Morotai Mutiny - What would you do?
Tue Nov 06, 2007 7:50 am
As the discussion regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki tends to polarise and stay that way, here's another little conundrum to consider.
In 1945 several experienced, commanding Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers tried to resign their commissions in protest at what they saw as particularly wasteful and essentially unproductive operations in a sideshow.
Briefly:
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/%22Cleani ... 0123162109
More and a better layout here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morotai_Mutiny
Bear in mind the officers in question were all highly experienced and competent leaders and fighters. Cobby, their line commander was a W.W.I ace, and also respected for his achievements. Cowardice or personal safety was not an issue. The legal concept of 'mutiny' was also not really the situation either, but it's a good summary.
Several times in the atomic bomb discussions people have (understandably) mentioned the point of 'bringing the boys back home, alive, as soon as possible'. This was the issue here, as the RAAF officers saw it - they were not shortening the war, they were 'wasting' their pilots lives, and for what at best was regarded as a sideshow.
In the background was a disgraceful feud being conducted by two senior RAAF officer (Bostock and Jones) and there was significant belief that MacArthur was ensuring that he chose particular units and forces for glory jobs and publicity, and relegated others to unimportant, hard, dirty work with little credit or understanding. USMC aviators and RAAF aircrew were among the people who believed they were sidelined in favour of MacArthur's favourites. Non US forces found it hard to be recognised and rarely got the high profiles jobs.
History shows that many of these 1945 operations were, indeed unimportant in the resolution of the war, even without the advent of the bomb. On the other hand it is an unarguable military principle that you need to apply force to the enemy at all times and where possible to make his resistance more difficult. But what price should you accept for these secondary actions?
A. Is there a point at which serving officer in the military of a democracy can see that the strategy is wrong, and how should they critique it?
B. Is there a point, generally or specifically that an officer can say 'no more'? (Bearing in mind that the Nuremberg trials established a principle of individual responsibility. As we all know 'I was only following orders' is not a good enough defence.)
C. Were you in the position of one of the officers in question, what would you have done differently and why, or do you think each person's actions were sensible?
D. If, in your opinion, these men acted inappropriately, at what point and how should an officer decline to carry out orders?
E. Anything else...
This isn't an anti-MacArthur item, or a critique of any person, but looking at the actions of various men in a tricky situation - everyone involved can legitimately point to a good record. However, it is one of those dilemmas which are difficult to decide, unequivocally, IMHO.
Just a historical episode for discussion - what d'you think (input from current or ex- service people welcome.)
Cheers,
In 1945 several experienced, commanding Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers tried to resign their commissions in protest at what they saw as particularly wasteful and essentially unproductive operations in a sideshow.
Briefly:
In the latter stages of the war in the Pacific, the First Tactical Air Force (TAF) was based at Morotai. At this stage, General MacArthur was formulating a series of moves which aimed to free the southern Philippines, Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo of hostile forces. These actions were part of the overall Montclair plan. The main role of the RAAF's First TAF in these operations was the neutralization and destruction of the enemy and his installations, as well as assisting in the air defence of Morotai. (2) Before the OBOE Operations which commenced in May 1945 with the landing at Tarakan, this mainly comprised strafing ground targets and watercraft, and some dive-bombing. Although there were few enemy aircraft seen in the air, the enemy anti-aircraft defences were active and a number of aircraft were shot at. (3)
Group Captain Arthur of No 81 Wing, came to the conclusion that the operations he was carrying out were not worthwhile: that the returns were outweighed by the costs in almost every case. He asked his Intelligence Officer to put together what he called a Balance Sheet for his Wing's operations in order to quantify the benefits as opposed to the results. He took his balance sheet to the Air Officer Commanding, Air Commodore Cobby, and was disappointed that no official attention was given to it. He assumed that, because no action was taken to remedy the situation, there was something dishonest in the way the First TAF, in particular and the RAAF in general, were prosecuting the war.
Arthur mentioned his unease to a number of friends and colleagues who indicated support of his views and on 20 April 1945, Group Captain Wilfred Arthur, Group Captain Clive Caldwell, Wing Commander Kenneth Ranger, Wing Commander Robert Gibbes, Squadron Leader John Waddy, Squadron Leader Bert Grace, Squadron Leader Douglas Vanderfield and Squadron Leader Stuart Harpham applied for permission to resign. Subsequent to this action, an Inquiry was held to investigate the resignations, as well as other matters. This was conducted by John Vincent William Barry KC.
