could the P38 and P47 have handled escort?

[Zachary]

I've never flown the Jug, but folks who do talk about cramped cockpit, hard to see out of and other issues.
gunny

Minor point in the discussion, but I'm curious to know who said that? I've interviewed quite a number of pilots who flew the Jug during the war, and they all agreed that the cockpit was very large and comfortable. Rearward visibility could be a problem with the razorback, but early models of the P-51 had the same problem. The bubble canopy eliminated the visibility problems from what I have been told.

Thanks for any info!

Zack

EDIT: I should have read further into the discussion, as I see Gunny answered the question to some extent. Although I have sat in the P-51 Impatient Virgin and at 6' tall it was quite cramped for me. If not for the Malcolm Hood my head would not have fit very comfortably at all. If anyone has a P-47 I can sit in, I'll gladly give a full comparison report between the two!

[drgondog]

JDK - wasn't sure whether your reference to Russia bleeding LW dry or Wermacht or both.

If LW I would disagree and point to 1943 as the pivotal year in which LuftFlotte Reich was formed in mid 1943 in recognition that the threat to German industry was coming from west - namely 8th AF and RAF, and to a lesser but important degree from south in form of 12th/15th AF hitting key Petroleum targets.

When the 8th and 9th AF started and built up, the key LW opponents were all essentially LuftFlotte 3 based in France, Belgium and Holland. The fighter arms were JG2 and JG26 (~240 plus Me 109s and Fw 190s). This was all there was to fight 8th/9th/RAf on the west.

LwBh Mitte was Germany and comprised of JG 1 (~90 effectives of Fw 190s) plus NJG1 through 4 (~200 t/e night fighters also used against 8th AF)

The Ost Front had Luft Flotte 1, 4, 5, 6 and Lw Kdo Sud Ost with JG 54, JG3, JG 51, JG 52, JG 53, JG 77, and JG 5 - in other words the center of gravity for LW fighter arms was Russian front.

During the next several months all of Mitte was absorbed into Reich and addt'l Gruppes from JG3, JG11, JG 27 were transferred to Reich from East Front until by February 1944 JG 1, JG3, JG 11, JG27, JG300 (all complete) plus most of JG5, and parts of JG53, JG 54, JG 301, JG 302 made the move - the LFReich also had ZG 26, 76, NJG1, 2,3, 5 6 and parts of ZG 1, 7, 101 and 107.

The only s/e units fighting Russia by May 1944 were parts of JG54(most), few parts of JG53/77/301 and all of JG 52.

The war of Germany bled the LW dry in 1944. What existed in November 1944 were experten, a few very experienced flight leaders and rookies - east and west.

Bodenplatte as Gunny noted was near complete destruction of the remainder of experts drawn from East and South for the big blow - which was crushed.

The collective meat grinders were first Big Week when 8th AF came out of its shell - a period that might be marked by the huge battles in March and April and May (largely Mustangs), then the Normandy campaign when the LW came west and got into range of RAF/9th AF/ all of 8th's remaining Jugs, then the summer/fall campaign to kill Petroleum/Chemical (back to Mustangs), then 1945 when LW largely deployed what was left after Bodenplatte to try to stem the tide of the Russian front.

Net - if you think the Eastern Front was the meat grinder of the LW - I would agree for March and April 1945.

[drgondog]

The Malcolm Hood mod for the P-51B/C occurred in Feb/mar 1944 and the first production P-51D's rolled off the production line in same timeframe with first deliveries of the P-51D-5 to 8th, 9th and 15th AF in May 1944.

IIRC the first production roll out of the P-47D-25RE with teardrop canopy was May 1944..

As a personal aside my father preferred his P-51B-10 w/Hood more than the 51D's - the visibility was very good (not as good as D) but from practical point of view you can crane the neck only so far around and the firepower was less but he had one day with 2 destroyed and a probable in it and his best day in the D was 2 destroyed and a damaged - with plenty of ammo remaining in both ships.

He simply liked the agility of the B better than the D. Same 1650-7 engine and 800 pounds lighter.

[drgondog]

More on topic than my diversion above! - Was it Dolittle who made an order to switch the 8th AF to P-51D and to withdraw P-38 and P-47 types from the units? (Or something similar.) I vaguely recall reading this account, but can't remember where, or even if I recall correctly. I think we discussed it here before and some people very kindly provided comment, but I can't remember the conclusion - if we reached it - and the search didn't throw it up this time.

So as we are in that arena... Anyone?

I asked Doolittle that question at the 1986 American Fighter Aces Reunion in 1986(?)..he said " That decision was beyond my paygrade but I strongly recommended we (8th AF) do that. The P-38 was a disappoinment due to the high altitude issues/aborts we were experiencing. The 9th AF wanted the P-38 and the P-47 for the upcoming Invasion"

I suspect (and he did not comment) that the deal was cut between Brereton (9th AF) and Spaatz in the December/January timeframe as the 354th FG was showing great promise.

