Warbird Information Exchange

Okay, let’s start with your first assertion, that 1/4 of the production run were “lost” in accidents. This is a prime example of the misconstrued statistics that permeate most discussions of the type. “Lost” leads one to believe that 25% of the aircraft were catastrophically destroyed. This could not be further from the truth. To begin with, the Cutlass, as a result of its long gestation period and delay reaching the fleet, found itself thrust into roles it was never originally designed for…. General purpose fighter, missile interceptor, nuclear delivery capable attack. As a result, in spite of it being the first to assume the last two of these tasks in the navy, it was by definition a “placeholder” aircraft to function in these roles until mission dedicated aircraft exited development and reached the fleet. In the case of missile interceptor it was a placeholder for the F3H-2M. Likewise, nuclear delivery saw it assume the placeholder role for the A4D. Even in the general purpose fighter role, it was the replacement for the much-anticipated but failed XF10 Jaguar that never materialized.

This resulted in a fiscal situation that saw the F7U-3 series to be considered a one-tour aircraft, meaning that no plans were made for the aircraft to transit an overhaul facility in preparation for a second bite at the apple service-wise. Because of this, airframes that sustained very minor damage incurred in normal operations, or airframes that sustained moderate ( but fixable) damage in accidents such as runway excursions were not repaired. The spare parts contracts that normally follow the initial production contracts were not proffered as the prevailing wisdom held that the airframes would soon be replaced by purpose built fighters, interceptors, and dedicated attack aircraft coming down the pipeline.

This lack of spares, and BuAer’s reluctance to fund repairs to airframes sustaining minor damage resulted in these airframes being “struck off charge” or less eloquently “sent for scrapping.”
Due to BuAer’s antiquated, yet rigid system for classification of asset status, these airframes that were fully repairable, and fully viable candidates for rework, were simply classified as unrepairable due to accident or incident. It is much akin to taking your new Tesla to the store and getting a shopping cart “ding” in the door….. instead of getting the dent pulled out, you scrap the car and wait for next year’s model to hit the showroom floor, electing to walk in the meantime.

So this 25% “lost” or “destroyed in accidents” figure that is flung about with much aplomb and glee by the uninformed is inclusive of all these repairable damages which were administratively elected to be ignored…..and which by the way, were rarely caused by the aircraft. Pilot and maintenance errors were rampant not due to a fault of the machine, but by the soon-to-be ubiquitous complexity not seen before in the fleet. This was coupled with a prevailing 1950’s BuAer mindset that believed that any Naval Aviator could fly any aircraft by simply reading the manual and hopping in ….no
matter the machine’s complexity, differences, aerodynamic idiosyncrasies, or the pilot’s lack of understanding of the new swept-wing, afterburning, flapless, tail-less, configuration he was about to strap into. You cannot express desire for capability and simultaneously lambaste the resultant complexity needed to achieve it.

This is but just one example of the “statistics” related to the F7U that without in-depth research into the “why” is often taken at face value after its repetition codifies it as “fact”. I certainly don’t fault you X-ray for mindlessly repeating what you’ve read and re-read countless times on Wiki and in the rags, but hope to instill the afterthought that perhaps when told with foot-stomping enthusiasm that the sky is silver or gold…. that perhaps you just might be being misled and there is more to the story…..

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Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

at the MAPS Museum

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May all your bent wings be F2G Corsairs!

My personal favorite subjective insult against an aircraft is labeling it "a maintenance nightmare".

For example:

The boys flying the ___ are very enthusiastic about it. It's the first airplane I have flown that will do everything the manufacturer says it will do -- but it will only do it one day a week. The maintenance problem is terrific. Perhaps when our mechanics and our engineering crews are adapted to the plane and find out its idiosyncrasies, they will be able to straighten it out; and maybe we'll be able to get it to fly two days a week...

-Major Joe Renner, CO of VMO-251, describing operations with the F4U Corsair on Guadalcanal

The F4U sounds like a maintenance nightmare. I'm beginning to wonder if any Chance-Vought design should be restored to airworthy!

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It was a good idea, it just didn't work.

Ummm, after 40+ years with an A+P I would argue ALL airplanes are a maintenance PITA! lol

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45-47=-2

Only those that were designed by folks who had never picked up a spanner. Or nowadays it's those that were designed by someone who, when faced with a full-sized aircraft, says "oh it's bigger than I imagined".