That is the "mutiny" in a nutshell...
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/%22Cleani ... 0123162109
More and a better layout here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morotai_Mutiny
Bear in mind the officers in question were all highly experienced and competent leaders and fighters. Cobby, their line commander was a W.W.I ace, and also respected for his achievements. Cowardice or personal safety was not an issue. The legal concept of 'mutiny' was also not really the situation either, but it's a good summary.
Several times in the atomic bomb discussions people have (understandably) mentioned the point of 'bringing the boys back home, alive, as soon as possible'. This was the issue here, as the RAAF officers saw it - they were not shortening the war, they were 'wasting' their pilots lives, and for what at best was regarded as a sideshow.
In the background was a disgraceful feud being conducted by two senior RAAF officer (Bostock and Jones) and there was significant belief that MacArthur was ensuring that he chose particular units and forces for glory jobs and publicity, and relegated others to unimportant, hard, dirty work with little credit or understanding. USMC aviators and RAAF aircrew were among the people who believed they were sidelined in favour of MacArthur's favourites. Non US forces found it hard to be recognised and rarely got the high profiles jobs.
History shows that many of these 1945 operations were, indeed unimportant in the resolution of the war, even without the advent of the bomb. On the other hand it is an unarguable military principle that you need to apply force to the enemy at all times and where possible to make his resistance more difficult. But what price should you accept for these secondary actions?
A. Is there a point at which serving officer in the military of a democracy can see that the strategy is wrong, and how should they critique it?
B. Is there a point, generally or specifically that an officer can say 'no more'? (Bearing in mind that the Nuremberg trials established a principle of individual responsibility. As we all know 'I was only following orders' is not a good enough defence.)
C. Were you in the position of one of the officers in question, what would you have done differently and why, or do you think each person's actions were sensible?
D. If, in your opinion, these men acted inappropriately, at what point and how should an officer decline to carry out orders?
E. Anything else...
This isn't an anti-MacArthur item, or a critique of any person, but looking at the actions of various men in a tricky situation - everyone involved can legitimately point to a good record. However, it is one of those dilemmas which are difficult to decide, unequivocally, IMHO.
Just a historical episode for discussion - what d'you think (input from current or ex- service people welcome.)
Cheers,
Tue Nov 06, 2007 12:42 pm
a) chain of command. If this breaks down and you told to shut the F up, write congress. Nothing that I know of can put heat on a situation like having your state senator call your co's office personally. I have done it twice, and both times the situation reversed itself immedtiatly. Once it was over a somewhat sily issue, the second it was honestly a life and death situation, with the Army bumbling about its way ignoring reality.
b) In reality he would be relieved of command and probably court martialed. That is the price you pay for playing with the big boys. If you are a commander, and your men's lives are at risk, you must consider their welfare of paramount importance, yet not as important as the mission. It really isn't up to you to decide how important the mission is. Again, a senator could help- but there is a cost to playing this card, and isn't small, or fast.
c) I have not. Closest I could call was that all the Rangers in Mogadishu were awrare that doing all those snatches wasn't wise. It wasa pattern that the skinnies watched and could read and reacto to. Our planners screwed up and we knew they were doing it. There were larger issues than our lives at risk, and everybody just buttoned their lips.
d) I am sure an officer like Randy or Eric Downing could anwser more appropriatly, but IMHO this is not an issue you can resolve uintil you are in it. And then the military will likely hammer you either way. After all, you are just a small cog in the machine, to be used and discarded as it needs.
b) In reality he would be relieved of command and probably court martialed. That is the price you pay for playing with the big boys. If you are a commander, and your men's lives are at risk, you must consider their welfare of paramount importance, yet not as important as the mission. It really isn't up to you to decide how important the mission is. Again, a senator could help- but there is a cost to playing this card, and isn't small, or fast.
c) I have not. Closest I could call was that all the Rangers in Mogadishu were awrare that doing all those snatches wasn't wise. It wasa pattern that the skinnies watched and could read and reacto to. Our planners screwed up and we knew they were doing it. There were larger issues than our lives at risk, and everybody just buttoned their lips.
d) I am sure an officer like Randy or Eric Downing could anwser more appropriatly, but IMHO this is not an issue you can resolve uintil you are in it. And then the military will likely hammer you either way. After all, you are just a small cog in the machine, to be used and discarded as it needs.
Last edited by muddyboots on Thu Nov 08, 2007 7:51 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Morotai Mutiny - What would you do?
