Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Wed Mar 02, 2011 7:20 pm
began 68 years ago today - March 2, 1943. I think this began the turning of the tide in the SWPA.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Wed Mar 02, 2011 9:58 pm
I think the tide turned in the SWPA in November, 1942. The Bismark Sea was icing on the cake. My 2 cents. Randy
P.S. Not to start a war, but if you haven't studied the naval and air battles around Gudalcanal in some detail, you might enjoy "Netpune's Inferno" by James Hornfisher. I had studied these battles in some detail and found his recent book a great view of the various actions both in detail and overview. This was what really broke the back of the IJN in my opinion - the battles, not the book! Your mileage may vary as always.
P.P.S. I ran a naval wargames group at the U. of Alaska Fairbanks with 2400:1 ship miniatures while in Geology grad school after the Army in the mid-1970s. You can't believe the look on the USN players as the IJN "Long Lance" torps from the IJN cruisers and destoyers kept coming and coming! Never did figure out a good way to simulate the IJN subs in 2D, on top of drafting tables, nor the planes, even with the advanced "personal computers" of the time - S-100 buss Z-80 stuff, teletypes for printers and dumb ADM-3A and similar non-graphic video terminals, if anyone here cares. We also had some great micro-armor battles with 285:1 scale armor, both WWII and "modern" at the time. Oh, I digress.
P.S. Not to start a war, but if you haven't studied the naval and air battles around Gudalcanal in some detail, you might enjoy "Netpune's Inferno" by James Hornfisher. I had studied these battles in some detail and found his recent book a great view of the various actions both in detail and overview. This was what really broke the back of the IJN in my opinion - the battles, not the book! Your mileage may vary as always.
P.P.S. I ran a naval wargames group at the U. of Alaska Fairbanks with 2400:1 ship miniatures while in Geology grad school after the Army in the mid-1970s. You can't believe the look on the USN players as the IJN "Long Lance" torps from the IJN cruisers and destoyers kept coming and coming! Never did figure out a good way to simulate the IJN subs in 2D, on top of drafting tables, nor the planes, even with the advanced "personal computers" of the time - S-100 buss Z-80 stuff, teletypes for printers and dumb ADM-3A and similar non-graphic video terminals, if anyone here cares. We also had some great micro-armor battles with 285:1 scale armor, both WWII and "modern" at the time. Oh, I digress.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Wed Mar 02, 2011 10:13 pm
3rd Attack Crews that participated on the Mission... It's been an honor to have met and become friends with some of the guys who flew that day.. 8th/89 Bill Webster, Bill Beck and Jack Taylor..13th Dick Walker, "jug" Main, Leo McMann, and Jack Methvin...90th Dr. Bob Reed, Jock Henebry and his gunner Dick McKinney..
Bill
13th:
8th/89th:
90th:
90th's "CHATTERBOX"
One of the "victims"
Bill
13th:
8th/89th:
90th:
90th's "CHATTERBOX"
One of the "victims"
Last edited by Hemiman on Thu Mar 03, 2011 5:14 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Thu Mar 03, 2011 12:24 am
Don't forget the RAAF Beaufighters/Bostons/Beauforts etc....
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea came after the allied victories of Milne Bay, the Kokoda Trail and Guadalcanal all of which were significant turning points in the South Pacific war with Japan.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is important as it ranks as the turning point in maturity, tactics, organization, support and logistics where an allied aviation force was able to completely dominate the air and sea in such force that a convoy shipping a Japanese division to Lae in New Guinea was decimated.
From that point forward the United States 5th Air Force dominated the air and ocean such that no Japanese aircraft or shipping was able to move without the risk of being sunk or destroyed. Soon after the Australian and American aircraft in the South Pacific began wearing white tails and wings as they were more at risk of shooting each other down than Japanese. The dominance was total.
Prior to late 1942 the attacks by the RAAF and 5th Air Force were disjointed and lacked sufficient numbers. They were constantly at risk from attack by Japanese fighters as well. Logistics were poor as was serviceability rates and aircraft often had to turn back for maintenance reasons.
This was largely because the Australians and Americans had been bundled back from Singapore in a very short period and had lost a lot of men, machines and supplies in the process. The airmen of 1941 and early 1942 were fighting to keep a foot hold in New Guinea - which they achieved against great odds.
