I just got back from another trip to Maxwell AFB and the Air Force Historical Research Agency. I scanned about 3,000 pages of reports from 1967-1969. Here is a (long) and beautiful tidbit from one of the reports at the deactivation of the 609th and the A-26s from SEA: ========================================= December, 1969 609th Special Operations Squadron:
This quarter marked the end of one of the 56th Special Operations Wing's most active tactical squadrons and the end of another era for a USAF aircraft, the A-26. On 1 December the 6o9th Special Operations Squadron was deactivated after more than two years of active service with the wing. It was activated in August 1967.
The A-26s tour of duty with the 56th Special Operations Wing began nearly a year earlier as eight B-26s (as the A-26s were formerly known) were deployed TDY to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB under operation "BIG EAGLE". The B-26s were then redesignated A-26s.
Their operations proved so successful that they were kept on a permanent basis. In January 1967, the A-26s were merged with the 606th Air Commando Squadron (now Special Operations Squadron). As their mission grew, the Nimrods gradually acquired more crews and aircraft. By December 1968, the 609th had a total of 18 aircraft.
In the slightly more than two years of its existence, the 609th flew 7,159 combat sorties for a total of 19,762.7 combat flying hours. During this period, the Nimrods were credited with destroying 4,268 trucks and damaging 696 more. The Nimrods also destroyed 201 enemy gun positions and silenced an additional 696. This extremely high truck kill record, averaged slightly better than one truck destroyed or damaged for each one and one-half sortie flown. This was significantly higher than any other weapon system currently in use in the Southeast Asian Theater.
The 609th was first commanded by Lt. Col. Howard L. Farmer, who was followed in this capacity by Lieutenant Colonels Allen F. Learmonth, Robert E. Brumm, John J. Shippey, Atlee R. Ellis, Robert L. Schultz, Robert w. Stout and Jackie R. Douglas.
The primary mission of the 609th Special Operations Squadron in their association with the 56th Special Operations Wing was to conduct combat operations as directed. They were also fragged to fly armed reconnaissance, flare support, and FAC missions to disrupt and harass enemy lines of communications and supply by attacking or directing attacks on pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity in BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER NORTH, and STEEL TIGERSOUTH areas of Laos.
During October of this quarter, activity increased for the Nimrods with a 700 per cent increase in strikes against trucks. Most of this truck activity was in the STEEL TIGER portion of Laos. Consequently, an ever increasing number of the squadrons sorties were flown in this area.
The Nimrods continued to lend support to the friendly ground forces in Laos, with 18 per cent of their missions being utilized for this purpose. The use of Nimrods for this close air support posed somewhat of a problem as a squadron policy dictated that new crews (those with less than 30 missions) could not be used for close air support. This policy was instituted to allow the new crews to become accustomed to striking in combat situations, and thereby lessen the possibility of a short round. There were no new problems encountered during the month; however, some recurrent problems reappeared. On 23October, Nimrod 22 and 23 were sent by MOONBEAM to 130/62/93 against troops in contact. Knowing that this area was in BARREL ROLL west, and hence, not validated for napalm, the Nimrods advised MOONBEAM that 22 was carrying six napalm and only two hard bombs. MOONBEAM told them to go anyway, drop the two hards and then come back out over the trail to get rid of his napalm.
A similar incident occurred on 25 October. As Nimrod 32 and 33 climbed out enroute to BARREL ROLL they were called by a Candlestick and advised that another Candle had spotted 15 trucks in STEEL TIGER NORTH, but was unable to get any ordnance.
The Nimrods contacted ALLCCAT with their request for diversion to the Candle, but their request was turned down, as they were "really needed" in the BARREL. Once in the BARREL, they were first held for 20 minutes, and then sent to a BLIND BAlT FAC., who didn't have any active targets, but would put them in on their secondary target.
Enroute to BLINDBAT, the Nimrods heard that LULU, one of the FACs., was in trouble and needed help. Again, the Nimrods volunteered., but again their request was denied, as "napalm was not allowed on troops in contact”. Since this was contrary to the briefed Rules of Engagement, the Nimrods questioned this statement, but to no avail.
Finally, just as they were about to strike their fragged secondary target, ALLEYCAT called to say that they couldn't. strike that target either, as it wasn't validated for napalm. By this time the Nimrods were low on fuel so BLINDBAT found a 'truck' on the road so that they could get rid of their ordnance and go home.
One of the most frustrating problems that the Nimrods encountered was to be working a target, especially trucks, and then be pulled off so that some flights of jets that were bingo fuel could come in and strike. This proved to be the case on 25 October for Nimrods 22 and 23 after they had trapped 25 trucks by interdicting the road on both ends of the convoy, they were pulled off the target three times for fast mover flights.
Another problem was caused by the high traffic density in the strike areas. On 18 October Nimrods 34 and 35 were in the BARREL ROLL. ETHAN, the airborne radar control for that area had the Nimrods and another flight at the same location and altitude, passing head on. ETHAN gave no warning to either flight.
On 19 October, Nimrod 37 almost shot down a fastmover with his rockets, as he rolled in on a target. TheF-4 flew through the strike area twice.