After reading Al's thoughts I had another thought about the time period of the Cutlass. The second Eisenhower administration was caught in the vise of needing to be a nuclear deterrent to our friends the Soviets, bankrolling the rebuild of Western Europe, and then having to deal with a recession in 1957 as well as enter the space race. The chiefs at the Pentagon were in a very fragile position for acquiring new hardware by the politics of the time, especially since NATO was being stood up around this time to offset the need for a large US conventional defensive posture. This is what led to the end of the Martin P6M Seamaster and lots of other innovative projects which had their origin in post-WWII developments and lessons. Just like the F-14 had to go because it got in the way of developing the F-35 (with questionable logic on both accounts), I can see the Cutlass getting caught in the politics of the time. There are lots of examples throughout military history of technology getting delayed because existing technology was considered "good enough." Think of the development of the M-1 Garand being delayed by the massive numbers of 1903 rifles being on hand in the 1920's, cancellation of the B-32 program, and delay of the HMMWV by the adoption of the M-151 MUTT. Things aren't always about airspeed, performance, maintainability, or what a group of people think is correct...It is a much more complex equation for any weapons system. At least from my armchair....

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REMEMBER THE SERGEANT PILOTS!

Or to look at it another way...
The "state of the art" was moving so rapidly, you didn't need the Cutlass' unique configuration (and its issues...minor or major) to get high performance.
Witness Vought's next project, the Crusader.
Compared to the Cutlass, very conventional (adjustable wing incidence aside)...and it certainly was a winner.

As far as the JFK administration, they too were caught in a similar situation...they had to adapt to the new missile based defense system.
So the P6M flying boat went (and in another move that broke the heart of traditionalists, the Navy ended its airship program in 1961-62) and the retirement of the huge B-47 fleet was greatly accelerated by the administration.
My guess is the B-58 was too far along (and too fast...it would have been a bad pr move) to cancel. But certainly it was never bought in the numbers initially envisioned.
The B-70 also became a victim of missiles....both SAMs and ICBMs.
And we begin to see the decline of conventional CONUS air defense, the ADC. If missiles were the new bomber threat, no need for many F-106s, let alone the YF-12. A huge change from just a decade before.

Another change, if I remember my history correctly, was the cutback of expensive European Army bases and troops...it was decided that the Army would be mobile with rapid reinforcement of troops by air and pre-deployment of heavy equipment.
That's what paid for the C-141 and I suspect, the C-5.
So, a lot of changes were in play...and this was long before Vietnam and the issues it brought.

So, technology and the entire defense posture had changed in a very short amount of time.

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Remember the vets, the wonderful planes they flew and their sacrifices for a future many of them did not live to see.
Note political free signature.
I figure if you wanted my opinion on items unrelated to this forum, you'd ask for it.

Please do! I would find this really fascinating! For what it's worth, I am very sympathetic to the need to dispel long held myths and have a few similar unpublished articles myself.



I do have to take issue with this one particular point. The standard for Wikipedia is verifiability, not "truth". This means all claims must be attributable to reliable sources and primary sources do not meet that standard. There is a very good reason for this: it prevents anyone from justifying adding anything they want. Yes, sometimes it means that it is difficult to correct long established misinformation, but the alternative is worse. (This is just one of many reasons, so if anyone wants to read more, the previous link goes into significantly greater detail.) Much like you are tired of "read[ing] post after post in many platforms" deriding the Cutlass, I have the same reaction when it comes to claims of Wikipedia of not accepting "truth". I have seen the many, many cases of people attempting to insert biased or incorrection information. So, I apologize if this seems aggressive, but I am a bit defensive for the same reasons you are.


I very much appreciate this effort and it may be the the source necessary to correct the misunderstandings, but could still potentially fall afoul of the self-published sources rule. (I assume the book you are referring to is Naval Fighters 94, is this correct?) The Air and Space Quarterly article could also go a long way toward addressing any inaccuracies.

On the subject of the Cutlass more generally, my knowledge of the aircraft is limited - especially in relation to Mr. Casby - but the impression I always had of it was similar to the XB-35. That is to say, as an aircraft with a very unconventional layout it was something that: 1) most pilots were not familiar with and 2) the aerodynamic nature of the design was ahead of what the technology of the time was able to achieve.

In regards to the first point, I like to point to the website AirCrash.org. It claims that there was a big conspiracy to suppress the designs of Vincent Burnelli. (Full disclosure: I am a big fan of the CBY-3, but just because its strange design and paint scheme make it look awesome.) This is of course not true, but it also not the relevant point here. Instead, it is the author's second claim - that Burnelli designs are inherently safer. What he misses is that the reason aviation is so safe these days has less to do with the design of any individual aircraft, than the institutions and conventions. Redesigning all aircraft to use a lifting body design would, in all likelihood, cause more crashes because it is such an unknown quantity and pilots would not know how to handle it. I get the feeling the F7U is the same way. If you gave it to the average navy pilot of the 1950s - or even today - they would have trouble with it because it is so different from what they are used to. However, if you have a very skilled pilot with extensive training on the Cutlass specifically, it seems doable.