Additionally the American industrial machine was just starting to rev up to the kind of enormous output that it achieved in 1944/45. Supplies of aircraft, parts and ammunition were starting to flow into the South West Pacific [SWPA] despite the Germany first strategy of America, Britain and Russia.
Up until this period the only heavy bombers in the South Pacific were American B17s which had been the sole strike force in New Guinea since the Japanese advance. The only medium bombers were an obsolete rag tag of Australian Hudson's and Beaufort's which had fought against impossible odds to carry out their tasks.
In late 1942 more B17s arrived along with B24 Liberators. Douglas A20s started appearing along with the RAAF receiving Bristol Beaufighters from England. More importantly the North American B25 Mitchell started appearing in the theater.
The Beaufighter and B25 were important. The Beaufighters quickly showed themselves to be an able weapon platform against Japanese shipping, airfields and army emplacements because of the enormous firepower in their nose and wings. The Beaufighter packed four 20 mm canons along with four .303 machine guns. When that firepower was focused on shipping it was devastating.
Because of this realization the 5th Air Force equipped the B25s of the 3rd Attack Group with multiple .50 cal machine guns in the nose and in nacelles on the side. This gave the B25s eight machine guns to suppress anti-aircraft fire as they came in for low level attacks.
Bombing doctrine prior to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was for heavy and medium bombers to attack ships from height; often up to 7,500 feet. This was to stay away from fighters and anti-aircraft fire. The problem was that results for this were very poor as Japanese shipping would twist and turn making difficult targets for level bombing.
The solution was skip bombing. This is where a medium bomber comes in at mast height level and drops the bombs so that they skip into the ship before exploding on a delayed fuse. This was practiced originally by the B17s on a rusted old shipwreck in Port Moresby but the medium bombers were more maneuverable and more effective with this tactic.
Due to the breathing space being given by the victories in Milne Bay, Kokoda and Guadalcanal the 5th Air Force and RAAF started training in combined operations. Again on the rusty old wreck in Port Moresby but the tactic was for the Beaufighters to come in low and fast to strafe the ships and suppress any anti-aircraft fire. The skip bombers would come in immediately behind them while more medium and heavy bombers would do their bomb runs from a normal height. Lex MacAuley writes:
A practice mission against the wreck was finally flown on 28th of February, 1943. All the elements of a coordinated attack were included. The B17s went in first,bombing from 8,000 feet, followed by medium level B25s at 5,000 feet. RAAF 30 Squadron Beaufighters then went in firing their heavy armament of four 20mm cannon and six .303 machine guns, closely followed by Ed Larner's B25s with .50 cal nose guns and 500 lb bombs.
This combined operational effort was what was used in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea two days later.
The Japanese convoy itself was eight transport ships and eight destroyers as escort which left Rabaul for Lae. There it was intended the Japanese 51st Division would reinforce Japanese forces in New Guinea.
There were multiple attacks against the convoy prior to the devastating skip bombing mission. Heavy bombers attacked the convoy from height and scored some hits on the transports, including sinking the Kyokusei Maru, but there was a flurry of tropical storms that hid the convoy for a day or so. Australian Beauforts also tried a torpedo run against the convoy but this produced no result. Eventually an RAAF "black cat" Catalina followed the convoy through the night marking its position and destination.
The Japanese convoy decided to circle during the night so it would reach Lae in the morning. This decision meant that the convoy was exposed to attack through a spate of good weather the next morning in which the entire weight of the 5th Air Force and RAAF could be thrown against the convoy. Lex MacAuley writes:
First at the rendezvous point, the 71st Squadron, 38th Bomb Group began a wide, lazy circle at 5,300 feet as they waited for the armada to follow. The crews then saw a procession of air power greater than anything the Allied Air Forces had concentrated before in New Guinea.
Captain W.S. Royalty described it as 'an almost unbelievable number of planes'. B17s were moving into formation above the 71st; below came three separate flights of B25s; in formation and beginning to circle were Beaufighters and A20; the highest up were the P38s.