Tue Nov 06, 2007 7:39 pm
Excellent topic JDK.
If I can add to the discussion with the following. I am neither current or former Military, though my working life has been spent in a compliance environment (IE Civillian employee with the State Police Service)
I personally enjoy the quote from Gene Hackman's USN Character in "Crimson Tide" " We're here to preserve Democracy not practice it"
Both are interesting points which IMHO could span any military campaign or topic from the Wilderness Campaign in the American Civil War, Gallipoli or to the current War on Terror. Without highjacking this topic I would like to specifically add something under (E) as perhaps others may not be aware of the context in which the events took place.
It might be pertinent to add to the discussion that any discussion of the "Mutiny" is that the then Australian Govt under John Curtain deferred to Douglas MacArthur for decisions relating to our Armed Forces in the SWPA.
I have always been aware of the futility of the Operations in Borneo, having had the rare opportunity to speak to 7th Australian Division veterans who had some hard words about General (Later Field Marshall )Thomas Balmey.
A well known quote concerning Blamey was when he reviewed the tent lines of the 7th Division in North Queensland and said " Gentlemen I have inspected your tent lines and found them to remind me of a Brothel". To which a booming Australian voice from the rear rank shouted " You'd know all about that Tom" !!
The Borneo operation in particular has always been of interest to me, as I consider it wasteful and futile given the timeframe of the Operation, and the advance that the US towards the Japanese home Islands. I personally believe Blamey was very pleased to have an opportunity to use not only Australian land forces in a set piece action, but also his "toys" such as DUKW and LVT vehicles. Blamey being well known for advocating the use of such vehicles having observed their use by the USMC etc. It is well known that the operation to invade Borneo was to allow :
www.navy.gov.au/spc/semaphore/issue10_2005.html
www.news.com.au/couriermail/extras/ww2/ ... ghting.htm
Well respected writer and author Peter Charlton said that:
And further Gavin Long, the official historian, was highly critical of the operations in Borneo in the last months of the war against Japan.
ajrp.awm.gov.au
Interestingly enough:
And in closing the following quote from General Thomas Blamey who stated that
I think its important to highlight the fact that the action of the "Mutiny" took place within the broader context and plan of the Politicians whatever party, something thats as relevant today as it was in 1945.
Politicians start wars and servicemen & women finnish them
If I can add to the discussion with the following. I am neither current or former Military, though my working life has been spent in a compliance environment (IE Civillian employee with the State Police Service)
A. Is there a point at which serving officer in the military of a democracy can see that the strategy is wrong, and how should they critique it?
D. If, in your opinion, these men acted inappropriately, at what point and how should an officer decline to carry out orders?
I personally enjoy the quote from Gene Hackman's USN Character in "Crimson Tide" " We're here to preserve Democracy not practice it"
B. Is there a point, generally or specifically that an officer can say 'no more'? (Bearing in mind that the Nuremberg trials established a principle of individual responsibility. As we all know 'I was only following orders' is not a good enough defence.)
C. Were you in the position of one of the officers in question, what would you have done differently and why, or do you think each person's actions were sensible?
Both are interesting points which IMHO could span any military campaign or topic from the Wilderness Campaign in the American Civil War, Gallipoli or to the current War on Terror. Without highjacking this topic I would like to specifically add something under (E) as perhaps others may not be aware of the context in which the events took place.
It might be pertinent to add to the discussion that any discussion of the "Mutiny" is that the then Australian Govt under John Curtain deferred to Douglas MacArthur for decisions relating to our Armed Forces in the SWPA.
I have always been aware of the futility of the Operations in Borneo, having had the rare opportunity to speak to 7th Australian Division veterans who had some hard words about General (Later Field Marshall )Thomas Balmey.
A well known quote concerning Blamey was when he reviewed the tent lines of the 7th Division in North Queensland and said " Gentlemen I have inspected your tent lines and found them to remind me of a Brothel". To which a booming Australian voice from the rear rank shouted " You'd know all about that Tom" !!
