Hap Arnold, Dive Bomber Advocate?

[JDK]

Hi All,
I've been told that in the pre-war and early W.W.II era, the then Major General H H Arnold was a keen advocate of the dive bomber concept. Can anyone point to references that support this idea?

Many thanks,

[Invader26]

Some interesting stuff on Arnold and dive-bombing>>>

North American A-36 Apache
Powered by an Allison V-12 engine equipped with a single stage supercharger, the A-36 Apache was essentially an early model P-51 Mustang fitted with two dive brakes on each wing. Other modifications to the airframe included strengthening of the wings, movement of the bomb racks closer to the main landing gear for less wing “flexing” while the plane was taxiing, and the installation of small vent windows in the windscreen side panels. In addition, two .50 caliber machine guns were mounted in each wing, and two Browning M2 .50 cal. guns were mounted in the lower nose to fire through the propeller. Naturally, the A-36 inherited the Mustang’s clean aerodynamics; but why did North American turn the P-51 into a dive-bomber? To answer this question, we must look at the Mustang’s origins. In early 1940, the British asked the company to build Curtiss P-40’s under license from Curtiss. Rather than building another company’s design (especially one that was already considered obsolete), North American proposed building a fighter of its own. After some hesitation (the company had no fighter experience), the British agreed, and the first Mustang prototype (the NA-73X) flew on October 26, 1940. Flight tests were successful, and the British ordered 320 of the new planes, calling them Mustang I’s. Interestingly, the U.S. government kept two Mustangs for itself, calling them XP-51’s. Ultimately, the British received 650 Mustang I, Ia, and II’s through outright purchase and Lend/Lease distribution. By the time the Lend/Lease order was placed, U.S. pilots had flown the two XP-51’s and were raving about their performance. As a result, the U.S. retained 55 England – bound Mustangs for itself. The majority of these 55 airplanes were converted into to armed, high-speed reconnaissance aircraft, known as F-6’s. The rest were used as high-speed ground attack airplanes, and as low altitude escort fighters. The British used their Mustang primarily in the close air support role as well.

Despite the Mustang’s effectiveness as a ground-support airplane, enthusiasm by the military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic was lukewarm at best. The British, although satisfied with their Mustangs, were apprehensive about relying on a foreign aircraft. They were concerned about the availability of parts and maintenance. Hence, they focused their efforts on developing their own fighters. At the same time, the U.S. Army was already buying P-38’s, P-39’s, and P-40’s. By 1942, there was no money in the defense budget for new fighters. It appeared that production of the Mustang was coming to an end. Fortunately, a few people recognized the Mustang’s potential. One of these Mustang “visionaries” was Major General Oliver P. Echols, who was instrumental in the Army’s successful retention of the 55 Lend/Lease Mustangs. General Echols noticed that there was money available in the budget for attack airplanes, and he brought this to the attention of North American’s “Dutch” Kindelberger. Kindelberger, in turn, approached Army Lt. General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold with the idea of turning the P-51 into a dive-bomber, knowing that Arnold had been an early proponent of dive-bombing tactics.

Although Army doctrine held that dive-bombing was ineffective and dangerous, (because of the high dive and pull-out speeds), Arnold had managed to persuade the Army to procure a few dive bombers – the Douglas A-24, and the Vultee A-31 among them. If Arnold would go along with the idea of producing a Mustang dive – bomber, North American’s production lines would be kept open. Kindelberger managed to convince Arnold that, by replacing the British armament (two 20mm cannon in each wing) with .50 cal. machine guns, and adding dive flaps, the Mustang would fill the bill as a dive-bomber. Arnold was convinced, and the first A-36 flew on September 21, 1942. Only five hundred A-36’s were built. The results of flight tests conducted at Florida’s Eglin Army Air Field seemed to reinforce the Army’s doubts about dive-bombing, and the A-36. The A-36 dove at speeds approaching 500 mph; the brakes only reduced the speed to about 350mph. Unfortunately, one of the test airplanes crashed because it lost its wings during a vertical dive. Not surprisingly, Army officials decided that the airplane had great diving capabilities for a fighter, but dove too fast for a dive – bomber. As a result of all this, the Army restricted the plane’s dive-angles to 70 degrees. In addition, the evaluators at Eglin recommended that the A-36 be used mainly as a low-altitude attack airplane, and that the dive brakes be eliminated. This last recommendation may have given rise to the oft-repeated myth that all A-36’s had their dive brakes wired shut. Apparently, this recommendation was never adopted as official policy.

Source: The Plane That Saved The Mustang: The North American A-36 Apache

[JohnB]

Arnold's support could also explain te A-24 and A-25 production for the USAAF.

