Congressman Tiahrt petition re: KC-X Tanker

skymstr02 · **Posted:** Wed May 28, 2008 2:38 pm

Northrop Grumman KC-45: Why We Won -- Key Selection Criteria
Highlighting reasons the U.S. Air Force selected the KC-45 Tanker as best for our men and women in uniform.
WASHINGTON, May 19, 2008 (PRIME NEWSWIRE) -- The U.S. Air Force found Northrop Grumman Corporation's (NYSE:NOC) bid to build the next generation of aerial refueling tankers superior to Boeing's in four of the five most important selection criteria. Despite this fact, the losing bidder wants the Government Accountability Office to overturn the Air Force decision to award the contract to Northrop Grumman even though the Air Force conducted what even Boeing described as a fair, open and transparent bidding process. Here is another reason Northrop Grumman won, drawn from a list of facts included in a redacted version of a protected Air Force selection document.

Key Selection Criteria

The Air Force analyzed the competing bids for the KC-X using five factors: Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance, Cost/Price, and an Integrated Fleet Air Refueling Assessment (an analysis of tanker performance in a realistic global conflict scenario). Northrop Grumman won in four out of the five categories, and the two companies tied on the fifth (Proposal Risk). That's why the Air Force concluded, as it explained in a document outlining its decision that it provided to both companies, "Northrop Grumman Corporation's proposal offered the best overall value to the government. Northrop Grumman's proposal meets or exceeds the Air Force's requirements, as stated in the Request For Proposal (RFP)."

In Mission Capability, the Air Force focused on aerial refueling and airlift -- refueling receivers and transporting cargo, troops, and wounded soldiers to and from the battle theater. An Air Force document provided to both companies shows the KC-45 enjoyed a two-to-one advantage on key discriminators in these categories. In refueling, the Air Force concluded that compared to the KC-767, the KC-45:

* Could deliver more fuel at greater ranges (30 percent more at 1,000 nautical mile (nm) radius)

* Was more fuel efficient (6 percent at 1,000 nm radius)

* Could perform more refueling operations faster

* Featured a larger boom envelope twice the size of its competitor

* Could takeoff with more fuel from a 7,000-foot runway.

In airlift, the KC-45 could:

* Transport more cargo pallets (32 versus 19)

* Carry more passengers and patients

* Met the Air Force's ferry range requirement of 9,500 nm (the KC-767 did not)

The Air Force concluded that the KC-45 "Offers significant advantage in the important areas of aerial refueling and airlift, and represents superior value to the government."

A contractor's track record is a critical element when the Air Force makes contracting decisions. Can the bidder come in on time and on budget? On Past Performance, in the key sub-factor of program management, Northrop Grumman was assigned a "moderate" risk rating, while Boeing received a rating of "little confidence." As the Air Force guidelines state, "Substantial doubt exists the offeror will successfully perform the required effort." The reasons behind this assessment were redacted for business competition reasons, but the public record is clear that Boeing is behind schedule on delivering tankers to Italy and Japan.

On Cost/Price, Northrop Grumman's development plans were assigned a lower risk/cost than Boeing, because Northrop Grumman's proposed aircraft and boom had already been built, flown and tested. Boeing's proposed version of the KC-767, which was significantly different from the less capable tanker sold to Japan and Italy, had not been built, flown or tested - and thus its development effort was assigned both higher risk/cost. For production, the Air Force concluded the KC-45 required "Substantially less funds required to develop and buy first 68 aircraft." By contrast, Boeing was rated as moderate risk because "Some difference exists between the offeror's proposed cost/price and the government's probable cost/price," and that those discrepancies had not been "reasonably explained." The overall life cycle cost for both tanker aircraft, which includes the cost of development, production, military construction and operating costs, were the same. The government concluded that "Northrop Grumman's more advantageous cost/price proposal was a discriminator in its decision to choose the KC-45."

In the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment, the government analyzed each competing tanker's operational capability. To do so, the Air Force simulated the operations of a KC-45 and KC-767 fleet in a highly realistic global conflict scenario using a verified and validated Air Force simulation tool. The tankers had to fly missions operating from real-world bases in a range of demanding roles. The simulation factored in the complex interactions of aircraft performance characteristics using ramp space constraints, real-world runway and ramp strengths, varying distances to multiple refueling orbits, and high levels of refueling demand. The KC-45 provided superior operational performance in realistic combat scenarios and was able to execute the operations using 22 fewer aircraft than the KC-767. This was "An efficiency of significant value" to the government.

Overall, the Air Force's rigorous analysis of the two competing tanker aircraft concluded that the government had more confidence in Northrop Grumman to provide a KC-45 with significantly more capability with multiple cost advantages. And that is why the Air Force picked the superior KC-45.