The Borneo operation in particular has always been of interest to me, as I consider it wasteful and futile given the timeframe of the Operation, and the advance that the US towards the Japanese home Islands. I personally believe Blamey was very pleased to have an opportunity to use not only Australian land forces in a set piece action, but also his "toys" such as DUKW and LVT vehicles. Blamey being well known for advocating the use of such vehicles having observed their use by the USMC etc. It is well known that the operation to invade Borneo was to allow :
www.navy.gov.au/spc/semaphore/issue10_2005.html
The Australian government desired to make a significant contribution to defeating Japan during 1945, in order to confirm its place at the table during later peace talks.
www.news.com.au/couriermail/extras/ww2/ ... ghting.htm
Well respected writer and author Peter Charlton said that:
In February 1945, then prime minister John Curtin wrote to MacArthur, seeking a more active role for the First Australian Corps, which had taken no part in the war for 18 months. Unless the troops could be found future operations, Curtin said he would be "confronted with a difficult situation". That is, demobilisation beckoned.
And further Gavin Long, the official historian, was highly critical of the operations in Borneo in the last months of the war against Japan.
ajrp.awm.gov.au
For the first time Australian troops were deployed primarily for political purposes that were not related directly either to winning the war or defending Australia. It was a policy that has continued ever since.
Interestingly enough:
The Australians did not know that MacArthur had told the Joint Chiefs that the Balikpapan operation was necessary because not to carry it out would “produce grave repercussions with the Australian government and people.”[8]
And in closing the following quote from General Thomas Blamey who stated that
“Were we to wait until Japan was finally crushed, it could be said that the Americans, who had previously liberated the Philippines, were responsible for the final liberation of the natives in Australian territories, with the inevitable result that our prestige abroad and in the eyes of the natives would suffer much harm”.[10]
I think its important to highlight the fact that the action of the "Mutiny" took place within the broader context and plan of the Politicians whatever party, something thats as relevant today as it was in 1945.
Politicians start wars and servicemen & women finnish them
Wed Nov 07, 2007 12:56 am
I had a long chat with the late Bobby Gibbs on this matter some years ago.
He said that the "mutiny"was the only way that he and others, Caldwell etc could impress on their superiors the gravity of there position. By this stage the war had long passed by, Yes there was a job to be done "mopping up"but they wanted to take the war to the enemy "where it counted" The word was filtering down about the Aussies in Burma and they wanted to get up there and help out their mates. Gibbs said that the mutiny was a bluff that got out of hand,. they were hoping that the "Brass"would see sense and get them out of P.N.G and into the real war, the rest is history.
He said that the "mutiny"was the only way that he and others, Caldwell etc could impress on their superiors the gravity of there position. By this stage the war had long passed by, Yes there was a job to be done "mopping up"but they wanted to take the war to the enemy "where it counted" The word was filtering down about the Aussies in Burma and they wanted to get up there and help out their mates. Gibbs said that the mutiny was a bluff that got out of hand,. they were hoping that the "Brass"would see sense and get them out of P.N.G and into the real war, the rest is history.
Wed Nov 07, 2007 5:55 am
It was most likely the press that gave the incident the 'mutiny' tag after a loaded question Barry asked GC Arthur: "This gets very close to mutiny, does it not?" Arthur replied "Yes, I meant to make as big a fuss as possible with the object of getting the position corrected."[1]
This quote below is also interesting relating to why the Australian Army conducted the Borneo campaign.
The landing was part of a series of operations planned by Blamey when it became clear that MacArthur would not be using the Australians in his Philippines campaign. Dubbed the 'unnecessary war' by Peter Charlton, the operations were of doubtful strategic value and were the result of Curtin being content to let Blamey and MacArthur look after the front while he looked after the rear. There was also public pressure on the Government to have the largely idle Australian troops fighting somewhere, almost regardless of where it might be, and a belief by the Government that the fighting was necessary to guarantee Australia a place at the Pacific peace table. [2]
[1]Kristen Alexander, Clive Caldwell: Air Ace, Allen & Unwin, 2006, p190
[2]David Day, John Curtin: A Life, Harper Collins, 1999, p569
And now to JDK's questions.
A. The problem here is with the basis of democracy. In theory, the soliders should do as they are told because strategic planning, although carried out by the military, is approved by a civilian government. Military people have no rights to override civilian law or regulatory functions in a true democracy. But what is a true democracy when the civilian government uses the military for political means as noted in [2] above?
B. Nuremberg doesn't belong in this argument, because it raises the issue of morals. Officers and soldiers can refuse an order if it would result in illegal action or is a breach of morality. The Borneo campaign, although misguided, didn't do either of the above; neither did MacArthur's decision not to take the RAAF north with him. The argument that the officers in the Borneo campaign had the moral obligation to protect the lives of their men by not taking them into combat opens a can of worms that could be applied to all combat situations.