The Beaufighters went in first at low height to strafe the ships, especially the bridge which was the central control point, and suppress any anti-aircraft fire. The Japanese Destroyers mistook the Beaufighters for a torpedo attack and turned toward them which left the transports undefended by their anti-aircraft guns.
The strafing run of one Beaufighter set the deck cargo of one transport alight which blew up and was noted by the other aircraft with a large dark smoke plume. Most of the anti-aircraft fire from the ships was aimed at the B17s which were bombing from on high and was not aimed at the low level bombers.
After the Beaufighters the skip bombing B25s came in, strafing with their nose guns like the Beaufighters, but this time skipping bombs into the hulls of the ships. The results were immediate from the skip bombing tactic. Ships that weren't sunk were immobilized by the bombing and strafing making them easier targets for the high level and medium bombers.
At the end of this attack four Japanese destroyers that were undamaged picked up as many survivors as they could and headed to Lae. What remained of the convoy was four or five damaged transport ships, a sinking destroyer and one destroyer going around trying to pick up survivors.
The second attack was not as large as the first because several squadrons could not get over the Owen-Stanley ranges due to bad weather. This included the RAAF Beaufighters, neither did the 39th Squadron USAAF with their P38s Lightnings.
The force that was gathered was still large; including B17s, B25s, RAAF A20s and P38s. Bombing squadrons such as 22 Squadron RAAF which had done airfield suppression during the first attack were now freed up to attack the convoy itself. The remainder of the ships were either sunk or immobilized. Those that remained were sunk over the next 24 hours by repeated bombing attacks.
The day's bombing had left numerous Japanese soldiers in the ocean after they had abandoned ship. The American and Australian airmen had been horrified by the stories of Japanese brutality to prisoners of war and injured soldiers. Airmen had seen Japanese fighters machine gun Australian and American airmen that had bailed out and were in parachutes.
One of the consequences of this was that the Australian and American bombers strafed the Japanese soldiers in the water. The airmen found it distasteful but realized it needed to be done and that if it was a Japanese airmen in their shoes no mercy would be shown.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the first time the US 5th Air Force and RAAF achieved dominance over the air and sea in the SWPA and after the Bismarck Sea they never lost it again. A mix of superior machinery, superior tactics, superior organization and the will to bring it bear destroyed a Japanese division before it could set foot on New Guinea. From this point on Japanese shipping was always at threat of being sunk by Allied aircraft and the Japanese were swept from the skies and ocean.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea came after the allied victories of Milne Bay, the Kokoda Trail and Guadalcanal all of which were significant turning points in the South Pacific war with Japan.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is important as it ranks as the turning point in maturity, tactics, organization, support and logistics where an allied aviation force was able to completely dominate the air and sea in such force that a convoy shipping a Japanese division to Lae in New Guinea was decimated.
From that point forward the United States 5th Air Force dominated the air and ocean such that no Japanese aircraft or shipping was able to move without the risk of being sunk or destroyed. Soon after the Australian and American aircraft in the South Pacific began wearing white tails and wings as they were more at risk of shooting each other down than Japanese. The dominance was total.
Prior to late 1942 the attacks by the RAAF and 5th Air Force were disjointed and lacked sufficient numbers. They were constantly at risk from attack by Japanese fighters as well. Logistics were poor as was serviceability rates and aircraft often had to turn back for maintenance reasons.
This was largely because the Australians and Americans had been bundled back from Singapore in a very short period and had lost a lot of men, machines and supplies in the process. The airmen of 1941 and early 1942 were fighting to keep a foot hold in New Guinea - which they achieved against great odds.
Additionally the American industrial machine was just starting to rev up to the kind of enormous output that it achieved in 1944/45. Supplies of aircraft, parts and ammunition were starting to flow into the South West Pacific [SWPA] despite the Germany first strategy of America, Britain and Russia.
Up until this period the only heavy bombers in the South Pacific were American B17s which had been the sole strike force in New Guinea since the Japanese advance. The only medium bombers were an obsolete rag tag of Australian Hudson's and Beaufort's which had fought against impossible odds to carry out their tasks.
In late 1942 more B17s arrived along with B24 Liberators. Douglas A20s started appearing along with the RAAF receiving Bristol Beaufighters from England. More importantly the North American B25 Mitchell started appearing in the theater.