About the KC-45

The KC-45 Tanker aircraft will be assembled in Mobile, Ala., and the KC-45 team will employ 48,000 American workers at 230 U.S. companies in 49 states. It will be built by a world-class industrial team led by Northrop Grumman, and includes EADS North America, General Electric Aviation and Sargent Fletcher.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense and technology company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in information and services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers worldwide.

-----------------------

Highlights

* KC-30B forms the baseline for Northrop Grumman's KC-30 offering in the U.S. Air Force's KC-X competition

* Australian program milestone further reduces risk in the integration of the refueling system and directly benefits the KC-30

* Australia and the United Arab Emirates have selected an aerial refueling configuration similar to that proposed by Northrop Grumman in the KC-X competition

Highlights

* KC-30B forms the baseline for Northrop Grumman's KC-30 offering in the U.S. Air Force's KC-X competition

* Australian program milestone further reduces risk in the integration of the refueling system and directly benefits the KC-30

* Australia and the United Arab Emirates have selected an aerial refueling configuration similar to that proposed by Northrop Grumman in the KC-X competition

CONTACT: Randy Belote
(703) 875-8525
randy.belote@ngc.com

Tim Paynter
(321) 961-1101
tim.paynter@ngc.com

bdk · **Joined:** Sun May 02, 2004 1:16 am **Posts:** 11319

Quote:

TANKER CONTROVERSY: QUESTIONS THE AIR FORCE MUST ANSWER
by Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

It is now three months since the Air Force shocked the world by awarding the contract for its next-generation aerial-refueling tanker to Northrop Grumman and the European parent of Airbus. Throughout that time, service officials have insisted that the process by which the winner was chosen was transparent and fair. But the service has failed to answer even the most basic questions about how the decision was made to deny the contract to Boeing, the widely favored incumbent. The Government Accountability Office is expected to issue a ruling on Boeing's protest of the outcome in mid-June. Whatever it finds, the Air Force has some explaining to do...
1. The Air Force says it would cost roughly the same amount to develop, manufacture and operate 179 next-generation tankers, regardless of whether they are based on the Boeing 767 or the Airbus A330. But the Airbus plane is 27% heavier than the Boeing plane, and burns over a ton more fuel per flight hour. With fuel prices headed for the upper stratosphere, how can both planes cost the same amount to build and operate over their lifetimes?
2. The Air Force says it would be equally risky to develop the Boeing tanker or the Airbus tanker -- after forcing Boeing to substantially increase the time and money required to develop its version. But Boeing proposed to build its tanker on the same assembly line where it has already constructed hundreds of the same airframe, whereas Airbus proposes to build its tanker at a plant and with a workforce that don't yet exist in Alabama. How can the risks be equal?
3. The Air Force says that a computerized simulation of how the competing tankers would function in an actual wartime scenario strongly favored the larger Airbus plane. But the simulation assumed longer runways, stronger asphalt and more parking space than actually exists at forward bases, and failed to consider the consequences of losing bases in wartime. How can such unrealistic assumptions be relevant to the selection of a next-generation tanker?
4. The Air Force says the Northrop-Airbus team received higher ratings on past performance than the Boeing team, based on a review of programs deemed similar to the future tanker. But Boeing built all 600 of the tankers in the current Air Force fleet, whereas Northrop and Airbus have never delivered a single tanker equipped with the refueling boom the Air Force requires. How can Northrop and Airbus have superior past performance?
I could go on. The Air Force refused to consider Boeing cost data based on 10,000,000 hours of operating the commercial version of the 767, substituting instead repair costs based on the 50-year-old KC-135 tanker. It said it would not award extra points for exceeding key performance objectives, and then proceeded to award extra points. It said it wanted to acquire a "medium" tanker to replace its cold war refueling planes, and ended up picking a plane twice as big.
Whatever else this process may have been, it definitely was not transparent. Even now, neither of the competing teams really understands why the competition turned out the way it did. It would be nice to hear from the Air Force about how key tradeoffs were made, because at present it looks like a double standard prevailed in the evaluation of the planes offered by the two teams.

bdk · **Joined:** Sun May 02, 2004 1:16 am **Posts:** 11319

Hmmmm.... I wonder if Boeing was asked to compete for this purchase?

Quote:

France Upgrades Presidential Aircraft
New York Times 06/12/2008
Author: Reuters
c. 2008 New York Times Company

PARIS (Reuters) — President Nicolas Sarkozy of France will have his own version of Air Force One as part of an upgrade to the presidential fleet of aircraft announced on Wednesday.