C. It's hard to say what I would have done because I'm not a fighter pilot. Those men were fighter pilots; it's what they did. Both Gibbes and Caldwell tried not to get posted back to Australia after their desert campaigns were done because they were afraid they wouldn't get to fight any more. And that's basically what happened. It's a hard thing to be trained how to fight and then not be allowed to do it.
Walrus
This quote below is also interesting relating to why the Australian Army conducted the Borneo campaign.
The landing was part of a series of operations planned by Blamey when it became clear that MacArthur would not be using the Australians in his Philippines campaign. Dubbed the 'unnecessary war' by Peter Charlton, the operations were of doubtful strategic value and were the result of Curtin being content to let Blamey and MacArthur look after the front while he looked after the rear. There was also public pressure on the Government to have the largely idle Australian troops fighting somewhere, almost regardless of where it might be, and a belief by the Government that the fighting was necessary to guarantee Australia a place at the Pacific peace table. [2]
[1]Kristen Alexander, Clive Caldwell: Air Ace, Allen & Unwin, 2006, p190
[2]David Day, John Curtin: A Life, Harper Collins, 1999, p569
And now to JDK's questions.
A. The problem here is with the basis of democracy. In theory, the soliders should do as they are told because strategic planning, although carried out by the military, is approved by a civilian government. Military people have no rights to override civilian law or regulatory functions in a true democracy. But what is a true democracy when the civilian government uses the military for political means as noted in [2] above?
B. Nuremberg doesn't belong in this argument, because it raises the issue of morals. Officers and soldiers can refuse an order if it would result in illegal action or is a breach of morality. The Borneo campaign, although misguided, didn't do either of the above; neither did MacArthur's decision not to take the RAAF north with him. The argument that the officers in the Borneo campaign had the moral obligation to protect the lives of their men by not taking them into combat opens a can of worms that could be applied to all combat situations.
C. It's hard to say what I would have done because I'm not a fighter pilot. Those men were fighter pilots; it's what they did. Both Gibbes and Caldwell tried not to get posted back to Australia after their desert campaigns were done because they were afraid they wouldn't get to fight any more. And that's basically what happened. It's a hard thing to be trained how to fight and then not be allowed to do it.
Walrus
Wed Nov 07, 2007 7:11 am
Really appreciate the detailed responses from each person.
Interesting we have three Aussie responses, and one American. C'mon guys anyone can play.
Muddyboots - good insight. We don't have the same senatorial system as such (there's an upper and a lower house etc.) and I dunno that you'd get any support from an Aussie Pollie, then or now. But I don't know.
Can't argue with anyone's points, just a gloss to Walrus' comment on the Nuremberg reference, he's right to say that referred to 'moral' or 'illegal' rather than what might be called 'militarily effective' (are we using our resources, including lives, to best effect).
The public are often misled by military PR and arms manufacturers with talk of 'efficient' and 'cost effective' 'solutions'. Wars are messy and incredibly wasteful - as we all probably know, but it's a context point.
More please!
Interesting we have three Aussie responses, and one American. C'mon guys anyone can play.
Muddyboots - good insight. We don't have the same senatorial system as such (there's an upper and a lower house etc.) and I dunno that you'd get any support from an Aussie Pollie, then or now. But I don't know.
Can't argue with anyone's points, just a gloss to Walrus' comment on the Nuremberg reference, he's right to say that referred to 'moral' or 'illegal' rather than what might be called 'militarily effective' (are we using our resources, including lives, to best effect).
The public are often misled by military PR and arms manufacturers with talk of 'efficient' and 'cost effective' 'solutions'. Wars are messy and incredibly wasteful - as we all probably know, but it's a context point.
More please!
Wed Nov 07, 2007 9:36 am
Personally, I understand their wish to get into the action and MacArthur wasn't the greatest commanding officer out there when it came to utilizing the best units available instead of those he "liked" the best, but at the same time I don't necessarily disagree with the officers requesting permission to resign. I don't think that a good officer would do that, but if an officer feels he can't lead effectively, then I think that one of the options available to him should be to remove himself from that position.
I don't think I'd necessarily react the same way, but then again, I've never been in such a position nor do I ever expect to be, but in my civilian career, that's the way I've always been taught to handle my job. If I feel that I cannot be an effective employee, then it is my responsibility to remove myself and find somewhere else to work where I can be productive instead of hanging around and hurting everyone else at that job because if I'm miserable, they will be too.