The Beaufighter and B25 were important. The Beaufighters quickly showed themselves to be an able weapon platform against Japanese shipping, airfields and army emplacements because of the enormous firepower in their nose and wings. The Beaufighter packed four 20 mm canons along with four .303 machine guns. When that firepower was focused on shipping it was devastating.
Because of this realization the 5th Air Force equipped the B25s of the 3rd Attack Group with multiple .50 cal machine guns in the nose and in nacelles on the side. This gave the B25s eight machine guns to suppress anti-aircraft fire as they came in for low level attacks.
Bombing doctrine prior to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was for heavy and medium bombers to attack ships from height; often up to 7,500 feet. This was to stay away from fighters and anti-aircraft fire. The problem was that results for this were very poor as Japanese shipping would twist and turn making difficult targets for level bombing.
The solution was skip bombing. This is where a medium bomber comes in at mast height level and drops the bombs so that they skip into the ship before exploding on a delayed fuse. This was practiced originally by the B17s on a rusted old shipwreck in Port Moresby but the medium bombers were more maneuverable and more effective with this tactic.
Due to the breathing space being given by the victories in Milne Bay, Kokoda and Guadalcanal the 5th Air Force and RAAF started training in combined operations. Again on the rusty old wreck in Port Moresby but the tactic was for the Beaufighters to come in low and fast to strafe the ships and suppress any anti-aircraft fire. The skip bombers would come in immediately behind them while more medium and heavy bombers would do their bomb runs from a normal height. Lex MacAuley writes:
A practice mission against the wreck was finally flown on 28th of February, 1943. All the elements of a coordinated attack were included. The B17s went in first,bombing from 8,000 feet, followed by medium level B25s at 5,000 feet. RAAF 30 Squadron Beaufighters then went in firing their heavy armament of four 20mm cannon and six .303 machine guns, closely followed by Ed Larner's B25s with .50 cal nose guns and 500 lb bombs.
This combined operational effort was what was used in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea two days later.
The Japanese convoy itself was eight transport ships and eight destroyers as escort which left Rabaul for Lae. There it was intended the Japanese 51st Division would reinforce Japanese forces in New Guinea.
There were multiple attacks against the convoy prior to the devastating skip bombing mission. Heavy bombers attacked the convoy from height and scored some hits on the transports, including sinking the Kyokusei Maru, but there was a flurry of tropical storms that hid the convoy for a day or so. Australian Beauforts also tried a torpedo run against the convoy but this produced no result. Eventually an RAAF "black cat" Catalina followed the convoy through the night marking its position and destination.
The Japanese convoy decided to circle during the night so it would reach Lae in the morning. This decision meant that the convoy was exposed to attack through a spate of good weather the next morning in which the entire weight of the 5th Air Force and RAAF could be thrown against the convoy. Lex MacAuley writes:
First at the rendezvous point, the 71st Squadron, 38th Bomb Group began a wide, lazy circle at 5,300 feet as they waited for the armada to follow. The crews then saw a procession of air power greater than anything the Allied Air Forces had concentrated before in New Guinea.
Captain W.S. Royalty described it as 'an almost unbelievable number of planes'. B17s were moving into formation above the 71st; below came three separate flights of B25s; in formation and beginning to circle were Beaufighters and A20; the highest up were the P38s.
The Beaufighters went in first at low height to strafe the ships, especially the bridge which was the central control point, and suppress any anti-aircraft fire. The Japanese Destroyers mistook the Beaufighters for a torpedo attack and turned toward them which left the transports undefended by their anti-aircraft guns.
The strafing run of one Beaufighter set the deck cargo of one transport alight which blew up and was noted by the other aircraft with a large dark smoke plume. Most of the anti-aircraft fire from the ships was aimed at the B17s which were bombing from on high and was not aimed at the low level bombers.
After the Beaufighters the skip bombing B25s came in, strafing with their nose guns like the Beaufighters, but this time skipping bombs into the hulls of the ships. The results were immediate from the skip bombing tactic. Ships that weren't sunk were immobilized by the bombing and strafing making them easier targets for the high level and medium bombers.
