the operational debut and early actions of P-40 equipped 75 Sqn RAAF at Port Moresby were creditable in the pinch.
Quote:
No. 75 Squadron was formed at Townsville on 4 March 1942. After a very brief period of training the Squadron deployed to Port Moresby on 21 March where it was the only RAAF fighter squadron located at this critical base before 25 August 1942. During this period it destroyed over 60 Japanese aircraft in air-to-air combat and strafing attacks for a loss of 24 aircraft and 12 pilots.
The Squadron was withdrawn to the mainland on May 3, 1942. After a short time in Australia for rest and re-equipment, the squadron deployed to Milne Bay on 21 July 1942. With No. 76 Squadron, it played a key role in the Australian victory in the Battle of Milne Bay.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._75_Squadron_RAAFMore here:
http://home.st.net.au/~pdunn/75sqn.htmWhy were they successful? Multiple reasons, not all of which I'd be qualified to summarise, but included a cadre of (European) experienced pilots, fighting offensively (albeit in a defensive war) rather than trying to defend a location
without an air defence system (Darwin was essentially unprotected in 1941-early '42).
And not believing in 'magic' names.
Quote:
A few weeks later a crack R.A.F. Spitfire squadron was rushed to Australia from Europe and lost 17 out of 27 pilots over Darwin in two raids. The Spitfire was far superior to the P-40 as a combat plane. It was simply a matter of tactics. The R.A.F. pilots were trained in methods that were excellent against German and Italian equipment but suicide against the acrobatic Japanese.
Actually a number of those Spitfires were lost due to fuel starvation - not even enemy activity, due to poor guidance and misunderstandings in the initial tasks. Naturally, this wasn't widely announced at the time.
Certainly, as in Nathan's original statement, the P-40 is under-credited with its real capability. Used to its performance advantage at medium and low level, it was certainly a good enough fighter in the early W.W.II period.
It is probably fair to say that 'in the book' figures showed no significant advantage of the P-40E over the 109F/G or Spitfire V at low level and at a disadvantage at altitude. The P-40E should be superior to the Ki 27. I wouldn't comment on the Zero or Oscar comparison. The P-40C wasn't better than the contemporary Hurricane I.
In the right hands, the P-40E was able to best any
average pilot in any of these other aircraft, provided they had an even (unbounced) chance. 'Good enough' IMHO.
Regards,