In regards to the second point, my understanding is that the only large flying wings like the B-2 were possible was because of advanced software that could run the flight controls. While this may not be strictly true of the F7U - it isn't uncontrollable - it was trying to do something that just wasn't reasonable practical with the technology of the 1950s. As has been noted in a previous post, Mr. Casby has been forced to make numerous upgrades during the restoration.

This is not to say flying it is without risk. The crash of the N-9M in 2019 is evidence that flying an unconventional aircraft can still go wrong.

A question for you Mr. Casby: Would you consider the Cutlass progam, as a whole, a failure? Yes, it seems the airplane could be flown safely, but if you build a weapons system that a significant portion of your pilots struggle to fly ("the loss of a friend who had joined the squadron a few days earlier and crashed on his first Cutlass flight had gotten his attention"[1]), a weapons system that is frequently down for maintenance ("'When everything was working right'"[1]), a weapons system that relies on immature technology ("problematic 3,000-psi hydraulic system"[1]), a weapons system that does not perform the roles it was assigned ("it was by definition a “placeholder” aircraft to function in these roles until mission dedicated aircraft exited development"[2]) - isn't that a failure? Or was the aircraft successful and the organization around it - an organization that did not successfully prepare its pilots, an organization that did not provide for spare parts, an organization that did not adapt to new technologies, an organization that pushed it into roles it was not designed for - and that means the failure lies elsewhere? I think I know what your response is going to be, but I would appreciate either acknowledgement or rebuttals to the opposing claims.

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Tri-State Warbird Museum Collections Manager & Museum Attendant

Warbird Philosophy Webmaster

Thank you for your response, I’ll try and answer your questions as best I can.

First off, my derision of Wikipedia stands firm. Verifiability in their view is constituted by the ability to point toward a published source. Often this source is a magazine article or book excerpt written by an author who parrots what the last magazine or book author has stated. This repetition then creates a “history track” of published bullsh*t which is then held ahigh with the reverence one normally attributes to the Bible. When I refer to “primary sources” I do not mean personal recollections of now elderly players who may or may not have an axe to grind, or a desire to glorify, for whatever personal reason…. I am referring to official accident reports, internal factory and BuAer memos and reports, official test pilot reports, NATC and NACA reports. How many magazine authors (many with well known names due to their propensity of turning out rheems of regurgitated trash) have taken the time and expended the money (travel, hotels, car rental) and TIME to source these records before putting pen to paper to meet next months publishing deadline? Few, if any. They find a previously written hit piece, change the wording enough to avoid a plagerism lynch-mob, and churn out a bunch of crap that Wikipedia now considers “verifiable”, and therefore deserving of citing in their highly exalted forum. No thank you. I know how bad their “verifiable” information is regarding the F7U and J46; I can’t even imagine the level of cockeyed drivel the remainder of the platform contains….

In response to your questions, allow me to answer a couple of them simultaneously. The aircraft is often saddled with the ominous moniker of “ensign eliminator” or “ensign eater” in the previously discussed “verifiable” rags. The truth of the matter is that only two Ensigns perished in the F7U. If you really wish to get down to the nitty-gritty, only one perished as the second had received notice of promotion a couple days before even though it did not officially occur at the time of death. For fun (?) let’s take a look at these two accidents. The ensign who lost his life on his first flight, according to the official BuAer and CVA accident analysis flew a perfectly good aircraft into the earth shortly after takeoff. No aircraft failure could be determined. The prevailing wisdom was that he became disoriented while switching stick hands to change radio frequencies and lost control. This may have been exacerbated (or primary caused) by the inadvertent application of almost full aileron-function trim which the stick was found to depict. The Cutlass, like the early F8U had a rheostat trim system (versus coolie-hat) that in the transfer of gloved hands could have been activated without desire while simultaneously being distracted from aviating in the pursuit of communicating. We will never know for sure, but we do know there wasn’t a catastrophic failure of the aircraft precipitating his demise.

