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Mon May 14, 2012 8:26 pm
Here's a aviation history question to consider. When taking three great bombing operations of W.W.II:
- The 617 Squadron raid on the German dams (The Dam Busters raid),
- The Dolittle Tokyo raid and
- The Ploesti raid of 1943 (Tidalwave),
Why is it that only the Dolittle raid can be regarded as 'fully successful'? After all, it was the one with the least bombs dropped to the least destructive effect. This isn't some secret factoid, but IMHO, just a question of
perception and
knowledge, including hindsight... So, it's now up for discussion.
Regards,
[Edited for clarity on Ploesti!]
Last edited by
JDK on Tue May 15, 2012 7:24 am, edited 1 time in total.
Mon May 14, 2012 8:31 pm
The Dolittle raid was more of an effort to boost morale at home than to inflict serious damage on the Japanese. It accomplished that goal and drove the Japanese to rethink their deployments, which benefitted the Allies in subsequent campaigns.
The other raids had more concrete objectives, which were not completely achieved.
Mon May 14, 2012 9:04 pm
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Last edited by
Mark Allen M on Mon Sep 10, 2012 11:20 am, edited 1 time in total.
Mon May 14, 2012 9:33 pm
It is hard to say if the Doolittle raid was "fully sucessful", but it did achieve the primary goal of boosting morale, while failing the secondary goal of providing bombers to China. However, the raid made the Japanese hold back aircraft to defend against a repeat. Most importantly as the Japanese did know where the raiders came from it was one of the reasons behind the Japanese attempt to take Midway, so in a sense the Doolittle raid was sucessful beyond imagination.
Mon May 14, 2012 9:34 pm
I feel the big success of the Doolittle Raid was that the United States, after almost five months of losses and retreats, was able to strike back at a thought to be, untouchable, Japanese homeland.
The moral boost to America and, to a degree its, allies, was tremendous and very needed.
Jerry
Mon May 14, 2012 9:48 pm
The Doolittle raid caused the Japanese to start rethinking defense of the home Islands, showed the world and Japan that in less than 5 months after the devistating Pearl Harbor attack, when the Japanese were counting on America pulling back and licking it's wounds it instead struck back with a daring plan that didn't match up to the traditional Japanese method of accessing an enemy and it's reactions.
From the get-go it was known that very little real damage could be inflicted upon Japan by the raid, but that it would, and did have pretty significant impacts on the thinking of the Japanese and how they had to adjust their long range plans for persecuting the war it also showed the American public that like Gary Cooper in a Western, 'you can knock me down and bloody my nose, but when I get back on my feet your a$$ is mine-'
Halpro was a brave but sort of inept attempt to do too much too far away with less than complete discipline and execution of planning or follow through of the plan., too much improvisation and lack of knowledge of basic things like where the flak guns were located, low level attack with flak on the hills surrounding the targets, equals duck shoot.
The Dams raid was a stroke of genius and technical excellence but it's doubtful if one person, civilian or military,in one Hundred really knew what Harris and 617 had accomplished once it was made public and since they didn't see an immediate change in the persecution of the war, most of the effect was wasted on John Q. Public.
Mon May 14, 2012 10:11 pm
Excellent responses, but I think we're still ducking one essential (uncomfortable) element, though kyleb and others have pointed in that direction.
The Inspector wrote:Halpro was a brave but sort of inept attempt to do too much too far away with less than complete discipline and execution of planning or follow through of the plan., too much improvisation and lack of knowledge of basic things like where the flak guns were located, low level attack with flak on the hills surrounding the targets, equals duck shoot.
The Dams raid was a stroke of genius and technical excellence but it's doubtful if one person, civilian or military,in one Hundred really knew what Harris and 617 had accomplished once it was made public and since they didn't see an immediate change in the persecution of the war, most of the effect was wasted on John Q. Public.
Good analysis of the
execution issues, but that's not the
objective, is it?
John Q. Public's opinion wasn't the main aim of the propaganda, I believe, but something much more specific. One of the main propaganda objectives of the dams raid was to show Uncle Joe that the British were serious and capable. It apparently did that, but was that a fair measure?
Regards,
Mon May 14, 2012 11:07 pm
I don't know if the British press printed a headline the day after the raid on the dams in 84 point type, but every front page of every newspaper in the U.S. carried some version of TOKIO HIT above the fold in the blackest or most vibrant red ink the paper owned in the biggest type set they had or could carve overnight.
The end objective was to boost morale on 'our' side and hopefully disenchant 'them guys', didn't work as the more you try to bomb me out of existence, the stiffer becomes my resolve to resist. That mental attitude as demonstrated by Russian soldiers who would fight to the death for the piece of dirt they were standing on flummoxed the Germans. Later the Germans adopted the same attitude when the German skies were black with Allied aircraft.
Tue May 15, 2012 12:13 am
Mark Allen M wrote:What he said, but I wouldn't consider the Doolittle raid to be "fully successful" ... successful yes, not fully successful. IMHO
In what was do you think it wasn't 'fully successful'?
Clifford Bossie wrote:It is hard to say if the Doolittle raid was "fully sucessful", but it did achieve the primary goal of boosting morale, while failing the secondary goal of providing bombers to China. ...