And of course it's well known that the Luftwaffe (Udet, IIRC) was influenced by the US Navy's use of dive bombers.

[JDK]

Thanks chaps. Unfortunately, interesting though that quote is, it's another secondary account (like those that raised the question).

It appears 'everybody knew' Arnold was a dive-bomber advocate, yet there's no reference to his direct support - as can be seen the adoption of the A-36 Apache was as much a way of getting around pursuit budget restrictions as favouring dive bombers.

And there's a break in the chain - Arnold - assuming the accounts are correct, which I am - never ensured that the USAAF used dive bombers effectively, or ensured strategy or tactics were developed to make them worth having bought. (As the account says, the USAAF got US Army versions of the Commonwealth ordered Vultee Vengeance, and the USN's Douglas SBD Devastator and Curtiss SB-2 Helldiver - both of which were even less-modified adaptations of others' orders than the A-36.)

Pretty lukewarm advocate, given his power to follow through, surely? While the dive bomber was effectively replaced by the fighter bomber by 1943 onwards, the USN, Imperial Japanese Navy and Regia Aeronatica and Luftwaffe all made very effective - battle-winning in fact - use of them prior. Yet the USAAF and RAF (and Commonwealth forces) were actually strongly opposed to the concept in doctrine terms, cancelling orders, using the types inappropriately and condemning them for failures that any type would suffer from. (In contrast dive bombers were almost always more effectively accurate than heavy or high-bombing by medium bombers when used tactically, yet there was never criticism of heavy or medium bombing types (in this use) as being conceptually flawed, though they were wasteful of men and materiel and often used the equivalent bombs of the sledgehammer on the nut.

Just some thoughts for discussion.

[shrike]

By 1943 dive bombing had been thoroughly discredited in the US, with articles in popular print pointing out that the attacking aircraft presented a long, near zero-deflection target to gunners on the ground. As long as the gunners held their ground and manned their guns. This was especially true on board ship, where said gunners had no place to retreat (or flee) to.

The Germans had had their early successes, and dive bombing was a personal favorite of AH owing to it's potential precision. Hitler,as a veteran of the western front, loathed the indiscriminate nature of artillery barrages, and of the concept of 'strategic' or 'carpet' bombing as well. While the Germans eventually gave up on dive-bombing in practice, the requirement to be able to do so detrimentally influenced aircraft design throughout the war.

The Japanese were doctrinally somewhat hidebound. While very advanced at the start of the war, mainstream Japanese tactics never seemed really able to adapt to changing conditions. Their early successes were against under-defended and unprepared targets, but unlike the Luftwaffe, they continued until attrition of their trained pilots made in untenable.

The Italians, who produced the fined aerobatic aircraft ever to carry guns (NOT great fighters), appreciated the glory and elan of dive-bombing even in the face of it's ever decreasing effectiveness.

[JDK]

Thanks, Shrike, but I think you're missing the question/s. Critically, we are talking about HH Arnold's 'advocacy' of dive bombers (presumed) in the late 1930s, specifically during the order and development of the A-36 Apache in 1940-1, and all prior to 1943. Whatever post '43 views were, the USAAF should've had a developed doctrine and numerous units of dive bombers in 1942 - but apart from a couple of ill-trained groups with mixed equipment, they didn't. If Arnold was a dive bomber advocate, it seems he was definitely doing so without much commitment, which could be explained, legitimately in a number of ways. But buying a pursuit type with dive bomber money isn't serious advocacy. (Note that the first USAAF Mustangs were configured also as photo recon types - seems like they really didn't know what to do with them!)

What was conventional wisdom of post '43 isn't applicable (and incidentally, the USN persisted with the SB-2 Helldiver well past 43, but arguably proving the point, in that there was never a decisive use of the type in the way that the SBD was vital at Midway, in 1942 changing the course of the war by one incidence of a dive bomber attack).

To continue on the later period (off topic) general dive bomber theme! The conventional critique of dive bombers is true in parts, but not complete, such as:

By 1943 dive bombing had been thoroughly discredited in the US, with articles in popular print pointing out that the attacking aircraft presented a long, near zero-deflection target to gunners on the ground. As long as the gunners held their ground and manned their guns. This was especially true on board ship, where said gunners had no place to retreat (or flee) to.

Not true. The efficacy of the Luftwaffe (and Regia Aeronatica) against the Royal Navy in the Med with Stukas sunk an awful lot of tough ships with tough men 'staying at their posts' and firing back, and that included some of the new anti-aircraft destroyers. The claim that it required men staying at their posts is a canard, the need was better AA equipment on ships, which is why all navies spent much of the mid-war period upping their AA facilities or facing the consequences.