The Airbus A330 model chosen for Mr. Sarkozy’s use costs $175 million when sold to airlines and has twice the range of the aging short-haul A319 planes and business jets now in use by government officials.

The limitations of the existing fleet caused embarrassment on Mr. Sarkozy’s first official trip to China last year, when his A319 had to make a refueling stop in Siberia, while journalists flew nonstop on a much larger A340.

A government spokesman, Luc Chatel, said some of the government’s planes had been in service for 30 years. “The maintenance cost of the planes means renewing them is less expensive,” he said.

He did not say whether the A330 would be purchased new. The newspaper Libération said a used model would be acquired and refitted to have a presidential office and sleeping quarters.

skymstr02 · **Posted:** Thu Jun 12, 2008 11:07 am

bdk wrote:

Hmmmm.... I wonder if Boeing was asked to compete for this purchase?

It doesn't matter, EADS did not bid on the KC-X Tanker, Northrop Grumman did. And Boeing did.

I think that the French Presidents aircraft was most probably a sole source contract. Nothing is written that contracts must be competitively bid.

bdk · **Joined:** Sun May 02, 2004 1:16 am **Posts:** 11319

skymstr02 wrote:

bdk wrote:

Hmmmm.... I wonder if Boeing was asked to compete for this purchase?

It doesn't matter, EADS did not bid on the KC-X Tanker, Northrop Grumman did.

Sure they did! Northrop Grumman is only a middleman in the deal. Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't EADS bid and lose on one of the previous tanker contract proposals?

skymstr02 wrote:

I think that the French Presidents aircraft was most probably a sole source contract. Nothing is written that contracts must be competitively bid.

So isn't that a government funded handout to EADS? Seems similar to what the EU is complaining about (the US government giving "subsidies" to Boeing).

skymstr02 · **Posted:** Thu Jun 12, 2008 2:32 pm

bdk wrote:

So isn't that a government funded handout to EADS? Seems similar to what the EU is complaining about (the US government giving "subsidies" to Boeing).

So, from what you are saying, the US Government is subsidizing Boeing every time that it contracts for an F/A-18 for either domestic or FMS, and each P-8, each T-45, each C-17.

When the USAF needs more MQ-9 UAV's, they aren't competitively bid, General Atomics is the only contractor contacted to see if they want the business, its a sole source, indefinite quantity provider. Is that subsidizing General Atomics?

When the Marines or Army needs more Hummvee's, they have to go to Hummer because nobody else can build them, is that subsidizing General Motors?

When the Government needs another batch of Sidewinders, Raytheon is a sole source provider, isn't that subsidizing Raytheon?

CAPFlyer · **Posted:** Thu Jun 12, 2008 4:11 pm

No, you're talking about apples and oranges. The French president's plane is a new aircraft, not a continuation of an existing programme.

That is the issue. When the DoD goes to any of those you listed, they competitively bid on the original program and won the sole source contract for future orders of that product. What the French just did is purchased a new product without a compeition for the contract.

Now, I won't necessarily say they were wrong because the DoD does that occasionally as well for smaller contracts where a need is identified and an "off the shelf" solution is known to already exist, but for a big contract, there are rules preventing them from giving non-competitive bid awards depending on what it's for.

skymstr02 · **Posted:** Fri Jun 13, 2008 7:24 am

Like you said, apples to oranges. The procurement rules are different from the US and other Governments. I have not seen the RFP for the French contract, but it is conceivable that one of the prerequesits is that it be domestically built.

Mike Bates · **Posted:** Wed Jun 18, 2008 12:54 pm

GOA side with Boeing.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/busin ... f=business

Mike

bdk · **Joined:** Sun May 02, 2004 1:16 am **Posts:** 11319

Here's an opinion from a guy that ought to know!

Quote:

Op-Ed: Let's solve the tanker mess
BY: Gen. John Handy (ret.), Human Events
07/07/2008

Most of us in the Air Force mobility community were a bit surprised by the decision to buy the quite large Airbus-330 tanker instead of the smaller Boeing 767 tanker. But the real shock was in the unusually harsh language used by the Government Accountability Office in overturning that decision. It was the harshest language used to overturn an action by the Air Forces choice that I have read in my entire career.

In that career -- spanning 39 years in the Air Force -- I was fortunate enough to have been the Commander of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) from November 2001 until retiring from the Air Force in October 2005.

I devoted many years to the operation of air refueling tankers in support of the hundreds of other aircraft and tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and Coast Guardsmen who depend on them to create the “air bridge” that enables American forces and relief supplies to reach any corner of the world in only a few hours. Without the tankers performing when and where needed, America would not -- quite literally -- be a “superpower.”