At the end of this attack four Japanese destroyers that were undamaged picked up as many survivors as they could and headed to Lae. What remained of the convoy was four or five damaged transport ships, a sinking destroyer and one destroyer going around trying to pick up survivors.
The second attack was not as large as the first because several squadrons could not get over the Owen-Stanley ranges due to bad weather. This included the RAAF Beaufighters, neither did the 39th Squadron USAAF with their P38s Lightnings.
The force that was gathered was still large; including B17s, B25s, RAAF A20s and P38s. Bombing squadrons such as 22 Squadron RAAF which had done airfield suppression during the first attack were now freed up to attack the convoy itself. The remainder of the ships were either sunk or immobilized. Those that remained were sunk over the next 24 hours by repeated bombing attacks.
The day's bombing had left numerous Japanese soldiers in the ocean after they had abandoned ship. The American and Australian airmen had been horrified by the stories of Japanese brutality to prisoners of war and injured soldiers. Airmen had seen Japanese fighters machine gun Australian and American airmen that had bailed out and were in parachutes.
One of the consequences of this was that the Australian and American bombers strafed the Japanese soldiers in the water. The airmen found it distasteful but realized it needed to be done and that if it was a Japanese airmen in their shoes no mercy would be shown.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the first time the US 5th Air Force and RAAF achieved dominance over the air and sea in the SWPA and after the Bismarck Sea they never lost it again. A mix of superior machinery, superior tactics, superior organization and the will to bring it bear destroyed a Japanese division before it could set foot on New Guinea. From this point on Japanese shipping was always at threat of being sunk by Allied aircraft and the Japanese were swept from the skies and ocean.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Thu Mar 03, 2011 6:35 am
Eventually an RAAF "black cat" Catalina followed the convoy through the night marking its position and destination.
I have had the good fortune to meet and work with Dr Gwynne Duigan, widow of Terence Duigan, the son of Reg Duigan and nephew of John Duigan, as part of the project to build a Duigan replica, and celebrate the Duigan Centenary of Flight 2010.
The Duigan brothers are Australia's version of the Wright brothers, and designed, built and flew Australias first local design in 1910, without ever previously seeing or flying another aircraft.
http://www.duigancentenaryofflight.org.au/duigan-aircraft.html
While "apparantly" diverting the thread off topic to early Flying Machine activities in Australia in 1910, the reason for doing so is to put Terence Duigan in context of his famous ancestors before I introduce him as the pilot of that RAAF "Black Cat" that found the convoy and shadowed it to mark its position for the coming attack.
Terence, B.Arch., F.R.I.A., the second son, joined the R.A.A.F. After training at Pt Cook, Victoria and Rathmines, N.S.W., he was posted to No 11 Squadron to fly Empire Boats, [Short Sunderlands] in1941, transferring to Catalinas, [PBYs] in1941. In mid 1944, he was posted to No 21 squadron to fly Liberators, [B 24’s] 1944 -45. Terry awarded the M.I.D. and D.F.C
Perhaps the most publicised episode of this era in which Terry took part, was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, although he spoke of it very much as a routine procedure.
On March 1, 1943, a Japanese convoy assembled in Rabaul harbour, set sail in poor weather. It was spotted by the crew of an American Liberator at 16.00 hours on a return flight to Milne Bay. The alarm was raised and the strike forces readied. Two attacks were made on March 2 by Flying Fortresses, B17s, at 09.50 and 18.20 hours, but in the bad weather the position of the fleet was lost at 18.45.
Lieutenant Walter Higgins, the captain of the B-24, happened to meet Terry in Milne Bay and tell him about sighting the ships off the northwest coast of New Britain.
At 22.00 hours, after some three hours of searching, Terry and his crew sighted the Japanese fleet heading for the Bismarck Sea.
On reporting its position, Terry was ordered to shadow the fleet until Beaufighters from Milne Bay arrived. This he did until 02.40 on March 2 when he had to leave, because the Catalinas were only allowed to fly over enemy territory during the hours of darkness because of their vulnerability to attack by Zekes.
So with approaching daylight, they dropped their bomb load, unfortunately due to an error in the bomb sight, scoring only a near miss on a destroyer and headed home.