The Germans had had their early successes,...

Which included the effective conquest of continental Europe by the application of the Blitzkrieg concept, a critical part of which was the use of Stukas to hit pinpoint tactical targets to enable the army to keep moving. Let's not under-rate the revolutionary nature of that achievement.

and dive bombing was a personal favorite of AH owing to it's potential precision. Hitler,as a veteran of the western front, loathed the indiscriminate nature of artillery barrages, and of the concept of 'strategic' or 'carpet' bombing as well.

More critically, and far from just Hitler's own preferences, strategic and carpet bombing would simply not have done the job. However the Stuka as dive bomber and part of Blitzkrieg never failed in that task; all failures (Battle of Britain, Russia) were due to other elements - air superiority, logistics - failing their part of the combined offensive. In 1939-41 provided the fighters did their job, and the logistics kept up, the Blitzkrieg prevailed. And staying at the guns to shoot back here is a canard also. The shortfall was not in tenacity, but in effective AA, all European armies (and the US forces of the period) having inadequate anti-dive bomber guns and systems. Despite the claims that the dive bomber was an easy target to determined gunners, it clearly was not, or it wouldn't have prevailed over a good dozen or so different armies

While the Germans eventually gave up on dive-bombing in practice, the requirement to be able to do so detrimentally influenced aircraft design throughout the war.

Absolutely, it became an idée fixe.

The Japanese were doctrinally somewhat hidebound. While very advanced at the start of the war, mainstream Japanese tactics never seemed really able to adapt to changing conditions. Their early successes were against under-defended and unprepared targets, but unlike the Luftwaffe, they continued until attrition of their trained pilots made in untenable.

One can argue that. The early Japanese successes - including in China etc in the 1930s tell a different story, and the allies held onto various strategies that proved ineffective, but he weight of allied (US material, Russian humans in Europe) ultimately prevailed, overcoming doctrinal shortfalls of the allies. Certainly there were adaptations and failures to do so by all nations in the war, but lets not congratulate the Allies for innovation when it was ultimately Napolions 'big battalions' which ensured victory, and made innovation and secret weapons a time and resource saving luxury rather than a vital answer.

(See the USN's adherence to the SB-2 mentioned earlier past any effective potential use, or the RAF and USAAF's denial of any effective use of the Vengeance specifically, despite the occasions they were used in the Far East very effectively and with greater precision, economy and lower losses than fighter bombers. Doctrine dictates what is believed as much as it sets a structure and approach to problems.)

The Italians, who produced the fined aerobatic aircraft ever to carry guns (NOT great fighters), appreciated the glory and elan of dive-bombing even in the face of it's ever decreasing effectiveness.

Not really sure what to make of this; it's true enough of the fighters, the main use of Italian-built dive bombers was in the 1930s against tribesmen in Abasynia etc. (just like the RAF and French air policing, although with more mustard gas). The Italian W.W.II era dive bomber designs were all (AFAIK) failures, but the Italian use of Stukas, and their invention of skip-bombing, taken up later by the USAAF among others, was their contribution - and an effective one after the decline of the Aerosluranti torpedo bomber heroes. But yes, the 'elan' and admiration of bomber heroes over fighter jocks was part of the Italian way; albeit ultimately failed by (as you've said) the decline of the dive bomber, and their industry and materiel.

IMHO, the summary of the dive bomber is this - dive bombers were the ideal answer in 1939-42 for tactical pinpoint bombing (remember through W.W.II no-one was very good at hitting targets with medium or high level bombing). By mid 42, aircraft structures and engine power improvements meant a single-engine, single-seat fighter was tough enough (for most dives) to do essentially the dive bombers job, and fight its own way out of trouble after or at the cost of its bombs, on the way in to target. Like the torpedo bomber which was decisive in the Med and Pacific, by mid war, it was no longer even a good answer.

Good points, though! Good discussion.

Regards,

[SaxMan]

Everything I've read about Hap Arnold would seem to indicate otherwise. Dive Bombing was the antithesis of everything air-minded Generals wanted. Most air leaders in the USAAC, and I would include Arnold, were subscribers to the Douhet theories on air warfare before World War II, that a strategic bombing campaign could win wars through airpower alone by destroying the enemies factories and their will to fight. That meant having bombers...and big ones. The Air Corps commanders wanted more B-17s pre-war, but the Army General Staff wanted more planes and thus we ended up with large quantities of the near useless B-18 when the war started.

