As the discussion regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki tends to polarise and stay that way, here's another little conundrum to consider.
In 1945 several experienced, commanding Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers tried to resign their commissions in protest at what they saw as particularly wasteful and essentially unproductive operations in a sideshow.
Briefly:
Quote:
In the latter stages of the war in the Pacific, the First Tactical Air Force (TAF) was based at Morotai. At this stage, General MacArthur was formulating a series of moves which aimed to free the southern Philippines, Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo of hostile forces. These actions were part of the overall Montclair plan. The main role of the RAAF's First TAF in these operations was the neutralization and destruction of the enemy and his installations, as well as assisting in the air defence of Morotai. (2) Before the OBOE Operations which commenced in May 1945 with the landing at Tarakan, this mainly comprised strafing ground targets and watercraft, and some dive-bombing. Although there were few enemy aircraft seen in the air, the enemy anti-aircraft defences were active and a number of aircraft were shot at. (3)
Group Captain Arthur of No 81 Wing, came to the conclusion that the operations he was carrying out were not worthwhile: that the returns were outweighed by the costs in almost every case. He asked his Intelligence Officer to put together what he called a Balance Sheet for his Wing's operations in order to quantify the benefits as opposed to the results. He took his balance sheet to the Air Officer Commanding, Air Commodore Cobby, and was disappointed that no official attention was given to it. He assumed that, because no action was taken to remedy the situation, there was something dishonest in the way the First TAF, in particular and the RAAF in general, were prosecuting the war.
Arthur mentioned his unease to a number of friends and colleagues who indicated support of his views and on 20 April 1945, Group Captain Wilfred Arthur, Group Captain Clive Caldwell, Wing Commander Kenneth Ranger, Wing Commander Robert Gibbes, Squadron Leader John Waddy, Squadron Leader Bert Grace, Squadron Leader Douglas Vanderfield and Squadron Leader Stuart Harpham applied for permission to resign. Subsequent to this action, an Inquiry was held to investigate the resignations, as well as other matters. This was conducted by John Vincent William Barry KC.
That is the "mutiny" in a nutshell...
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/%22Cleani ... 0123162109
More and a better layout here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morotai_Mutiny
Bear in mind the officers in question were all highly experienced and competent leaders and fighters. Cobby, their line commander was a W.W.I ace, and also respected for his achievements. Cowardice or personal safety was not an issue. The legal concept of 'mutiny' was also not really the situation either, but it's a good summary.
Several times in the atomic bomb discussions people have (understandably) mentioned the point of 'bringing the boys back home, alive, as soon as possible'. This was the issue here, as the RAAF officers saw it - they were not shortening the war, they were 'wasting' their pilots lives, and for what at best was regarded as a sideshow.
In the background was a disgraceful feud being conducted by two senior RAAF officer (Bostock and Jones) and there was significant belief that MacArthur was ensuring that he chose particular units and forces for glory jobs and publicity, and relegated others to unimportant, hard, dirty work with little credit or understanding. USMC aviators and RAAF aircrew were among the people who believed they were sidelined in favour of MacArthur's favourites. Non US forces found it hard to be recognised and rarely got the high profiles jobs.
History shows that many of these 1945 operations were, indeed unimportant in the resolution of the war, even without the advent of the bomb. On the other hand it is an unarguable military principle that you need to apply force to the enemy at all times and where possible to make his resistance more difficult. But what price should you accept for these secondary actions?
A. Is there a point at which serving officer in the military of a democracy can see that the strategy is wrong, and how should they critique it?
B. Is there a point, generally or specifically that an officer can say 'no more'? (Bearing in mind that the Nuremberg trials established a principle of individual responsibility. As we all know 'I was only following orders' is not a good enough defence.)
C. Were you in the position of one of the officers in question, what would you have done differently and why, or do you think each person's actions were sensible?
D. If, in your opinion, these men acted inappropriately, at what point and how should an officer decline to carry out orders?
E. Anything else...
This isn't an anti-MacArthur item, or a critique of any person, but looking at the actions of various men in a tricky situation - everyone involved can legitimately point to a good record. However, it is one of those dilemmas which are difficult to decide, unequivocally, IMHO.
Just a historical episode for discussion - what d'you think (input from current or ex- service people welcome.)
Cheers,