Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Wed May 20, 2015 8:59 pm
I've been doing a lot of research on early Soviet jet engines and jet aircraft recently, as part of some future writings. The popular myth, one that's now been mostly discredited by more recent sources using newly (post-1991) available archival material, is that the MiG-15 was substantially based on the Focke-Wulf Ta 183 project. However, even this leaves another question-where did this idea begin? I don't recall, in a lot of the "early" (ie, 1950s-60s) aviation material I've seen, much mention of the various "secret projects" of the Luftwaffe, and it seems like this didn't get popularized until much more recently. I can certainly see where it would have come from in the "high Cold War" of the 1950s, with everything being thrown into talking down the Soviets as a matter of propaganda. Moreover, the idea of claiming someone copied another aircraft design isn't new-recall that it was also leveled against the A6M Zero, and a Vought design whose name I can't remember (also inaccurately.) Does anyone know or remember more about where this all began?
Re: Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Thu May 21, 2015 12:35 am
The Soviets were extremely advanced in the field of aerodynamics before the war. Compare the I-16 to it's contemporary the Curtiss P-6. They even fielded a variety of variable geometry prototypes in the 30's, but the swept-wing data developed by the Germans was a unique advancement that the east and west both managed to get a hold of. It was so much of a game-changer, and led to such rapid development that there is still the controversy over who broke the sound barrier.
Re: Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Thu May 21, 2015 7:21 am
I think the Japanese, with regards to the Zero, were accused of copying the Hughes racer.
The Mig-15 also benefited significantly from the British, basically giving them the Rolls Royce Nene.
This was copied and became the Klimov RD-45.
Both the Russians and Americans benefited dramatically from captured German technology.
Andy
The Mig-15 also benefited significantly from the British, basically giving them the Rolls Royce Nene.
This was copied and became the Klimov RD-45.
Both the Russians and Americans benefited dramatically from captured German technology.
Andy
Re: Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Thu May 21, 2015 9:36 am
If they did have good engineers, Stalin squandered many of them with his paranoia...best known is the imprisonment of Tupolev (Not to mention Igor Sikorsky barely escaping with his life during the revolution).
Given its natural and human resources, the USSR didn't do that much in WWII aircraft design wise. Yes, they made some good fighters and the Tu-2, but not larger types unless you count a B-29 clone as an original design. When I see a Tu-95 I wonder if there are any B-29 parts lurking in there.
Certainly the Tu-70 was a passenger version of the Tu-4/B-29 so a lot of the Tupolev design bureau's early knowledge of large modern structures came via Seattle.
And I've got to think that many postwar types like the IL-14 was a product of the education the Soviet industry received thanks to building DC-3s under license...I'm not saying it was a copy, but the license building and the gifting via lend lease of state of the art types, was a huge boost for their industry.
That, combined with captured/imprisoned Germans along with its own excellent "home grown" talent (not to mention a defense-based economy and full government support) ensured success for the Soviet aircraft industry.
Given its natural and human resources, the USSR didn't do that much in WWII aircraft design wise. Yes, they made some good fighters and the Tu-2, but not larger types unless you count a B-29 clone as an original design. When I see a Tu-95 I wonder if there are any B-29 parts lurking in there.
Certainly the Tu-70 was a passenger version of the Tu-4/B-29 so a lot of the Tupolev design bureau's early knowledge of large modern structures came via Seattle. And I've got to think that many postwar types like the IL-14 was a product of the education the Soviet industry received thanks to building DC-3s under license...I'm not saying it was a copy, but the license building and the gifting via lend lease of state of the art types, was a huge boost for their industry.
That, combined with captured/imprisoned Germans along with its own excellent "home grown" talent (not to mention a defense-based economy and full government support) ensured success for the Soviet aircraft industry.
Re: Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Thu May 21, 2015 12:14 pm
I don't know enough about the link between the Ta 183 and MiG-15, but from what I know of Russian science and engineering, I have theories.