Terry was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross - DFC - for his service during this time
A remarkable family of Australian aviators, John Duigan went on to fly in the AFC in WW1, married but had no children, while Reg, who flew in 1910 but did not progress to get a licence had 4 children, all of who flew, with 2 serving in WW2, Brian in Europe in Bomber Command on Wellingtons, Beauforts and Lancasters, with Terry in the Pacific on Empire Boats, Cats and later Liberators, the other two children were two young to enlist but flew privately after the war.
Regards
Mark Pilkington
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Thu Mar 03, 2011 11:21 am
My Father was in the bismark sea battle, he was a gunner in a B-25. They skip bombed and sunk a transport. He is still alive today at 88.7 years, awarded the distiguished flying cross.
He still talks about raids on rabaul.
405th sqdn. 38th bg.
He still talks about raids on rabaul.
405th sqdn. 38th bg.
Last edited by crystal lakes on Fri Mar 04, 2011 12:35 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Thu Mar 03, 2011 5:22 pm
Invader/Mark..
No way would I add to a post about the Bismarck Sea without mentioning "Black Jack" Walker and his Beau's, along with the Mates that flew with the 3rd as fill-ins. Also have to give credit to the P-38, B-17 , and B-24 Groups, along with 38th's B-25's , the Black Cats, and the Aussie A-20's that hit Lae. One he## of a effort!
Now, couple photos from my good friend Jack Heyn...
This one is id'ed as from a 13th Sqdn a/c..
Jack has this id'ed as a 90th shot, but it sure looks like the photo's from 89th Sqdn pilot Bill Beck's passes..
No way would I add to a post about the Bismarck Sea without mentioning "Black Jack" Walker and his Beau's, along with the Mates that flew with the 3rd as fill-ins. Also have to give credit to the P-38, B-17 , and B-24 Groups, along with 38th's B-25's , the Black Cats, and the Aussie A-20's that hit Lae. One he## of a effort!
Now, couple photos from my good friend Jack Heyn...
This one is id'ed as from a 13th Sqdn a/c..
Jack has this id'ed as a 90th shot, but it sure looks like the photo's from 89th Sqdn pilot Bill Beck's passes..
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sat Mar 05, 2011 8:54 am
one photo that I forgot to post originally. The spark plug of the 90th, Ed Larner, in his B-25 named for his wife.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sat Mar 05, 2011 9:00 am
Quite a few RAAF crews flew with 90th as well. Check out the guy on the right of "Chatterbox"...
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sat Mar 05, 2011 10:42 am
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sat Mar 05, 2011 2:05 pm
Randy Wilson wrote:I think the tide turned in the SWPA in November, 1942. The Bismark Sea was icing on the cake. My 2 cents. Randy
P.S. Not to start a war, but if you haven't studied the naval and air battles around Gudalcanal in some detail, you might enjoy "Netpune's Inferno" by James Hornfisher. I had studied these battles in some detail and found his recent book a great view of the various actions both in detail and overview. This was what really broke the back of the IJN in my opinion - the battles, not the book! Your mileage may vary as always.
P.P.S. I ran a naval wargames group at the U. of Alaska Fairbanks with 2400:1 ship miniatures while in Geology grad school after the Army in the mid-1970s. You can't believe the look on the USN players as the IJN "Long Lance" torps from the IJN cruisers and destoyers kept coming and coming! Never did figure out a good way to simulate the IJN subs in 2D, on top of drafting tables, nor the planes, even with the advanced "personal computers" of the time - S-100 buss Z-80 stuff, teletypes for printers and dumb ADM-3A and similar non-graphic video terminals, if anyone here cares. We also had some great micro-armor battles with 285:1 scale armor, both WWII and "modern" at the time. Oh, I digress.
I once read a book that I think was called"US naval action in the Pacific" might be wrong. it covered daily naval actions and not just the major battles.I was amazed at how many ships were destroyed by the Long Lance torpedo. battles no one knows about. they had amazing torpedos and we paid the price for them
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sat Mar 05, 2011 11:49 pm
The Kokoda Trail battle is probably one of the most under-appreciated victories of the war. By stopping and reversing the Japanese advance, it saved Port Moresby and all the airfields. It was (IMHO) the turning point in the Southwest Pacific.