I don't think I'd necessarily react the same way, but then again, I've never been in such a position nor do I ever expect to be, but in my civilian career, that's the way I've always been taught to handle my job. If I feel that I cannot be an effective employee, then it is my responsibility to remove myself and find somewhere else to work where I can be productive instead of hanging around and hurting everyone else at that job because if I'm miserable, they will be too.
Wed Nov 07, 2007 11:41 am
I think a problem with this discussion is that the Governmental organization of Australia and the United States is different.
Muddyboots brought up a couple of good points.
I too have used the Congressional card, and while it works, it can sink your career faster than a screen door in the ocean.
The US Army preaches to its Officer and NCO Corp the necessity, nay the OBLIGATION to refuse an Illegal Order.
The reality is that the order is "only" illegal if some gets caught doing it. Usually after someone gets killed or injured. Then of course it is your butt on the line for not refusing the order in the first place.
For instance. I was in a unit that had not completed its Annual Physical Fitness Test for the Fiscal Year. It was the last day of Sept. The last day to conduct the test and we had an IG inspection in two weeks. When it came time for the two mile run event, a weather front was coming through with severe weather and frequent lightening. As an NCO I took the commander aside and told him we should wait till after the storm front passed. He told me that the training sched. that day was too tight and we had to run NOW. That led to a "discussion" between the two of us that was "resolved" when the 1SGT came up and told me to shut up, we were running, period. I took my squad and started to head back for the barracks, telling the leadership that his order violated several regs and we were not going to do it.
I was sent to my quarters under guard and they conducted the run. One soldier was killed by being hit by lightning.
While the Commander and 1st SGT were relieved and subsequently removed from active service, I was also brought up on charges for a Field Grade Article 15. Why? Because I had recognized the danger and did not utilize my chain of command.
The fact of the matter is that if no one had been killed I would have had my Army Career ended that very day.
Like I said; it is only illegal if you are caught.
Muddyboots. As a note; Involving my Congressman did not really help me. As the IG determined that I had the responsibility to contact Battalion and I did not do it. Never mind that I was under close guard in my quarters with no phone. I was literally in the LTC's office getting my butt chewed and getting reduced to PFC, with lots of additional duties, restrictions and a fine, when my Uncle walked in and took me to lunch. Without once even acknowledging the LTC. Did I mention that my Uncle was a LT General at the time?
Strangely I never heard another word about my AR 15. But; you can imagine what would have happened without the family connection. And; this was only one of several times I had to do the right thing.
(twentyseven years and still an E-5) SGT Kendall. lol
PS. James it is like being ordered to do a frontal assualt on a Machine Gun position. Sometimes it is necessary and legal, and sometimes un-nessary and Illegal. Circumstance determines the actions and legality.
Muddyboots brought up a couple of good points.
I too have used the Congressional card, and while it works, it can sink your career faster than a screen door in the ocean.
The US Army preaches to its Officer and NCO Corp the necessity, nay the OBLIGATION to refuse an Illegal Order.
The reality is that the order is "only" illegal if some gets caught doing it. Usually after someone gets killed or injured. Then of course it is your butt on the line for not refusing the order in the first place.
For instance. I was in a unit that had not completed its Annual Physical Fitness Test for the Fiscal Year. It was the last day of Sept. The last day to conduct the test and we had an IG inspection in two weeks. When it came time for the two mile run event, a weather front was coming through with severe weather and frequent lightening. As an NCO I took the commander aside and told him we should wait till after the storm front passed. He told me that the training sched. that day was too tight and we had to run NOW. That led to a "discussion" between the two of us that was "resolved" when the 1SGT came up and told me to shut up, we were running, period. I took my squad and started to head back for the barracks, telling the leadership that his order violated several regs and we were not going to do it.
I was sent to my quarters under guard and they conducted the run. One soldier was killed by being hit by lightning.
While the Commander and 1st SGT were relieved and subsequently removed from active service, I was also brought up on charges for a Field Grade Article 15. Why? Because I had recognized the danger and did not utilize my chain of command.
The fact of the matter is that if no one had been killed I would have had my Army Career ended that very day.
Like I said; it is only illegal if you are caught.
Muddyboots. As a note; Involving my Congressman did not really help me. As the IG determined that I had the responsibility to contact Battalion and I did not do it. Never mind that I was under close guard in my quarters with no phone. I was literally in the LTC's office getting my butt chewed and getting reduced to PFC, with lots of additional duties, restrictions and a fine, when my Uncle walked in and took me to lunch. Without once even acknowledging the LTC. Did I mention that my Uncle was a LT General at the time?