By this time approximately 250+ P-51B Mustangs had already rolled off the lines and were on the way to the ETO and the Dallas plant was in full production with the P-51C's. The P-51D line was near completion.

[JDK]

drgondog thanks for that, and I'm most interested in your Dolittle reference.

My Eastern Front reference was simply that was a very important part in the history overall in the destruction of Germany in W.W.II - one we in the west often overlook or underestimate - because it's 'there' not here, and the nature and propaganda of Stalinist Russia. If we simplistically regard the war in the West as a high-technology one, with strategic elements in aviation, the one in the East was relentlessly basic, with no strategic aviation element by either side yet, at an unbelievably higher human cost, that was where Germany was 'broken'.

Despite all the erudite discussion above, we mustn't forget that aviation was not the primary decisive factor in the defeat of Germany, although attrition and air superiority played important parts. It needed allied boots on the ground, in Berlin, to end the war.

In 1939 - and 1941 if you like, there was a pervasive air doctrine that bombing would shatter morale and win a war on its own, that bombers - not fighters - would 'always get through' and that countries with strong bomber forces would prevail - and swiftly. Germany showed that tactical bombing could be a decisive factor in the Blizkrieg in 1939 and 1940, but had no strategic aspirations there. Despite the claims of British and American bomber chiefs and pundits, bombing was not decisive in Europe on its own. With the use of the atomic bombs in 1945, it was the weapon, un-envisaged by the pre-war bomber-doctrine pundits, which is today credited with 'ending' the war as much as one might debate that, I suggest. One can make a case for the B-29 low-level firebombing raids as being more decisive and breaking Japanese morale, but overshadowed by the two big bombs.

Pre-war they talked of bombers. Postwar, we talk of fighters.

Are we off topic yet?

[drgondog]

drgondog thanks for that, and I'm most interested in your Dolittle reference.

My Eastern Front reference was simply that was a very important part in the history overall in the destruction of Germany in W.W.II - one we in the west often overlook or underestimate - because it's 'there' not here, and the nature and propaganda of Stalinist Russia. If we simplistically regard the war in the West as a high-technology one, with strategic elements in aviation, the one in the East was relentlessly basic, with no strategic aviation element by either side yet, at an unbelievably higher human cost, that was where Germany was 'broken'.

Despite all the erudite discussion above, we mustn't forget that aviation was not the primary decisive factor in the defeat of Germany, although attrition and air superiority played important parts. It needed allied boots on the ground, in Berlin, to end the war.

In 1939 - and 1941 if you like, there was a pervasive air doctrine that bombing would shatter morale and win a war on its own, that bombers - not fighters - would 'always get through' and that countries with strong bomber forces would prevail - and swiftly. Germany showed that tactical bombing could be a decisive factor in the Blizkrieg in 1939 and 1940, but had no strategic aspirations there. Despite the claims of British and American bomber chiefs and pundits, bombing was not decisive in Europe on its own. With the use of the atomic bombs in 1945, it was the weapon, un-envisaged by the pre-war bomber-doctrine pundits, which is today credited with 'ending' the war as much as one might debate that, I suggest. One can make a case for the B-29 low-level firebombing raids as being more decisive and breaking Japanese morale, but overshadowed by the two big bombs.

Pre-war they talked of bombers. Postwar, we talk of fighters.

Are we off topic yet?

I agree your points.

On Doolittle - he was razor sharp at ~90 years old then.

One of the 'other topics' was me asking him his rationale for downgrading the Medal of Honor to Distinguished Service Cross for Royce Priest when he landed behind enemy lines under German fire to rescue my father on August 18, 1944 for the first Piggy Back rescue in a P-51.

He said that it was a very tough decision and the reason was simply that he did not want every fighter pilot under his command emulating the rescue - and looked up and later explained and apologised to Priest after the war. Priest told him he was delighted as my father had given him a direct order to take the squadron home and NOT to attempt a landing. Priest told Doolittle he thought he was going to jail (or be shot) for disobeying a direct order in combat!

Ironically 6 weeks later the 355th top ace Henry Brown was downed by flak and Lenfest, another ace flying my fathers 51 got stuck in the mud near Nordlingen trying to rescue him. Al White also lande close by, and was going to give up his Mustang to save the other two but they had run into nearby forest and he took off empty handed.

Doolittle was 'irritated' and made it clear that severe consequences would follow for the 'next attempt'

[JDK]

Thanks! I also appreciate your (much more detailed) input.

On Doolittle - he was razor sharp at ~90 years old then.

Doolittle strikes me as one of the most interesting an impressive people in the history of aviation, a remarkable guy by any measure. I'm intending to read his autobiography, but his achievements both the lack of negatives and so many positives is unique, in breadth and depth, I think.

Regards,