Dive Bombing, from a land based air force's point of view, could only be used to support ground troops and not a strategic campaign, and the AAF leadership was far more focused on their strategic vision. The USAAF seemed slow to grasp the concept of ground support, only finally coming into it's own in the summer of 1944 with the 9th AF Thunderbolts. In some ways, the Air Force has always had a reluctance to engage in the ground support role. Had they grasped the importance of ground support, P-47s should have been retained in the inventory. Instead, when war broke out in Korea, all the USAF had were Mustangs. While they did a fine job, they were also extremely vulnerable to ground fire and they suffered losses accordingly. The P-47 would have been far superior for the ground support role in Korea...but alas, there were none to be had. On the other hand, the Navy and Marines retained their Corsairs and augmented them with Skyraiders, which were far better suited for ground support.

Even today, we saw the USAF trying to push the A-10 out of the inventory in favor of using F-16s as ground support aircraft. Desert Storm, Bosnia, Gulf War II and Afghanistan all proved the necessity for the ability to fly low and slow, to loiter over a target, and support the guys on the ground. As the A-10s age, we don't see anything on the drawing board as a possible replacement.

[JDK]

Thanks SaxMan, you've made an excellent summary of the doubts I've got, but you've articulated better.

Still looking for an Arnold quote or comment pro or conta dive bombers.

Cheers

[Dan K]

It would not appear that Hap Arnold was a pre-war proponent of dive bombing. Consider the following episode from 1938, when he was still assistant to the chief of the Air Corps:

Policy guidance from Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring to the chief of the Air Corps on 29 July 1938 was similar. He instructed that "estimates for bombers in Fiscal Year 1940 [must] be restricted to light, medium, and attack types." Arnold's belief in strategic bombardment doctrine, although not yet fully developed in his thinking, cautioned him to recommend that the chief of the Air Corps "fight this decision" by the secretary of war.

All this and more may be found online here (The portion above from page 67):

http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_Col ... ustonI.pdf

Happy reading.

[JDK]

Good score there Dan, many thanks.

I'm wondering - and just thinking aloud here - if Arnold's support for the P-51 as the A-36 Apache was the origin of a myth that he was pro dive bombers, where in fact he was being pragmatic regarding what might be done with the budgets and opportunities.

Interesting.

[Dan K]

I'm wondering - and just thinking aloud here - if Arnold's support for the P-51 as the A-36 Apache was the origin of a myth that he was pro dive bombers, where in fact he was being pragmatic regarding what might be done with the budgets and opportunities.

I would concur, but good luck finding THAT in a quote.

I'm not a student of Arnold, but from what I've read about him believe that he really stuck his neck out requesting the design study which eventually resulted in the B-29 program. American isolationist thinking of the late 30's had no need for such an aircraft. In his own mind, I think justification was found during his April 1941 trip to London and the damage she had received at the hands of the Luftwaffe.

[shrike]

I think Arnold was in favor of bombing in general, and if, at any given juncture, the choice was dive-bombing or no-bombing he would have been a supporter of dive-bombing.

[JDK]

A correspondent very kindly found Hap Arnold's diaries online, and passed the link to me (thanks!). Although this is a later report than the pre- A-36 order period, it's clear Arnold has a strong antipathy to dive bombers by September 1942:

Continuous experience indicates the effectiveness of high altitude bombing:

1.High altitude bombing permits of continuous day after day effort.
2.Our losses permit this. Navy bombing indicates losses so serious after dive-bombing that further effort is negligible after one attack. Midway: 4 [dive-bombers] back out of 44; Coral Sea, Solomons, 7.
3.In every case in which Navy has tried dive bombing it has lost a carrier.
4.When dive bombers are used in small numbers they do not get hits.
5.Low ceilings do not permit dive bombing.
6.When intercepted by Zeros dive-bombers do not get home; B-17s do get home. 10 Zeros [destroyed] for everyB-17 lost. Average in South Pacific operations, 320bombs, 34 hits on ships.

Page 397
Monday September 28, 1942

http://www.scribd.com/doc/39803661/WWII ... -Diaries-I

It's possible these are the words of someone who two years earlier was a supporter of dive bombers, but it hardly seems likely, given his vehemence here (based on US (navy) experience.

Off on a tangent, an amusing story, after the quote above:

No ball turret. Improvised mount for hole in floor for B-26.In wrestling with gun against Zero, new gunner who took place of wounded man had jam and improvised mount failed. Gun dropped and hit Zero on ring cowl. Cowl went through tail and disintegrated. Kenney gave gunner Purple Heart and bill for gun. Gunner asked if he could return Purple Heart and get credit on cost of gun.

Regards,