In the many challenges we faced in those years, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in TRANSCOM pulled together as a joint team to get the job done on a daily basis throughout the entire time I was blessed to be their commander. We engaged in multiple crises around the world -- humanitarian disasters as well as significant military conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The most serious limitation we had was our equipment: the shortage of adequate mobility assets -- meaning airlift and air refueling aircraft. First among those problems was then, and is now, the tankers.

I spoke about the air refueling tanker age and shortages on a routine basis with anyone who would listen. And I did so in the context of the other requirement those badly needed assets would support which includes virtually everything the armed services have to move from one place to another that can be loaded onto an airplane.

The shocking language of the GAO decision compels me to do something I’ve never done before: to speak out publicly. I am not employed by either Boeing or Northrop-Grumman. But the service I’ve devoted most of my life to appears to need a bit of help.

Somewhere in the acquisition process, it is obvious to me that someone lost sight of the requirement. Based on what the GAO decided, it’s up to people such as myself to remind everyone of the warfighter requirement for a modern air refueling tanker aircraft.

Recall that we started this acquisition process in order to replace the Eisenhower era KC-135 aircraft with a modern version capable of accomplishing everything the current fleet does plus additional needs for the future. Thus the required aircraft is of small to medium size much like the KC-135. Not a very large aircraft like the current KC-10, which may be replaced later with a comparably large aircraft.

Why a smaller to medium size aircraft? Because, first of all, you want tankers to deploy in sufficient numbers in order to accomplish all assigned tasks. You need to bed them down on the maximum number of airfields around the world along with or close to the customer -- airborne fighters, bombers and other mobility assets in need of fuel close to or right over the fight or crisis. This allows the supported combatant commander the ability to conduct effective operations around the clock. The impact of more tankers is more refueling booms in the sky, more refueling orbits covered, wider geographic coverage, more aircraft refueled, and more fuel provided. A “KC-135 like” aircraft takes up far less ramp space, is far more maneuverable on the ground and does not have the risk of jet blast reorganizing your entire ramp when engine power is applied.

The second requirement is survivability. The aircraft and crew must be able to compete in a threat environment that contains enhanced surface to air missiles and other significant threats. The crew must receive superior situational awareness to include automatic route planning and re-routing and steering cues to avoid those threats. They must have maximum armor protection, fuel tank explosion protection and world class chemical/biological protection. All of this means the warfighter has the requirement for a large number of highly flexible and survivable air refueling aircraft.

I also want the acquired aircraft to be integrated with the current defense transportation system. That means 463L compatible pallets; floor loaded on a freighter capable floor all compatible with the current modern airlift fleet. When I put passenger seats in this aircraft, I want to be able to use existing airlift aircraft seats and pallets. When tasked with our precious aero medical mission, I want to be able to use integral medical crew seats, onboard oxygen generation systems, more outlets and be able to use the USAF patient support pallet. I do not want to harness the USAF with the problem of going out to acquire unique assets due to a more radically sized and equipped tanker aircraft.

Now, if you look at these rather simple requirements and look at the previous offerings from industry, you might agree with me that the KC-767 more closely meets these needs than the competition. If that’s what the warfighters need, that’s what they should get.

My purpose is only to help select the right aircraft that meets the warfighter’s requirements. It is not anything else. With that thought in mind, the KC-767 -- or another that is the same size and has the same capabilities -- is the right aircraft for the USAF. Now let’s see what the new leadership of the Air Force does to obtain the right aircraft for the warfighter.

Ztex · **Posted:** Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:34 pm

The Pentagon will reopen a $35 billion aerial tanker bid process to build the Air Force's fleet after the process that picked Northrop Grumman and EADS (European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Co, NV) over Boeing was determined to be flawed. Boeing protested that the Air Force modified their requirement after the bid publication and shared info only with one bidder to improve that bidder's bid. Two top USAF officer's have already taken forced retirement as a result.

The General Accounting Office in June stated Boeing might have won had the USAF not made mistakes in evaluating the bids. The Pentagon will now oversee the reopened bidding, not the USAF.

http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewContent.act?tag=3.5721%3Ficx_id=D91QPUP00

cco23i · **Posted:** Sat Jul 12, 2008 3:35 pm

Well as I work on KC-135R's I have an interest in this "battle". All the pilot's I know all said they "sooner retire or quit before they fly a foreign built airframe. The thing that worries me is like the C-160 the Germans and French fly, the French cannot get spare parts from the German plant as they are pissed at each other. Hell, what happens if we piss France off and next thing you know we have a bunch of REALLY EXPENSIVE STATIC DISPLAYS!! Just the thought of a crechief.

Scott

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Congressman Tiahrt petition re: KC-X Tanker

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