Strangely I never heard another word about my AR 15. But; you can imagine what would have happened without the family connection. And; this was only one of several times I had to do the right thing.
(twentyseven years and still an E-5) SGT Kendall. lol
PS. James it is like being ordered to do a frontal assualt on a Machine Gun position. Sometimes it is necessary and legal, and sometimes un-nessary and Illegal. Circumstance determines the actions and legality.
Wed Nov 07, 2007 5:40 pm
yah, I never had conections. I had an M16, big balls, and a very small brain. As I said before, I wasn't the best of soldiers. Mostly because I didn't give a sugar about the "respect the rank not the man" thing. Either you earned it or you didn't. If you did I would eat poo for you. If you didn't you didn't exist in my world. That only works in a perfect world, and war, the military, is never perfect 
Thu Nov 08, 2007 6:57 pm
I have to give the credit for standing up to there thoughts, They did the right thing by going up channel, and then requesting to get out. But no one ever said they didn't follow legal orders. War is hell, when you don't get to play on the first team, but sometimes its the little battles which make the big battle go over so well.
Kurt
Kurt
Thu Nov 08, 2007 7:32 pm
Kurt, this is often true,
but sometimes its the little battles which make the big battle go over so well".
In this case the enemy was well and truly defeated, their supply lines had been destroyed long ago, the native population were not helping them, they were turning to canabulism to survive, Bobby Gibbs said that the Jungle would surely kill them, it just might take a little longer. In the mopping up many Aussies were being wounded and dieing needlessly catching up with isolated pockets of Japanese, that in all honestly held no threat to the security of P.N.G. It was this inordinate waste of manpower and resources that helped fuel their fight to be transferred out of the back zone to where they knew that they could do some good.
but sometimes its the little battles which make the big battle go over so well".
In this case the enemy was well and truly defeated, their supply lines had been destroyed long ago, the native population were not helping them, they were turning to canabulism to survive, Bobby Gibbs said that the Jungle would surely kill them, it just might take a little longer. In the mopping up many Aussies were being wounded and dieing needlessly catching up with isolated pockets of Japanese, that in all honestly held no threat to the security of P.N.G. It was this inordinate waste of manpower and resources that helped fuel their fight to be transferred out of the back zone to where they knew that they could do some good.
Fri Nov 09, 2007 7:36 pm
Very informative discussion on a (little-known to a lot of us in the US) interetsing subject. Point, counter-point and well documented. Thanks, guys!
Sat Nov 10, 2007 2:22 am
Old SAR pilot,
Some interesting discussion, and excellent points made, I agree. Would be nice for more input / comment, too.
Cheers,
James
Some interesting discussion, and excellent points made, I agree. Would be nice for more input / comment, too.
Cheers,
James
Re: Morotai Mutiny - What would you do?
Sat Nov 10, 2007 2:54 am
This is really an "officership" discussion. Realize that in ROTC or the academies, discussion topics like this one are taught and analyzed at length over quarters of academic classes. Anything said here will literally only be scratching the surface of all the dimensions here.
In general, they should voice their concerns through correct channels. If the General officer level doesn't take action, then they pick up their crayons and begin to color. Officers at the Tactical level (in terms of the three tiers -- strategic, operational, and tactica) which the O-5s and O-6s in this case, do not always have the view from the higher levels.
There is a case study that we did in my officer training (that I wish I could remember the details of) which emphasizes this. It essentially put us in the position of an O-6 Group Commander level during the Vietnam war in which we get orders to fly a bunch of airplanes in a known hostile area. We're not there to bomb anything...just go fly into the threats and back.
Noting that this will probably cause our pilots un-due exposure to danger with no benefit, we participating in the exercise voice our concerns to the leadership, only to be told to do it anyway. As the exercise goes on, most of us get pretty angry at the waste of being ordered to fly jets to a point and back -- in a combat zone, getting shot at -- all for nothing. Many people choose to make Inspector General complaints, or outright disobey the order, or other things of the like (I don't think anyone offered to resign over it!).
Anyway, at the end of the excercise, we're "let in" on the strategic war plan, which was to have our airplanes go fly out over bad guy land to act as a diversion for the "real" mission, which was the POW rescue at Son Tay prison. A mission we were not authorized to know about because of the extremely high security around it.