As "Westerner's", most people who take the time to read on Soviet/Russian aircraft are looking through the prism of translated information, much of which was redacted for intelligence purposes in the early cold war, and more of which was used to propagandize the Soviets throughout the cold war. There is no question that the Soviets from the point of the revolution in 1917 forward to WWII were hamstrung by the destabilization of all of their industry, the crash programs to feed people, then the crash programs to survive the German invasion and of course the politics of Stalin regarding purges, programs, and technology. That said, looking at what the Soviets did in the course of 1920 to 1945 is just as impressive as what the US did in the same time period. The US, Britain, France, and the USSR all appropriated German technology after WWII, not only through outright grabs of research and prototypes, but in the transfer of personnel to more stable environments where their war talents would not be wasted in a dis-armed Germany. These personnel certainly had a real reason to downplay an opposing technology versus their own contributions- they were in many cases being excused of war crimes in order to get a new start. That is a big impetus to describe the other side as "stolen from the same well I bring right to you with my service and employment."
You also have to put your mindset into the growing cold war politics. Although the US and other Western countries had lifting body, swept wing, delta wing, and jet propulsion all under study and in the pipeline in WWII, I doubt they would have been carried forward as fast as they were if there wasn't another aggressor country pursuing the same forward technological leaps at the same time in opposition to the US. The Russians were thinking in the same terms. Although there were outright grabs of captured tech, I think the pressures of the cold war were more reason for such tech advance after WWII than just wanting to exploit a fallen country's technology for your own benefit. As a gross example, it was easy to convince somebody to push past swept wing technology if you say you can defeat it with delta wing technology. It enhances your selling point to paint the other side as only using captured tech, and that you have the real handle on where technology is going and can get your employer past the other side's advances.
In short, I think there were real reasons to create the illusion that an enemy was using captured technology, and that their designs were backward, and were behind your own current efforts. It explains the sudden shock when Sputnik started beeping. We wasted so much time trying to figure out what they had done, fearing a huge leap forward in technology. We had on hand or in the pipeline all the same technology- they just beat us to the punch and rubbed our noses in it. To a troubled President Eisenhower and all people beneath working on keeping ahead, it was easy to just paint the whole program, and all Soviet programs, as second string using only stolen technology, and to then dedicate your whole country to another leap forward.
Knowing some Russians who served in the latter part of the cold war, I am always intrigued at how well-educated they are, and how amazed they are at our technology when they encounter it. And having served as a cold-war soldier, I am amazed at how progressive their thinking is when it comes to technology. I think this is the last prism I'll mention- the prism of the iron curtain. We really had no idea from 1945 until after 1991 what was going on over there, and before that, we only had ideas. It's hard to appreciate the curve of tech growth in a country which was so isolated for so long, the nuances of success and failure, and even tech that came and went without ever getting noticed. I think it means you have to keep a very critical eye on anything written in that period, because how could it be based on anything other than pure speculation?
As "Westerner's", most people who take the time to read on Soviet/Russian aircraft are looking through the prism of translated information, much of which was redacted for intelligence purposes in the early cold war, and more of which was used to propagandize the Soviets throughout the cold war. There is no question that the Soviets from the point of the revolution in 1917 forward to WWII were hamstrung by the destabilization of all of their industry, the crash programs to feed people, then the crash programs to survive the German invasion and of course the politics of Stalin regarding purges, programs, and technology. That said, looking at what the Soviets did in the course of 1920 to 1945 is just as impressive as what the US did in the same time period. The US, Britain, France, and the USSR all appropriated German technology after WWII, not only through outright grabs of research and prototypes, but in the transfer of personnel to more stable environments where their war talents would not be wasted in a dis-armed Germany. These personnel certainly had a real reason to downplay an opposing technology versus their own contributions- they were in many cases being excused of war crimes in order to get a new start. That is a big impetus to describe the other side as "stolen from the same well I bring right to you with my service and employment."
You also have to put your mindset into the growing cold war politics. Although the US and other Western countries had lifting body, swept wing, delta wing, and jet propulsion all under study and in the pipeline in WWII, I doubt they would have been carried forward as fast as they were if there wasn't another aggressor country pursuing the same forward technological leaps at the same time in opposition to the US. The Russians were thinking in the same terms. Although there were outright grabs of captured tech, I think the pressures of the cold war were more reason for such tech advance after WWII than just wanting to exploit a fallen country's technology for your own benefit. As a gross example, it was easy to convince somebody to push past swept wing technology if you say you can defeat it with delta wing technology. It enhances your selling point to paint the other side as only using captured tech, and that you have the real handle on where technology is going and can get your employer past the other side's advances.