The second O1 loss came as a result of taking off while feeding from external drop tanks (in violation of established procedure and training). This resulted in depletion of the external tanks during the afterburner takeoff and subsequent flameout at low level due to fuel exhaustion. A perfectly good Cutlass crashed due to fuel starvation with full internal fuel aboard. The death was made far more tragic by the ejection seat not firing due to a mechanic failing to screw the firing cap on the seats catapult down past the one turn required to keep it temporarily in place….. the striker’s firing-pin functioned as designed, it just couldn’t reach the charge’s firing cap. Again human error due to not following proscribed procedure and checklists. But…. Have any of Wiki’s lofty “verifiable” sources relayed “these” details? I’m sorry, truth is truth. I am more interested in the facts than I am in how many times a mistruth is repeated for “verifiability”

So these two accidents account for the Ensigns who were “eliminated”, but what about all the other ensigns who came close? A detailed study of all accidents in the F7U reveals an interesting fact. Ensigns (by definition, new to both the aircraft and flying in general) had the fewest accidents and incidents of all naval aviators flying the Cutlass! Now, let me break from the numbers and insert an opinion: the lack of experience in general allowed the newly minted aviators the ability to absorb and adapt to swept wing aerodynamics better than their more-experienced senior squadron mates who had to overcome the techniques and muscle-memory associated with their more docile and forgiving straight wing previous rides. But the numbers speak volumes, and these statistics don’t lie. Nobody in the navy had swept-wing experience…. The F7U was the Navy’s first swept wing aircraft. The more previous experience you had in straight wing conventional aircraft, the more chances of you’re screwing up in the Cutlass. Fault of the aircraft? I think not. Fault of a bureaucratic system and antiquated culture not prepared for this leap in technology and ill-prepared for the transition?…..a reasonable observer would probably conclude so.

Regarding the comparison to B-2s and N-9Ms….. apples and oranges. Contrary to internet and magazine drivel, the F7U was an inherently stable design. Yes, in the -3 it had PSG (post-stall gyration) issues that affected it following clean stalls. However this was not the result of an instability in the design. It was the result of not increasing the size of the fins commensurately with the rest of the planform when the -1 was redesigned into the -3. Remember, the -1 had no PSG issue…. Its stall characteristics both clean and dirty were described as gentle to the point of non-existent. It wasn’t realized until a decade later when the A-7 had similar issues in development and computer modeling identified the issue. The F7U, although having the first flight stabilization system used for gunnery stabilization in the pitch realm, and yaw stabilization for pilot comfort, did not require this system to fly. The design, contrary to Wikipedia-verifiable common perception was a rock-stable platform not needing any computer to keep it flying.

Regarding your assertion (or misunderstanding of what I wrote) that the aircraft could not perform the roles it was given: nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is it did perform those roles, that’s why it was given them to perform. In most cases it was the only aircraft in the fleet at that time that could! Only the straight-wing lackluster F3D could loft four heavy Sparrow-1 missiles back in the day besides the F7U. That is why the F7U was the navy’s first missile deployed fighter. It was a placeholder for the F3H which was purpose-designed for that role. Certainly you cannot assess blame to the machine for the timing of its existence any more than you can lambaste the bicycle for coming between the horse and automobile and not being capable of what it’s replacement was capable of! We have a human nature foible of wanting to judge things by what came after them. This is logically the mark of a fool as anything’s value can only be compared to what it replaced, not what has yet to be developed. I am certain that had fly by wire, glass cockpits, high-thrust turbo-fan engines, lightweight structure, zero-zero ejection seats, and computer modeling bern available, Vought would have used it all in the Cutlass, or for that matter, the beloved Corsair making them both equal to today’s technological marvels. But the exercise in dreaming is just that….

Finally, let me address some misunderstanding. I am not redesigning anything in the aircraft. Nothing needs re-design. Almost fifteen hundred pilots checked out (or flew without checkout) the F7U. 26 perished, of which two could be attributable to the aircraft. There is nothing that needs re-design. What does need replacement are the weak points in the available technology of the day. If I could point to one item that was the cause of the most consternation with the aircraft it was the hose, fitting and seal (o-ring) technology that existed when the Cutlass came to fruition. This is an easy (albeit costly) fix. These hydraulic, fuel, and oil componants were not up to the task back then. But, they were the best we had. Again, you can’t judge by what came later. So these will be replaced and the reliability issues will
be solved. The engines are as reliable as any with these items addressed. The airframe is unbreakable. (Show me another aircraft with a 25G spread….. +16 and -9 DEMONSTRATED without any structural deformity or degradation). The aircraft is inherently stable, stout, and well-built. It has docile characteristics in all regimes except clean stall. Solution? Don’t stall the aircraft clean. It ain’t rocket-surgery. It was in the manual back then, it’s still in the manual.