The point of the exercise is that sometimes as a leader you're going to be given orders to follow that do not make sense. It's your duty to upchannel your concerns if you have them, but it's also your duty to salute smartly and execute them if you're again told to do it -- because you probably don't have "the big picture".
So...'what if' the 81 Wing's operations had a strategic purpose that Gp Capt Arthur did not know about. What if his "conclusion that the operations he was carrying out were not worthwhile" was FALSE because he didn't understand the bigger picture of operations being carried out in the Pacific.
As others have pointed out, officers are legally obligated to disobey illegal orders. We recieve Law of Armed Combat training ad nauseum and are frequently told of the avenues to report it.
As I desribed above, if I legitimately felt that the operations were not worthwhile, I'd loudly voice my concerns. Then, when I was told to 'shut up and color', I'd grab my crayons and go for it. The operations aren't illegal, so I have no legal foot to stand on in disobeying it.
If these officers felt so strongly about their conviction that they needed to disobey lawful orders, then they also need to realize that they will be held accountable for their actions under the military laws of their own country. In other words, take the risk only if you are prepared to accept the consequences.
JDK wrote:A. Is there a point at which serving officer in the military of a democracy can see that the strategy is wrong, and how should they critique it?
In general, they should voice their concerns through correct channels. If the General officer level doesn't take action, then they pick up their crayons and begin to color. Officers at the Tactical level (in terms of the three tiers -- strategic, operational, and tactica) which the O-5s and O-6s in this case, do not always have the view from the higher levels.
There is a case study that we did in my officer training (that I wish I could remember the details of) which emphasizes this. It essentially put us in the position of an O-6 Group Commander level during the Vietnam war in which we get orders to fly a bunch of airplanes in a known hostile area. We're not there to bomb anything...just go fly into the threats and back.
Noting that this will probably cause our pilots un-due exposure to danger with no benefit, we participating in the exercise voice our concerns to the leadership, only to be told to do it anyway. As the exercise goes on, most of us get pretty angry at the waste of being ordered to fly jets to a point and back -- in a combat zone, getting shot at -- all for nothing. Many people choose to make Inspector General complaints, or outright disobey the order, or other things of the like (I don't think anyone offered to resign over it!).
Anyway, at the end of the excercise, we're "let in" on the strategic war plan, which was to have our airplanes go fly out over bad guy land to act as a diversion for the "real" mission, which was the POW rescue at Son Tay prison. A mission we were not authorized to know about because of the extremely high security around it.
The point of the exercise is that sometimes as a leader you're going to be given orders to follow that do not make sense. It's your duty to upchannel your concerns if you have them, but it's also your duty to salute smartly and execute them if you're again told to do it -- because you probably don't have "the big picture".
So...'what if' the 81 Wing's operations had a strategic purpose that Gp Capt Arthur did not know about. What if his "conclusion that the operations he was carrying out were not worthwhile" was FALSE because he didn't understand the bigger picture of operations being carried out in the Pacific.
JDK wrote:B. Is there a point, generally or specifically that an officer can say 'no more'? (Bearing in mind that the Nuremberg trials established a principle of individual responsibility. As we all know 'I was only following orders' is not a good enough defence.)
As others have pointed out, officers are legally obligated to disobey illegal orders. We recieve Law of Armed Combat training ad nauseum and are frequently told of the avenues to report it.
JDK wrote:C. Were you in the position of one of the officers in question, what would you have done differently and why, or do you think each person's actions were sensible?
As I desribed above, if I legitimately felt that the operations were not worthwhile, I'd loudly voice my concerns. Then, when I was told to 'shut up and color', I'd grab my crayons and go for it. The operations aren't illegal, so I have no legal foot to stand on in disobeying it.
JDK wrote:D. If, in your opinion, these men acted inappropriately, at what point and how should an officer decline to carry out orders?
If these officers felt so strongly about their conviction that they needed to disobey lawful orders, then they also need to realize that they will be held accountable for their actions under the military laws of their own country. In other words, take the risk only if you are prepared to accept the consequences.
Sat Nov 10, 2007 3:02 am
Walrus 7 wrote:But what is a true democracy when the civilian government uses the military for political means as noted in [2] above?
A true democracy is 51% mob rule determining what the other 49% will do. So far as I'm aware, this type of society hasn't existed in the western world in the last 60 years. Certainly not in Australia, the UK, or the US ever.
The military is ALWAYS used for political means. War is a tool used to achieve political objectives. The validity of those political objectives is always up for debate.