Warbird Information Exchange

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I continue to see references to "if Boeing hadn't bribed.."...

As I've stated before, the one thing I very much resent is my hard earned dollars are being taken as taxes to send my dollars overseas to purchase an aircraft that could be a bargaining chip down the road, and when we need spares or engineering and EADS gives the Pentagon the equivalant of John Cleeses rant from the castle in "Holy Grail'.

Whatever the outcome, my children and grandchildren will have to suffer the fruits of this decision

The Tanker Decision.

Oversized aircraft, oversized costs.

It doesn’t add up.

Chart Caption: As compared to the KC-767. Analysis based on publicly available and Boeing data.

The U.S. Air Force KC-X tanker competition set out to replace aging, medium-sized KC-135 tankers. The requirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP) were, first and foremost, aimed at providing a refueling offload capability comparable to that of the KC-135, while also incorporating features to improve operational flexibility. The goal was not to procure the largest tanker, but instead, to identify the right-sized tanker to give the warfighter the most capable aircraft for the air-refueling mission with the lowest total costs. But the right-sized aircraft was not selected. The Northrop Grumman/European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company KC-30 was chosen over the Boeing KC-767, even though it’s an oversized, less capable aircraft costing billions more to operate. It doesn’t add up.

Let’s look at the facts.

What Size Tanker is the Optimal-Sized Tanker? The Air Force Statement of Objectives for the KC-X reiterated that its primary mission is refueling aircraft. Enhanced mission capabilities including airlift and survivability were also requested. However, the Air Force stated publicly it did not want to buy a cargo airplane that was also a tanker or a passenger airplane that was also a tanker. It wanted an aircraft ideally suited to the air refueling mission. Furthermore, the RFP stated that no additional credit would be given for exceeding key performance requirements. Why not exceed the requirements? Because the larger you make a tanker, the more costly and less efficient it becomes. It burns more fuel, it’s more difficult to deploy, it costs more to house, operate and maintain. Still, the KC-30 was selected despite being more than twice the size of the KC-135 and more costly and less capable than the KC-767. It doesn’t add up.

Offload Capacity or Wasted Capacity? The Air Force KC-X fuel offload requirement at 1,000 nautical miles was 94,000 pounds, a requirement that the KC-767 exceeded by 20%. However, the fuel capacity of the KC-30 exceeds this requirement by 50%. How useful is the additional capacity? Historical data as well as the operational scenarios in the KC-X competition predicted average offloads per mission for both aircraft between 60,000-70,000 pounds. In other words, nearly two-thirds of the capacity of the KC-30 does not serve the air refueling mission--and brings with it enormous excess weight and therefore significantly higher operating costs. It doesn’t add up.

Bigger or Better? The Northrop Grumman/EADS KC-30 can carry more passengers and more pallets of cargo than the Boeing KC-767. Isn’t that a plus? Actually, it’s a very big negative. Consider first that in 2006, the Air Force moved less than 1% of their cargo and passengers with tankers. In fact, the Air Force RFP set no cargo or passenger threshold requirements for the KC-X tanker. Secondly, the KC-767 carries twice as many passengers and more than three times as many cargo pallets as the KC-135 tanker it would replace, more than enough capacity to fulfill any real-world tanker airlift mission. And because it has a true cargo floor, the KC-767 can carry approximately the same cargo weight as the much larger KC-30. The KC-767 provides all this capability without the additional $49 billion in total life cycle costs required by the fleet of larger, less efficient KC-30s. It doesn’t add up.

The facts are clear. In not selecting the more capable, optimal-sized KC-767, the warfighter and taxpayer get an oversized aircraft with oversized costs. This is not new information. In 2002, when first comparing the KC-30 platform (then called the KC-330) to the KC-767, an Air Force report concluded, "…the size difference of the EADS-proposed KC-330 results in an 81% larger ground footprint compared to the KC-135E it would replace, whereas the Boeing 767 is only 29% larger. The KC-330 increase in size does not bring with it a commensurate increase in available air-refueling offload. Finally, the EADS aircraft would demand a greater infrastructure investment and dramatically limits the aircraft’s ability to operate effectively in worldwide deployment." It’s a decision that doesn’t add up. And one that should not stand.

No, the point isn't getting missed. We don't need more KC-10s. We need a KC-135 replacement. The KC-10 is too big for many airports and it's fuel capability compared to its size and weight are not ideal. It is a true mutli-role aircraft, okay at everything, good at nothing. As such, the USAF issued an RFP for a KC-135 replacement, not a KC-10 replacement. What we have (at least for now) is a replacement for neither. It's bigger than the KC-10 and doesn't fill the role of the KC-135.