In short, I think there were real reasons to create the illusion that an enemy was using captured technology, and that their designs were backward, and were behind your own current efforts. It explains the sudden shock when Sputnik started beeping. We wasted so much time trying to figure out what they had done, fearing a huge leap forward in technology. We had on hand or in the pipeline all the same technology- they just beat us to the punch and rubbed our noses in it. To a troubled President Eisenhower and all people beneath working on keeping ahead, it was easy to just paint the whole program, and all Soviet programs, as second string using only stolen technology, and to then dedicate your whole country to another leap forward.
Knowing some Russians who served in the latter part of the cold war, I am always intrigued at how well-educated they are, and how amazed they are at our technology when they encounter it. And having served as a cold-war soldier, I am amazed at how progressive their thinking is when it comes to technology. I think this is the last prism I'll mention- the prism of the iron curtain. We really had no idea from 1945 until after 1991 what was going on over there, and before that, we only had ideas. It's hard to appreciate the curve of tech growth in a country which was so isolated for so long, the nuances of success and failure, and even tech that came and went without ever getting noticed. I think it means you have to keep a very critical eye on anything written in that period, because how could it be based on anything other than pure speculation?
Re: Ta 183 and MiG-15 - Where did it start?
Thu May 21, 2015 1:50 pm
Another child of the cold war here, so with that bias admitted.
The Soviets had always invested heavily in basic theoretical and prototypical science. TsAGi was at the very least the equal of NACA, and probably slightly superior. Before WWII the Soviets had made great strides in technical fields, notably aviation. In the technology and production transfers with Germany that came after the Rapallo Agreement of 1922 the Germans, particularly the group from Junkers setting up 'shadow' factories remarked (or complained) that Soviet production ability was lacking at the time, but the level of technical excellence, quality and attention to minor detail far exceeded what they were expecting. Rather than teaching the 'poor benighted peasant' they were being pushed harder than they had in Germany.
Both the US and Soviets made the similar decision at the start of the war to concentrate on the mass production of existing types rather than spend the effort developing new aircraft. Neither side completely abandoned new development, but almost all of the 'famous' WWII airplanes had either flown before their country's entry into the conflict, were contracted before, or were well along the development pipeline by then. Research continued of course, and a great deal of information was accumulated, but it's practical manifestation was mostly incremental improvements of existing designs.
The Germans, on the other hand, actually starting the war about half a generation behind devoted a lot of energy to developing new technologies in the form of 'Wonder Weapons' or other systems really too advanced for their infrastructure to properly support. The motivation and politics behind that fill several books.
The upshot of it all was that the Germans had done a lot of advanced research, without having the means to properly exploit it. Both the US and Soviets after the war had the means to use it. The US had vast amounts of excess production capability and the Soviets through dictatorial economic control. Both had researchers and engineers stymied and frustrated through the wartime years eager to make use of new information.
The Soviets had always invested heavily in basic theoretical and prototypical science. TsAGi was at the very least the equal of NACA, and probably slightly superior. Before WWII the Soviets had made great strides in technical fields, notably aviation. In the technology and production transfers with Germany that came after the Rapallo Agreement of 1922 the Germans, particularly the group from Junkers setting up 'shadow' factories remarked (or complained) that Soviet production ability was lacking at the time, but the level of technical excellence, quality and attention to minor detail far exceeded what they were expecting. Rather than teaching the 'poor benighted peasant' they were being pushed harder than they had in Germany.
Both the US and Soviets made the similar decision at the start of the war to concentrate on the mass production of existing types rather than spend the effort developing new aircraft. Neither side completely abandoned new development, but almost all of the 'famous' WWII airplanes had either flown before their country's entry into the conflict, were contracted before, or were well along the development pipeline by then. Research continued of course, and a great deal of information was accumulated, but it's practical manifestation was mostly incremental improvements of existing designs.
The Germans, on the other hand, actually starting the war about half a generation behind devoted a lot of energy to developing new technologies in the form of 'Wonder Weapons' or other systems really too advanced for their infrastructure to properly support. The motivation and politics behind that fill several books.
The upshot of it all was that the Germans had done a lot of advanced research, without having the means to properly exploit it. Both the US and Soviets after the war had the means to use it. The US had vast amounts of excess production capability and the Soviets through dictatorial economic control. Both had researchers and engineers stymied and frustrated through the wartime years eager to make use of new information.