So no, I do not think the Cutlass was a failure, rather a success. It pioneered what every single aircraft in service today embraces as the norm. It missed its intended mission role due to the need for increased development time between the -1 and -3 (would the naysayers prefer it had been fielded before that point?). It performed missions it was not designed for. It excelled in many of them (air to ground gunnery, nuclear weapon delivery, air to air combat maneuvers). It held the line and provided valuable guidance in designing the next generation of fighters to replace it. It held more “firsts” than any aircraft that comes to mind. It was the future, and still looks it to this day. I recently had the great honor of hosting a retired Admiral and former Cutlass pilot (including one of my F7U parts-aircraft) at my hangar a couple days ago. We talked about all things Cutlass, good and bad. But one thing stood out…. He said, and I quote “I flew a lot of good aircraft, the F2H, F7U, A4, A7….. but nothing could do what the Cutlass could…. It was one hell of a great aircraft”.

Of course, being just the opinion of a high-time Admiral who was instrumental in retaining Top-Gun and introducing the F-14 into the fleet, and not being “Wiki-verifiable” because it hasn’t been published in the latest issue of Aero-Spew Monthly and authored by a kid sucking Diet Coke and eating Cheetos in mom’s basement, you may need to take that tidbit with a grain of salt……right?

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Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

Yes, yes and YES!!! The term 'primary source' is not widely understood, and Wiki is partially to blame for that: the internet has made us lazy.

However don't tar us all with the same brush. I've been travelling, meeting people, documenting primary-source data and spending thousands over 40+ years of researching the F-86. I use official sources to verify anecdotal data and apply the latter in order to give a personal account of each episode. But it's interesting how many times over the years that I've had a person who witnessed an event, recall it incorrectly and quite adamantly. Then faced with the primary-source data, concede that they'd mis-remembered it. There is some skill required to ensure no offense is taken: most of us do it. It also takes a while to understand that part of the human make-up and take it into account.

And you only have to look at the unsubstantiated garbage that litters the internet (and is now perceived as 'fact') regarding George Welch's early XP-86 flights to realise that the F7U is not alone in being the target of this BS assault. There's now such a tidal wave of nonsensical rubbish surrounding the "Welch was first to Mach 1" fiction that any reference to primary-source data to disprove it only meets with accusations of conspiracy theories. Meanwhile there are probably three or more physical reasons why it couldn't happen (the more I research the more I find), quite aside from the total lack of any official documents that would prove otherwise.

I hope you can post some updates on here: this is a valuable site, with lots of interested and interesting folks aboard. And if every day is a school day then that's no bad thing

I couldn’t agree more. A good case in point is Wally Schirra. I’ve interviewed him three times (once alone and twice in the presence of others). His opinion of the F7U, and the resulting stories to back them up changed depending on his audience. When you look at his reports from back in the day, he was quite complimentary of the type. If you asked what “he” could do in the aircraft, he extolled its virtues with enthusiasm. If someone asked “tell me about the “gutless Cutlass” he would talk ill of it. I realized he told his stories based upon his audience, and Wally was a storyteller looking for the reaction, good or bad depending….

He was one of the primary Cutlass instructors and check pilots in VC-3. He liked the aircraft but felt it was too much for a new ensign (see previous post)…. Most likely due to his not training any ensigns, but senior squadron officers who were sent to be trained and return to their squadrons to teach the junior officers. This perhaps explains the opinion…. Experienced pilots experiencing difficulties for reasons already discussed, and the assumption that junior officers would have even more issues, which history has proven incorrect. As you elude to, you must trust but verify, and just because something is widely repeated doesn’t make it an incontrovertible fact….. unless you are Wikipedia and one of its fanboys.

I own all of Wally’s logbooks from the day he first flew to his last, including all his space flights and Korea as an exchange pilot. Interesting stuff……

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Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

Thanks Al as always for your extremely valuable feedback. Same for quemerfold. Both outstanding experts at their specifically researched aircraft. Can’t state enough just how valuable their time and research truly is.

It’s members like these fellows who make WIX second to none.

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“Knowing what’s right, doesn’t mean much unless you do what’s right.”

Well while we're at it Mark, you are one of the main reasons I check in here every day!

I second that motion!!!

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Al Casby
Project Cutlass

Cutlass Aeronautics, LLC
4863 E. Falcon Drive
Mesa, AZ 85215


“Restoring Aviation’s Cutting Edge” ™

Alcasby@projectcutlass.com
602-684-9371

Well then if it takes more of my Amateur threads to help keep you guys around, then I'll flood the WIX forum more than I already do. lol

Thanks for the fascinating posts guys. Amazing information to read.

Mark

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“Knowing what’s right, doesn’t mean much unless you do what’s right.”