Hi Brad,
Again thanks for your insight and input, and not least your work at the moment. Well done mate.
Brad wrote:
I'm not sure I meant for that comment to be taken literally. What I meant was that all the airplanes were controlled by the military. How much was British and how much was American or what percentage was civilian aircraft, I'm not sure. I never really thought about it. The logistical control of the situation was probably 100% handled by the military or the respective governments.
Fair comment again, and I wasn't disagreeing with your original (good) point. I think it's fair to say that the early stages of the Berlin airlift were difficult and confused - I don't know who provided ATC at the Berlin airports (and of course there was no ATC for the marine aircraft) and it was clear that (
exactly like Haiti) there was a drive from an initial mixed input with diverse aircraft and nightmare logistics towards streamlining and simplifying. Today aircraft and infrastructures are more capable and able to do more in wider conditions than they could then, as well as the greater scale of the Haiti effort today. Just like Haiti, the Berlin guys didn't know what would happen next, and while our 20/20 hindsight tells us that, it only happened that way due to a terrific effort.
Another critical point is that when they started the Berlin effort they didn't know if that airbridge
could actually work, and it was starvation level rations for the Berliners, initially at least. While there are major challanges, I don't think there was any doubt that the Haiti airlift would have a major effect - in fact some of the concerns arise from the fact that - as you've said - getting the aircraft there isn't the issue, it's managing at a very crippled and small infrastructure airport, and bringing in infrastructure for distribution and repair as well.
Quote:
I've never spent a lot of time studying the Berlin Airlift but I understand the basics of it. The biggest difference I see is the kind of stuff that we carried to Berlin versus Haiti. In Germany, we (meaning all airlifters) were taking in the stuff needed to sustain life. Mostly food, water, coal, medical supplies and such. In Haiti, we are taking in all of that, in additon to a lot of items the military needs to set up security and much of the infrastructure needed to deliver supplies. We are also taking in the machines needed to "undo" a lot of the damage that has been done by the earthquakes. In short, the future of Haiti is coming in on boats and planes.
Absolutely.
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West Berlin and a large percentage of it's occupants would probably survived without the airlift (going on the assumption that an agreement between the allies and communists could be reached to avoid starvation)
That's a big assumption, however. What 'might have happened' in history is a tricky area to venture into, but I see
no doubt, based on Stalin's other actions that he would cheerfully have let the West Berliners all die of starvation. (An example is the Red Army halt before the Warsaw Uprising to enable the Germans to erase much of that Polish resistance and city, for one.
That was one airlift that failed, through no lack of effort by the Western Allies, or the brave aircrew*. Stalin had no problem with wiping out thousands - millions if he could - of his own people let alone a former enemy.) The only 'agreement' likely to have been reached would have been for the Western Powers to give the whole of Berlin to Stalin, and what point of starvation they'd have done that we (thankfully) don't know. The minimum would have been substantial numbers of dead and debilitated and a communist controlled Berlin.
There's no question of the remarkable effort into Haiti, and people do tend to think bigger or better (or smaller or worse) is implicit in discussing historical comparisons to inform today's events. That's not my intent, and I'd hope most would agree that just like Brad, Tom and the others who are making a huge difference today, the aircrews of the Berlin and Warsaw airlifts deserve as much credit for
their attempts to redirect history, as we agree today's airlift crews deserve massive thanks.
Regards,
*See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_UprisingQuote:
Nevertheless, from August 1943 to July 1944, over 200 Royal Air Force (RAF) flights dropped an estimated 146 Polish personnel trained in Great Britain, over 4000 containers of supplies, and $16 million in banknotes and gold to the Home Army.[87]
The only support operation which ran continuously for the duration of the Uprising were night supply drops by long-range planes of the RAF, other British Commonwealth air forces, and units of the Polish Air Force, which had to use distant airfields in Italy, reducing the amount of supplies they could carry. The RAF made 223 sorties and lost 34 aircraft. The effect of these airdrops was mostly psychological—they delivered too few supplies for the needs of the insurgents, and many airdrops landed outside insurgent-controlled territory.
“There was no difficulty in finding Warsaw. It was visible from 100 kilometers away. The city was in flames and with so many huge fires burning, it was almost impossible to pick up the target marker flares.”
—William Fairly, a South African pilot, from an interview in 1982[88]
From 4 August the Western Allies began supporting the Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies.[89] Initially the flights were carried out mostly by the 1568th Polish Flight of the Polish Air Force stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy, flying B-24 Liberator, Handley Page Halifax and Douglas C-47 Dakota planes. Later on, at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile, they were joined by the Liberators of 2 Wing –No. 31 and No. 34 Squadrons of the South African Air Force based at Foggia in Southern Italy, and Halifaxes, flown by No. 148 and No. 178 RAF Squadrons. The drops by British, Polish and South African forces continued until 21 September. The total weight of allied drops varies according to source (104 tons,[90] 230 tons[89] or 239 tons[10]), over 200 flights were made.[91]
...by denying landing rights to Allied aircraft on Soviet-controlled territory the Soviets vastly limited effectiveness of Allied assistance to the Uprising, and even fired at Allied airplanes which carried supplies from Italy and strayed into Soviet-controlled airspace.[88]
...
The Red Army's order to halt just a short distance away on the right bank of the Vistula, and not to link up with or in any way assist the Resistance forces, is blamed on post-war political considerations and malice by Stalin.[10] According to this opinion, by ordering his forces to halt before entering the city, Stalin ensured that the Home Army would not succeed. Had the Home Army triumphed, the Polish government-in-exile would have increased their political and moral legitimacy to reinstate a government of its own, rather than accept a Soviet regime. The destruction of Polish resistance guaranteed that they could not resist Soviet occupation, that it would be the Soviets who "liberated" Warsaw, and that Soviet influence would prevail over Poland.[10]
Again, one can see parallels (and clues to possible plans) between Stalin's calculations regarding Warsaw and Poland and his intent, therefore, in post-war Germany towards Berlin.
All very interesting. IMHO.
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He's a short little fireplug lookin guy, probably still sporting a bruise on his cheek from a run in with a pallet jack.