Bismarck Sea was an important battle as it 1) denied the Japanese the reinforcements they needed in New Guinea and 2) showed the Japanese high command the growing strength and tenacity of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. Bismarck Sea came as a shock to them.
The battles around Guadalcanal were terrible attrition battles. Both sides lost 24 ships. The Japanese could not afford to break even with the U.S., as the U.S. could make good on those losses. Also were the losses of the Japanese "first team" carrier pilots. Between Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, the cream of Japanese Naval Aviation was destroyed. The remaining groups were decimated in the fighting over Rabaul between late 1943 through early 1944. By the time of the Phillipine Sea battle, the majority of the Japanese carrier pilots were inexperienced and this set up the "Marianas Turkey Shoot".
Bismarck Sea was an important battle as it 1) denied the Japanese the reinforcements they needed in New Guinea and 2) showed the Japanese high command the growing strength and tenacity of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. Bismarck Sea came as a shock to them.
The battles around Guadalcanal were terrible attrition battles. Both sides lost 24 ships. The Japanese could not afford to break even with the U.S., as the U.S. could make good on those losses. Also were the losses of the Japanese "first team" carrier pilots. Between Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, the cream of Japanese Naval Aviation was destroyed. The remaining groups were decimated in the fighting over Rabaul between late 1943 through early 1944. By the time of the Phillipine Sea battle, the majority of the Japanese carrier pilots were inexperienced and this set up the "Marianas Turkey Shoot".
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:44 pm
Quite brutal fighting all the way around, but the tide was turning. Allied air power was beginning to be a powerful tool in keeping the Japanese fleet from pushing it's way around. Aggressive actions by small units, weather it be PT-boats, Submarines, destroyers, aircraft or even small fleet units began to stiffen resolve and punch back.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Tue Mar 08, 2011 6:27 pm
SaxMan wrote:The Kokoda Trail battle is probably one of the most under-appreciated victories of the war. By stopping and reversing the Japanese advance, it saved Port Moresby and all the airfields. It was (IMHO) the turning point in the Southwest Pacific.
True, but Guadalcanal and the Owen Stanley drives were co-dependant upon each other. the Japanese viewed them as two separate problems while MacArthur used them as a single action to split the Japanese forces. The Japanese command was not going to reenforce New Guinea until Guadalcanal was recaptured. MacArthur had gotten wind of a large Japanese invasion planned for Milne Bay in mid-November hence the big push before they could get their breath.
After the war Hirohito lamented on the success of the Allied penetration of the Japanese line in the Owen Stanley..he said from that time on, "I was anxious for peace, but we had a treaty with Germany against concluding a separate peace; we couldn't violate an international committment." I wonder, if Claus von Stauffenberg had been successful in blowing up Hitler, would the Germans have been that faithful?
Edit
Last edited by airnutz on Wed Mar 09, 2011 1:18 am, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Battle of the Bismarck Sea ...
Tue Mar 08, 2011 6:50 pm
Says it quite well..
The British Field Marshal Sir William Slim, who had no part in the battle, said:
"Australian troops had, at Milne Bay in New Guinea, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land. If the Australians, in conditions very like ours, had done it, so could we. Some of us may forget that of all the Allies it was the Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of the invincibility of the Japanese Army; those of us who were in Burma have cause to remember."
Japanese forces had experienced local setbacks before: their first attack on Wake Island was thrown back, and American Marines defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal in the Battle of the Tenaru, four days before the Battle of Milne Bay began. But unlike Milne Bay, these actions did not result in complete Japanese withdrawal and the abandonment of the military campaign."
From Wikipedia..
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Milne_Bay
The British Field Marshal Sir William Slim, who had no part in the battle, said:
"Australian troops had, at Milne Bay in New Guinea, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land. If the Australians, in conditions very like ours, had done it, so could we. Some of us may forget that of all the Allies it was the Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of the invincibility of the Japanese Army; those of us who were in Burma have cause to remember."
Japanese forces had experienced local setbacks before: their first attack on Wake Island was thrown back, and American Marines defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal in the Battle of the Tenaru, four days before the Battle of Milne Bay began. But unlike Milne Bay, these actions did not result in complete Japanese withdrawal and the abandonment of the military campaign."
From Wikipedia..
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Milne_Bay