The top BDA for the month was recorded by Nimrod 30piloted by Maj. Charles Bate and Nimrod 31, piloted by Major Keller. On 21 October they destroyed 15 military structures and damaged 20. Major Koyn, in Nimrod 22, destroyed four trucks on 30 October.
During October, due to an extreme shortage ofM-1A4 fragmentation bombs, or the lack of a suitable substitute, Nimrod aircraft were loaded with one-half full, or even empty bomb bays for the last ten days of the month. The long awaited M-35-36 incendiary weapons arrived during this period; unfortunately, they were not certified for use on the A-26 aircraft.
In November, the wing received instructions from CINCPACAF directing them that 14 A-26 aircraft would be maintained in flyable storage at Clark AB, PI to await further disposition instructions. CINCPACAF also informed the wing that a spares kit for the 14 aircraft would also be required. Truck activity increased sharply in STEEL TIGER during the first nine days of November. The squadron struck at only three less trucks than during the entire month of October.
The squadron truck kill was identical with the October results, with 29 trucks destroyed and five trucks damaged. The 609th ceased combat operations on 10 November. Many of the same problems of the previous month remained with the squadron to the end. A problem has always existed with dud ordnance, but this problem reached a new high on 5 November when Nimrod 24 dropped eight dud napalms This high-dud rate was highly frustrating to the crews.
On 3 November, Nimrods 30,31,32, and 33 were all launched to missions to STEEL TIGER. Once in the area, each flight of Nimrods was held for more than two hours before being given a target to strike, hurried through the strike, and then hustled out of the way so that there wouldn’t be any A-26s in the way of the fast movers and AC-130gunships. This appeared to be a great waste of ordnance, especially considering the statistically superior strike efficiency of the A-26.
On 4 November, Nimrod 20, piloted by Major Bates was involved in a highly dangerous situation with a Night Owl F-4. During their strike against trucks, the Nimrods were shot at by an enemy anti-aircraft gun position. The Night Owl reacted to the gun without first determining if there were other aircraft already in the area. Consequently, the Night Owl started dropping flares directly through the Nimrod strike pattern.
Major Koyn, piloting Nimrod 20, had the best BDA results for the month. On 9 November, Major Koyn destroyed four trucks and silenced one 37mm gun position. Ground fire directed at the squadron's aircraft increased markedly during the month of November. There was a 250 per cent increase over the totals for the month of October, and the squadron new only nine days in November.
Upon deactivation of the 609th Special Operations Squadron, Lt. Gen. Francis c. Gideon, Thirteenth Air Force commander, sent the following message to Col Samuel E. Crosby Jr., 56th Special Operations Wing commander; and Lt. Col. Jackie R. Douglas, 609th commander:
The inactivation of the 609th Special Operations Squadron ends another significant chapter in the history of the 56th Special Operations Wing. Major contributions to our combat efforts in Southeast Asia were made through the dedication of every man in this fine organization. All of them - aircrew members and support personnel alike-share in the successful accomplishment of their important and difficult mission. Daily their professionalism and devotion to duty raised to ever higher levels those standards of excellence which have gained deserved recognition for this unit. Please convey my personal appreciation to the officers and men of the 609th Special Operations Squadron for the superior job they have done.
A similar message was sent by Brig. Gen Wendell L. Bevan Jr., Seventh Air Force Director of Combat Operations, who stated:
The day rapidly approaches when the 56th Special Operations Wing will lose one of the finest combat squadrons in SEA - the 609th SOS "Nimrods" - "A one of a kind" outfit- produced BDA under conditions where our more sophisticated weapons systems were stymied. Their loss, through deactivation on 10 November 1969, signals the end of an era for the grand old A-26 and the crews who flew it. The 609th can be justly proud of its participation in what history could well term "The Most Crucial Campaign in SEA'-" - that of our STEEL TIGER interdiction program. They literally "wrote the book" on how to kill trucks at night and in the most hostile AAA environment we have encountered. BDA statistics are of interest to everyone sitting in judgement of concepts, tactics, units, aircraft types, etc. The cumulative totals from May 68 thru October69 reflect 2,053 trucks destroyed, 304 trucks damaged,28 guns destroyed, 3,521 troops KBA, 6,655 secondary fires, and 7,145 secondary explosions from A-26 strikes. I consider these figures a true measure of the dedication and skill of the famed Nimrods.
Please convey to the 609th SOS my personal regrets over the deactivation of such a proud and professional organization. Their contributions to the goals and objectives of the USAF in SEA will be long remembered On 19 December, the wing was informed by CINCPACAF that the requirement to hold the A-26 aircraft for Indonesia no longer existed. Therefore, all fourteen A-26 aircraft which were temporarily assigned to Clark AB after being shuttled from NKP, would be returned to the CONUS and delivered171 to MASDC for reclamation.
The wing received another message from. Langley AFB, Va., the same day stating that ferry tanks would be required for the return trip to the CONUS. Because of the limited communications/navigation capability of the A-26 aircraft and the number of aircraft being delivered, they requested PACAF to provide an enroute support/escort aircraft, support kit and team to assist in delivery of the aircraft. The wing was in turn fragged for the job of ferrying the aircraft back to the states by providing nine crews, consisting of pilot, navigator and crew chief.
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