Was the delivery of bombers to China a serious objective? It's not one I was aware of.
The Inspector wrote:I don't know if the British press printed a headline the day after the raid on the dams in 84 point type, but every front page of every newspaper in the U.S. carried some version of TOKIO HIT above the fold in the blackest or most vibrant red ink the paper owned in the biggest type set they had or could carve overnight.
They (the British papers) did. The photograph/s of the damaged dams was quickly widely released and was (is!) one of the iconic images from the war.
The end objective was to boost morale on 'our' side and hopefully disenchant 'them guys', didn't work as the more you try to bomb me out of existence, the stiffer becomes my resolve to resist. That mental attitude as demonstrated by Russian soldiers who would fight to the death for the piece of dirt they were standing on flummoxed the Germans. Later the Germans adopted the same attitude when the German skies were black with Allied aircraft.
Not sure what that's got to do with the question... Are you referring to one of these raids? A general observation?
All three operations under discussion certainly had a greater or lesser propaganda element, but none were just part of the strategic bombing offensive per se.
So, what's the bit we
don't like to talk about?
Tue May 15, 2012 1:00 am
JDK wrote:Was the delivery of bombers to China a serious objective? It's not one I was aware of.
Subject: B25B Special Project
To: Commanding General Army Air Forces
Should the Russians be willing to accept delivery of 18 B-25-B airplanes, on lease lend, at Vladivostok our problems would be greatly simplified and conflict with the Halverson project avoided.
Transcribed from hand-written memo submitted to Commanding General Army Air Forces (Gen. H. Arnold, USAAF). The memo is microfilmed at the National Archives
HyperWar Foundation
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/rep ... ecial.htmlJDK wrote:All three operations under discussion certainly had a greater or lesser propaganda element, but none were just part of the strategic bombing offensive per se.
I think you'll find the two US raids were part of the HALPRO program IE the build up of airpower / strength in the MTO and CBI. Pe
Tue May 15, 2012 6:55 am
JDK wrote:Here's a aviation history question to consider. When taking three great bombing operations of W.W.II:
- The 617 Squadron raid on the German dams (The Dam Busters raid),
- The Dolittle Tokyo raid and
- The Polesti raid,
James, perhaps it would help if you could clarify about which "Polesti (Ploesti?) raid" you are thinking.
It would appear some are thinking HALPRO attack (June 1942) while others perhaps TIDALWAVE (August 1943).
Tue May 15, 2012 7:31 am
Guess thats the
trick aspect of the question in his subject line
Tue May 15, 2012 7:34 am
Thanks Dan, I meant the Operation Tidalwave of 1943, and ~um~ "Ploesti" of course...
Guess that's why I don't usually set word quizzes!
Thanks CDF. I think that a vague hope the Russians would accept some unrequested bombers after an attack on a nation they weren't at war with is a pretty sketchy idea - Russia's also not China. It seems 'delivery' wasn't an objective of the task, just a possible solution to 'logistical misplacement'.
Tidalwave was indeed part of the anti-Axis-oil campaign, arguably part of the greater strategic bombing offensive, but it is also exceptional, as it was presented and for the question and reasons we are discussing, I'd suggest.
Regards,
Tue May 15, 2012 7:44 am
JDK wrote:It seems 'delivery' wasn't an objective of the task, just a possible solution to 'logistical misplacement'.
Yes it was
In the first month after the United States entered World War II, the Air War Plans Division put forth a plan to establish a major fighting air command in Burma to turn back the Japanese' sweeping advance into China. That new command was to be designated the 10th Air Force, and in mid-January Operation Aquila was employed to begin the initial buildup necessary to establish that command. Operation Aquila was a 5-point program designed to provide fighters, bombers, and a supply chain to the theater.
....The bomber element of the new 10th Air Force was to originate from two separate, highly secret projects.
The first was a volunteer group of B-25 pilots under command of Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. The twenty-six medium range bombers were tasked with making a carrier-borne assault on Tokyo in what would become Doolittle's famous Tokyo Raid. Theirs was a two-part mission. After making the historic attack on the Japanese capitol, the raiders were to fly to China where pilots, crews and their B-25s were to be absorbed by the 10th Air Force. (It was the loss of all 26 bombers that distressed Doolittle to the belief that he would be court-martialed, despite the success of the first part of his mission.)
Long-range bombing missions in the China-Burma theater would be carried out by a group of twenty-three B-24s under the command of Colonel Halvor "Hurry-up Harry" Halverson. This was the element that became known, by those few planners aware of its existence, as the Halpro Group (Halverson Project.) The group was tasked with flying EAST to reach China after completion of the Doolittle Raid. From their airfields in China, the Liberators would be within bombing range of Tokyo and able to continue the work from the west of Japan, that Doolittle's men started from an aircraft carrier east of the islands.
http://www.homeofheroes.com/wings/part2/09_ploesti.html
Tue May 15, 2012 8:16 am
CDF wrote:Yes it was
Are you sure, CDF? Seems to be some confusion there. Why not have a bit more of a look to check if
either of the contradicting proposals (Russia or China) was actually real and a task at the time of the raid from a reliable source (such as the first quote you've provided)? For instance the 'Purpose' line in that link's quite indicative.
Regards,
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